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The effect of energy on inequality and poverty is not well understood and its 
role in growth-inequality-poverty nexus has not been adequately studied. A 
country's energy mix can playa significant role in economic growth and 
poverty alleviation. Policy authorities and donors increasingly lend support to 
modem energy provision, especially Rural Electrification (RE). This thesis 
investigates which energy types contribute to poverty alleviation in South 
Africa and through what mechanisms. 
Theory indicates that poverty alleviation comes by growth boosting and 
inequality reducing policies. As such, the investigation of the pro-poor effects 
of any policy or factor would naturally culminate in studying the effects on 
economic growth (or production) and income distribution. Theory suggests 
endogeneity on one hand between energy and GDP and on the other between 
GDP and inequality. This necessitates a system of equations rather than the 
traditional single equations approach. There are other (South Africa-specific) 
reasons why the inequality-development relationship and the role of energy 
should be investigated. First, South Africa has been under-researched due to 
lack of data. Recent data released by the Presidency of South Africa (AMPS 
Dataset) makes such analysis possible. Secondly, the Kuznets' inequality-
development hypothesis can be tested with time series data rather than the 
cross-section analyses found in earlier literature. Third, energy's role in 
economic growth or production has been analysed with aggregate energy 
measures and aggregate GDP. This work argues that such an approach will 
mask energy type-specific and sector-specific details and undertakes a more 
disaggregated analysis. Fourth, the multiracial nature of South Africa requires 
sub-group decomposed inequality rather than national aggregates. 
Three levels of analyses are carried out with disaggregated energy types and 
economic sectors. The first level investigates causality and co-integration 
between energy and GDP on one hand and between energy and other factors 
of production on the other. Causality and co-integration are done in the Lag-
Augmented Causality and the Auto-Regressive Distributed Lag frameworks 
respectively. At the second level, the findings of this approach are compared 
with those of theory-based framework using jointly estimated variable 
elasticity of substitution production functions and energy demand frameworks. 
This helps to further examine the impact of energy on growth and the 
substitution possibilities between energy and other factors of production. At 
the third level joint estimation of Cobb-Douglas production function per 
worker, energy demand, (sub-group decomposed) inequality and poverty 











The mam findings are that: (1) without controlling for endogeneity in the 
growth-inequality and energy-production frameworks, single equations are 
likely to be plagued with simultaneity bias. (2) The elasticities of production 
and substitution vary over time. Therefore it is necessary to allow these 
parameters to vary in the production function. (3) All the productive sectors 
exhibit diminishing Returns to Scale without energy. With electricity, diesel, 
gas and coal, the scale elasticity increases somewhat, but only in the 
agricultural sector are there increasing Returns to Scale with the use of diesel. 
(4) Energy types like electricity, diesel and gas are the most productive and 
they set the pace for scale elasticity. This implies that if South African 
Economy is less endowed with these resources, economic growth will be 
seriously jeopardised. 
(5) Various energy types have different effects on output (and also on growth 
by their contribution to the scale elasticity), inequality and poverty. The effects 
vary with economic sectors. This implies that aggregate energy measures may 
not give the true picture of the impact of energy on development. (6) The 
within and between-group inequalities have positive and negative effects on 
production respectively, suggesting that in multiracial and fragmented 
societies, it is important to decompose inequality into sub-group components. 
In general, redistribution efforts should focus on between-group inequality 
component, which is poverty increasing. Efforts to reduce between-group 
inequality can also be associated with less consumption of energy, since it 
tends to increase the demand for energy. Access to energy types like 
electricity, diesel and gas are crucial for economic growth, but for them to 
yield significant anti-poverty impacts, policy efforts must go beyond energy to 
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1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Poverty is a major problem for developing countries especially of the Sub-
Saharan Africa. The problem of widespread poverty in Africa is rooted (in 
addition to fast population growth) in the economic crises of the late seventies 
and early nineties, during which its economic indicators seriously deteriorated. 
Economic growth recovery only started by the late nineties. This recovery was 
marked by high inequality in most countries, leaving behind the poor (Collier 
and Gunning, 1999). Hence, poverty reduction and improvements of standards 
of living have become the major priority for Sub-Saharan African countries in 
the post crisis 1 era. This preoccupation has transcended national and regional 
objectives to be incorporated into global development and equity concerns. 
This is evident in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted by the 
United Nations (UN) System in 2000. According to the UN (2002, P 8), the 
"development goals set out in the Millennium Declaration express the resolve 
of the world·s political leaders to free their fellow men. women and children 
from the abject poverty and dehumanising conditions of extreme poverty. to 
make the right to development a reality for everyone. and to free the entire 
human race from wants". 
Eradication of extreme poverty and hunger is the first of the eight MDGs2 If 
poverty is broadly considered to include Sen's (1998) concept of capability 
deprivation, then the rest of the goals would be directly related to poverty, 
excepting the last goal which is organisational. The most widely studied target 
1 During the early 1970s and late 1980s, Sub-Saharan Africa experienced widespread economic crises 
brought about by rising real interest rates, deteriorating terms of trade, and overambitious public 
investment supported by external debt and distorted incentives. This was followed by Breton-Wood 
prescribed Adjustment policies aimed at economic stabilisation and Structural Adjustment Programs 
(SAPs). Research has fOlllld a strong link between these SAPs measures and exacerbation of poverty 
(Collier and Gunning. 1999). 
2 The other goals relate to primrny education, gender equality and women empowerment, reduction of 
infant mortality, improvement of maternal health, fight against HIV/AIDS and other diseases, 











is the sub goal of the first MDG. It consists of halving the proportion of people 
living in extreme poverty (i.e. on less than US$ 1.08 per person per day) by 
the year 2015, starting from the 1990 level of extreme poverty. 
Research and Development experiences point to two prerequisites for 
meaningful and irreversible poverty reduction. The first is sufficiently high 
and sustained economic growth (Easterly, 2002). Even if achieved, for high 
and sustained growth to play an effective role in poverty reduction, the poor 
must significantly share in the fruits of such growth. Hence the second 
prerequisite is equality in income distribution or reduction of inequality index 
(Ravallion, 2004). As such, the investigation of the pro-poor effects of any 
policy or factor would naturally culminate in studying the effects on economic 
growth (or production) and the corresponding effect on income distribution. 
This thesis examines the role of energy in development within the South 
African economy, by examining production, energy, inequality and poverty 
connections holistically. The role of this chapter is to present a general 
introduction to the thesis. The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: 
section (1.2) looks at the background with respect to the South African 
economy. In (1.3), the research problem, hypothesis and objective are spelled 
out. Justification of the research is presented in (1.4), brief description of 
methodology in (1.5), definitions in section (1.6), while (1.7) concludes the 
chapter with an outline of the thesis. 
1.2 Background 
From the nineties to the beginning of the (2007-2009) financial crisis, Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) made progress in economic growth, averaging four 
percent per year by the second half of the nineties. According to the report of 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA, 2000), in 1999, 
real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by 3.2 percent, up from 3.1 per cent 
in 1998. At present, the African Development Bank (2008) forecast Africa's 
growth to be above 5% for 2008. However, a key issue remains that of 
whether this improvement has the capacity to lead to strong and sustained 
future growth (Collier and Gunning, 1999). Despite growth recovery, decadal 











per annum population growth rate of 2.8 percent and far below the 7 percent 
growth rate needed to halve Africa's poverty incidence by 2015. Besides, the 
recovery has been marked by high inequality (Collier and Gunning, 1999). 
South Africa particularly had enjoyed a century of mining-based high 
economic growth following the development of the Kimberly diamond fields 
in the 1870s. Between 1920 and 1970, the escalating international demand for 
gold yielded a combination of high profits and foreign exchange, which served 
as springboard for the expansion of the industrial sector. From 1948 to 1973, 
the average growth rate of real GDP was above 7 percent per annum and 
employment almost tripled. The average growth rate of employment was 4.3 
for the period (Feinstein, 2007: 186). 
Table 1.1: Percentage Growth Rates of Economic Fundamentals 
% growth of: 1974- 1984- 1989- 1994- 1999- 1974- 1984- 1989- 1994-
1983 1988 1993 1998 2006 1983 1988 1993 1998 
Output 
Real GDP Real GDP per capita 
Whole 2.7 2.0 0 2.8 3.9 0.1 -0.2 -2.4 0.6 
Manufacturing 3.5 2.4 -1.7 2.6 3.5 1.0 0.2 -4 0.4 
Agriculture -0.4 8.7 1.8 1.5 0.6 -2.8 6.4 -0.7 -0.7 
Mining -0.3 -0.4 0 -0.4 0.7 -2.8 -2.6 -2.4 -2.5 
Inputs 
Gross capital formation Employment 
Whole 3.1 -3.9 -1.8 7.7 5.6 1.9 1 -1.9 -2 
Manufacturing 4.6 -6.7 7.1 7.4 5.3 2.3 l.3 -l.3 -1.9 
Agriculture l.3 -4.1 -4.2 4.6 1.7 -2.5 1.7 -2.1 -3.1 
Mining 11.1 5.4 -10.7 8.8 5.4 1.15 1.4 -5.1 -5.5 
Factor productivities 
Output per worker Output per unit capital 
Whole 0.75 1 2 4.9 2.8 -0.1 7.2 2 -4.6 
Manufacturing 1.15 1.1 -0.4 4.7 3.5 0.1 15.6 -6.4 -4.1 
Agriculture 2.5 7 3.6 5.2 4.7 0.9 16.6 6.2 -2 
Mining -l.3 -1.7 5.5 5.8 6.9 -7.1 -5.4 13.6 -8.3 
Source. Calculated usmg mfonnatIon on GDP, populauon and capItal formatIon from South 
African Reserve Bank (SARB, 2009), and employment from SARB (2009), Statistics South 
Africa STATSSA (2007a) and South African Departinent of Agriculture (DoA, 2007) . 
However, from the early 1970s to the mid 1990s, the economy switched from 
triumph to distressing decline (Feinstein, 2007, p200). Table 1.1 shows 

























gross capital formation, employment and factor productivities. These 
indicators worsened in the decade between 1984 and 1993. There are a number 
of reasons that can explain this deterioration. Feinstein (2007) groups them 
into three categories. The first is both the decline in gold mining and sudden 
plunge in the price of gold (due to the loss of its position earlier in 1973, as 
ultimate reserve asset for the international monetary system) after 1980, 
coupled with high and rising cost of production. The second is a combination 
of adverse external economic and political factors. From the 1970s, the rapidly 
growmg world output and trade of the golden age ended, reducing South 
Africa's international market for export, while inflationary pressures and 
appreciating local currency - ZAR - (due to rising commodity prices and the 
two oil shocks3) led to South Africa suffering from less manufacturing export 
competitivity. Thirdly, stronger international hostility to apartheid led to a 
gloomy prospect of South Africa's financial and political stability and 
consequently, there was a massive outflow of capital. In such circumstances of 
growth stagnation, trends in employment also plummeted from the early 1980s 
as indicated in the employment sub-heading of Table 1.1. 
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Source: generated usmg mfonnahon on real capItal formatIon from SARB (2009), and 
employment from SARB (2009), STATSSA (2007a) and DoA (2007). 
However, though the economic situation started to ease in the early 1990s, 
3 Following the activities of OPEC member States, the prices of oil rose fourfold, this was the first oil 
shock. The second oil shock happened in 1979-1980 after the Iranian Revolution and by 1981, the US 











during the period of stagnation and after, employers tended to substitute 
capital for labour in an attempt to overcome the scarcity of skilled labour4 The 
reduction in the cost of capital equally led to more capital intensive production 
methods. This tendency has increased from the early 1990s to date (2006) as 
Figure 1.0 I shows. It is most remarkable in the mining sector, followed by 
manufacturing, with capitaVlabour ratio being above that of the national 
economy. 
Following the same trend in economic indicators, South Africa's energy mix 
has been changing. The pre-1990s anti-apartheid foreign sanctions on South 
Africa made it to rely much on the locally abundant coal, which eased later on. 
In early 1970s, to late 1980s, a unit of GDP contained higher coal' relative to 
other energy types. This coal content of a unit of GDP has been steadily falling 
while that of electricity has been rising, and from about 2000, electricity has 
been the dominant energy type in the economy while that of petroleum has 
been relatively stable6 This situation is the same in the manufacturing sector, 
while diesel and electricity stand at all time high in agriculture and mining 
respectively (see Figure Alof Appendix). It is plausible that the changes in 
energy-mixed, with increasing use of more efficient energy types such as 
electricity could be at the basis of the increased productivities of both capital 
and labour, as depicted in Table 1.1. 
4 This was encouraged by: the rise in real wages of black workforce, the growing organisation and 
militancy of black workforce, and the state policies, notably, influx control, which artificially increased 
urban labour cost by restricting the numbers available for work in urban areas (Feinstein, 2007). 
5 All energy types are considered net of use in the energy sector 
6 This relative stability was ensured by formation of a public corporation in 1950 to convert coal into 
gas, and then to petrol, diesel and other liquid petroleum products. This cOIporation, lmO\VIl as South 
African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation (SASOL) was fonned strategically to cOllllteract some adverse 
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Source: generated usmg mfonnatIon on real G DP from SARB, and energy types from lEA 
and South African Department of Minerals and Energy. 
The unequal access to opportunities inherited from apartheid policies and the 
capital intensive tendencies may underlie the deteriorated social indicators 
such as poverty and inequality which failed to improve following 
improvement in economic growth rates and capital formation. However, the 
various studies on the evolution of poverty in South Africa from 1995 to 2000 
show no definite consensus (Table 1.2). 
Table 1.2: Poverty Trends in South Africa from 1993-2004 
Study period evolution 
Statistics South Africa (2002) 1995-2000 Increase 
Hoogeveen and Ozier (2006) 1995-2000 Increase 
Leibbrandt et al. (2006) 1996-2001 Increase 
Meth and Dias (2004) 1999-2002 Increase 
UNDP (2003) 1995-2002 Slight decline 
Simkins (2004) 1995-2000 Slight increase 
Ardington et al. (2005) 1996-2001 Slight increase 
Van der Berg et al. (2oo7a) 1993-2004 Rise until 2000, slight decline 
thereafter 
Van der Berg et al. (2oo7b) 1993-2004 Increase until 2002, strong decline 
thereafter 
Meth (2oo6a, 2006b) 2001-2004 Slight decline 
However, a study by Van der Berg et al (2007b) suggests that a turning point 
may have been attained in 2002, after which poverty has fallen henceforth. 
This is corroborated by wage increase and increase in black share of 











mcome and per capita mcome (Lundahl and Petersson, 2009). The same 
studies show inequality increasing tendencies. However, this seems to have 
stagnated during the same period of apparent fall in poverty. Inequality 
indicators that show sub-group decomposition suggest that while average 
inequality tends to remain stable, inequality between- and within-groups 
evolve out of phase, with the former decreasing and the latter increasing. 
However, the period from 1993 to 1997 seem to suggest that the sub-group 
quantities were stable during the apartheid era. 
Figure 1.3: Evolution of inequality in South Africa 
1.2 Evolution of inequality 
0.8 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • ... 0.6 
~ • ... .. 
~---...----0.4 • • • • • • 
0.2 
o +--,--,--,--,--,--,--,--,-~-,--~-,--,--,--, 
",?>,?>":J ",?><I< "cf.J~ ,,#' "cf.J1 "cf.J'b ,,'?>cf.J '1-# 'I-~" 'I-~'I-'I-~":J '1-# 'I-~~ 'I-~ 'I-~1 
~Gini __ Theil within-group Theil between-group ~ Theil total 
Source: by author, using data from The Presidency of South Africa (2009). 
There is a clear correlation between energy use and levels of development. 
Figure 1.3 shows that levels of per capita energy consumption and human 
development index across countries are compatible. Countries like Iceland, 
Luxemburg, UAE etc, with high levels of per capita energy consumption also 
have higher human development index, compared to those with low levels of 
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Source: Generated using per capita energy data from Word Bank (WDI, 2008) and HDI from 
Human Development Report (UNDP, 2009). 
Equally, developing countries with high inequality also exhibit a 
corresponding unequal access by the poor, to modem energy services such as 
electricity compared to the rich. Figure 1.04 compares electricity access by 
income groups (poorest and richest quintiles) with inequality index (Gini 
coefficient) for selected developing countries. South Africa and Panama for 
example with highest rich/poor disparity in access to electricity (as of 2001) 
display the widest income inequality, while Pakistan with lowest rich/poor 
disparity in electricity access shows the lowest Gini coefficient. 
Currently (2007), South Africa's access to electricity is at 81.5% (STATSSA, 
2007). As of 2000, primary energy distribution constituted 74.8 percent coal 
(of which about 36 percent is used for electricity generation), 11.6 percent 
commercial and renewable energy sources (biomass, wind and solar), 9 
percent oil, 3.2 percent nuclear, 1.3 percent gas and 0.1 percent hydro7 
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quintile from Human Development Report (UNDP, 20078). 
Figure 1.6: The Evolution of South Africa's Energy Mix 
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Source: lEA (2005) 
South Africa's energy intensity is above the world's average, with only ten 
countries ranking above it. The industrial sector consumes the greatest share of 
coal (51%) followed by electricity (31%), other fuels (7%) and biomass (6%). 
In the commercial sector, electricity tops the choice (82.8%), then coal (8.2%) 
etc. In the residential sector, energy consumption is more diversified, with 
37.6% electricity, 29.8 wood, 20.4 coal, 8.9 kerosene, l.7 Liquefied Petroleum 
8 The data on electricity access by income groups is based on Dominique Lallement (2005). The data is 
only indicative, because it is extracted from a bar chart in UNDP (2008). The Gini coefficients for the 











Gas (LPG), 1.5 vegetable waste and 0.1% solar9 South Africa's National 
Electrification Program (NEP) was undertaken for socio-political reasons, 
mainly to redress the inequalities of the past. However, according to UNDP 
(2006), inequality and human poverty appear to have increased (from human 
poverty index of20 in 1998 to 30 in 2004). 
1.3 Research Problem and Objectives 
The oil shock-basis of the deep and widespread economic cnses of the 
eighties, and the strong stylised co-evolution of energy with economic 
performance, or at least factors of production (Gunder, 1959; Struckrneyer, 
1986; Kander and Schon, 2005), show that energy is essential in economic 
growth and human well-being. However, the role of energy in economic 
growth is a theoretical debate and two schools of thought exist (Stern and 
Cleveland 2004). One is the biophysical (ecological) economics, which 
considers energy as a fundamental (at extreme, sole) factor of production 
(Cleveland et ai, 1984; and Hall et ai, 2001). The other school is the 
mainstream or neoclassical economics, which considers that technical progress 
and substitution between factors of production can effectively decouple 
growth from energy use (Solow, 1974; 1993; 1997). 
The effect of energy on inequality and poverty is not well understood and has 
not received adequate attention in economic research. Energy can impact 
inequality and poverty in two ways. First, its production uses wage receiving 
labour. Secondly, energy use in households and communities affect human 
capabilities (education and health) and incomes of the rich, through 
production, and of the poor, through Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
(SMEs) according to World Bank (2002). 
Access to modern and clean forms of energy like electricity is necessary, 
(though not sufficient) for socio-economic development. A country's energy 
mix can play a non-negligible role in economic growth and poverty 
alleviation. For example, electric light extends the day, providing extra hours 












for reading and productive activities. Modem cook-stoves save wood 
collecting time for women and girls, allowing them to reallocate time for 
human capital development and more productive activities, while equally 
saving women and children from noxious fumes. Refrigeration can allow local 
clinics to keep vital medication at hand for prompt response to health needs. 
Policy authorities and donors increasingly incorporate energy in their 
development agenda (World Bank, 2007) hence lending support to modem 
energy provision, especially Rural Electrification (RE). Since the 1980s, the 
World Bank has been giving loans to developing countries for RE, with the 
hope that after the economic benefits, the indebted countries would repay their 
loans. South Africa, on its own initiative, financed the National Electrification 
Program (NEP) and subsequently, Free Basic Electricity (FBE) for the poor. 
The Independent Evaluation Group (lEG, 1994) of the World Bank, focusing 
on Economic Rates of Return (ERR), finds that benefits to electrification are 
not realised. World Bank (2008a) argues that the lEG did not broaden to 
include social and indirect economic benefits, however, it endorses the view 
that the larger share of RE benefits in terms of effective use for income 
generation are captured by the non-poor. No macroeconomic study has been 
done to assess the growth and poverty effects of the supposed benefits. To 
make energy policies more pro-poor, it is important to study what and how 
vanous energy types contribute to poverty alleviation. Theory indicates 
poverty alleviation comes by growth boosting and inequality reducing 
policies. Hence the relevance of the following question: What poverty impacts 
have varioWi energy sources and how can these impacts be enhanced for pro-
poor development? 
The contribution of energy to poverty reduction depends on the impact of 
energy on the main arguments of poverty reduction effort, i.e. (sustained) 
economic growth and access of the poor to the fruits of the growth. Therefore 
the main objective of this dissertation is to research the impact of energy 
sources on poverty via the growth and inequality avenues in South Africa. 
This would help to fonnulate recommendations on how energy can be used as 











• Investigate the relationship between vanous energy types and 
economic output in disaggregation 
• Investigate the relationship between energy types and other factors of 
production 
• Examine the production-inequality- poverty nexus and assess the effect 
of various energy types on inequality and poverty. 
The main contributions of this thesis are the disaggregation of energy types 
and economic sectors; the focus on the link between energy, inequality and 
poverty with time series data and the systems of equations approach in order to 
take care of endogeneity between GDP and energy, and GDP and inequality 
for South Africa. 
1.4 Justification of Thesis 
The goal of economic growth, poverty alleviation and sustainable 
development cannot be successfully achieved amidst uncertainty over the 
future of fossil fuel in particular and energy in general. There is therefore need 
for awareness in academia and the policy arena about the contribution of 
energy to economic growth and poverty in Sub-Saharan African countries 
which many of the development goals seem to target. 
Four factors drive the quest to investigate the role of energy in poverty in an 
inequality-growth framework. First is the role that inequality in income and 
access to resources play in socio-political tension and conflicts. Second is the 
role that energy-related crises have played in recent tensions around the world. 
Third is the theoretical perception of the relationship between energy and 
growth which can impact energy-related anti-poverty policies. The fourth is 
the two-way linkage between inequality and growth, established in theory, 
which suggest a system of interlinked equations for poverty-growth-inequality 
emplf1CS. 
Poverty can be considered as an expression of inequality in two ways: Firstly, 
while others are poor, some are non-poor. Secondly, even among the poor, 











production (land, education health, capital, etc) has implications for social 
tension and economic growth, resulting in conflicts in many societies. First, it 
is a major source of discrimination and marginalization among individuals of a 
society; secondly, it may be a non-negligible source of instability in the 
society. Countries with more acceptable distribution of income are more likely 
to avoid periods of destructive populist policy (Ales ina and Rodrik 1994). 
There is no doubt that most of the wars and strives in most developing 
countries are consequences of unequal intra-country distribution of resources. 
Alesina and Perotti (1993) have found strong and significant increase in socio-
political instability due to income inequality, leading to decreases in 
investment. As resources become more and more scarce, the inequality 
becomes reinforce therefore even greatly increasing the resulting tension and 
further reducing growth through reduction in investment. 
Some of the most recent examples carne through energy and food crises that 
resulted in loss of lives in areas like Haiti, Cameroon, South Africa, etc. World 
Bank (1996) has established an extensive linkage between energy choice, 
household poverty (according to the livelihood approach) and possible 
contribution to women empowerment. World Bank (lEG, 2008), in a micro-
based study finds that benefits to electrification accrue mainly to the non-poor. 
Therefore it is important to investigate the link between energy types and the 
arguments of poverty - growth and inequality. 
Literature highlights contradistinction theoretical views on the subject of 
energy-growth relationship (Stern and Cleveland, 2004). There is the 
ecological economics view, which considers energy as the fundamental (at 
extreme, sole) factor of production (Cleveland et ai, 1984 and Hall et ai, 2001; 
2003). Sub models in this category are Leontief input-output model with 
energy as the single primary factor (Kaufmann, 1987), neo-ricardian of 
Perrings (1987) and O'Connor (1993), assuming fixed proportions of 
technology and capital, in terms of stocks rather than flows. Empirically, 
Cleveland et al (1984) uses the biophysical framework and finds a strong 











In opposition to the ecological view are the mainstream (Neo-classical) growth 
models. In these models, technical progress and substitution between factors 
of production can decouple growth from energy (Solow, 1974; 1993; 1997). 
The fundamental of this category is proposed by Solow (1956). In this basic 
model, the only cause of continuing growth is technological progress. Another 
variant of this category is the endogenous growth models which allow the state 
of technology to respond to changes in one of the variables in the model 
(Arrow 1962). Empirical works using this framework have all concluded that 
energy and energy prices have only very minor and insignificant link to 
economic output (Rasche and Tatom, 1977; Burgess, 1984; Denison, 1979; 
Denison, 1985; Berndt, 1990). Kaufmann and Azary-Lee (1991) analysed 
substitution between energy and capital in the same framework and finds very 
low energy output elasticity. All these studies examine the US economy. 
Another body of literature avoids the a priori theoretical restrictions. The 
earlier version of non-theoretical approaches uses Sims' (1972) causality test. 
Most of these works scarcely find any causality from energy to output (Kraft 
and Kraft, 1978; Akarca and Long, 1980; Yu and Hwang, 1984; Yu and Choi, 
1985; Arnmah-Tagoe, 1990). A more recent version of the non theoretical 
approach uses the Vector Auto Regressive (V AR) framework of Sims (1980) 
and Sargent (1979). Lee and Chang (2007) in a panel V AR for 22 developed 
and 18 developing countries finds a bidirectional relationship between energy 
use per capita and GDP per capita for developed countries and a unidirectional 
causality from GDP per capita to energy consumption per capita for 
developing countries. However, earlier, Wolde-Rufael (2005) finds mixed 
results for 19 African countries - a mixture of unidirectional, bidirectional and 
no causal relationships. He suggests country-specific factors accounting for 
the different directions of causality. One commonality in these studies is the 
use of aggregate energy measure (total energy use) and aggregate GDP. 
Bourguiguon (2004) suggests that there is a two-way relationship between 
growth and inequality. On one hand, he argues that economic growth alters the 
distribution of resources across sectors, relative prices, factor rewards (labour, 











shown that inequality is associated with lower growth. One of the mam 
channels through which inequality weakens growth is tensions and conflicts 
(Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Alesina and Perotti, 1993; Persson and Tabellini, 
1994). This suggests that a system of equations may be appropriate for 
poverty-growth-inequality empirics, rather than a single equation framework. 
South Africa has often been neglected in earlier development-inequality 
analysis for lack of data. The multiracial and apartheid heritage of South 
Africa makes it a special case that may not yield the same results like the 
traditional single (average) inequality measure. Therefore, in this regard, 
South Africa merits a separate treatment. The choice of South Africa at this 
time is also guided by availability of recently published data by the Presidency 
of the Republic and also by well developed energy policies and a diversified 
energy portfolio. South Africa's energy policy is increasingly including the 
support of renewable, cleaner and environmentally friendly energy types, 
hence the development of a National Biofuels Strategy. The objective of this 
policy strategy is to address the issues of poverty and economic development 
from an energy angle. It aims at linking the second economy to the first, which 
entails job creation in underdeveloped areas. It is believed that encouraging 
biofuel feedstock production will stimulate agricultural production in the 
former "homelands" where agriculture was undermined by apartheid. 
1.5 Methodology 
This section gives a brief highlight of the methodology followed to achieve the 
objectives of this thesis spelled out in section (1.3). The methodology is 
designed to look at the impact of energy types on other factors of production 
on one hand, and output/growth and inequality (as arguments of poverty) on 
the other. For the effect of energy types on output and other factors of 
production, it revisits the vector autoregressive approach of causality and co-
integration using disaggregated energy types and economic sectors. The 
purpose is twofold. 
First, to determine the degree and direction of causality between vanous 











one hand, and energy and other factors of production (namely, labour and 
capital) on the other hand. This is done in the lag-augmented causality 
framework developed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) which presents clear 
advantages (such as reducing the risk of wrongful identification of integration 
order) over the traditional Granger causality method due to Granger (1969) 
and Sims (1972). 
Second is to assess whether there are any long-run or co-integrating 
relationships between the energy types on one hand and GDP and other factors 
of production on the other. Co-integration relationships are investigated using 
the Auto-Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) or bound test approach 
developed by Pesaran et al (2001). This method has several advantages 
(discussed in section 3.2.2) over the previously applied tests (Engle and 
Granger, 1987; Johansen, 1988; and Johansen, 1995 and Johansen and 
Juselius, 1992). 
After the Lag-Augmented Causality and the Auto-Regressive Distributed Lag 
(ARDL) co-integration frameworks, a theory-based Variable Elasticity of 
Substitution (VES) production function is adapted to compare with the 
relatively less theoretical ARDL setup. For this purpose, the Vinod (1972) 
type non-homogenous production function with three inputs (capital, energy 
and labour) and classical energy demand framework in simultaneous equations 
setting are considered in order to reconcile growth and energy demand 
theories. The framework allows for calculating three important parameters of 
production theory. First are the elasticities of substitution between (total and 
dis aggregated) energy types and other factors of production (capital and 
labour). Second is the output elasticity of respective inputs. Third are the 
Returns to Scale (RTS) with and without the energy types. In such framework, 
these parameters are also allowed to vary with time and factor proportion. 
In assessing the impact of energy on poverty, a per capita Cobb-Douglas 
production function is adapted to include inequality and energy. Ahluwalia's 
(1976) inequality functional form is extended to include government expenses 
and energy. In a multiracial society like South Africa, inequality within-groups 











ways and average inequality measure may not be able to reveal the details. So 
inequality is disaggregated into between and within-group components. These 
are jointly estimated with poverty equation adopted from Son and Kakwani 
(2008). 
Data for this work are as follows: annual energy data are from the 
International Energy Agency spanning 1971 to 2005. Complementary energy 
data for 2006 is sourced from the South African Department of Minerals and 
Energy. Productive sectors analysed are whole economy, manufacturing, 
agriculture and mining. For the whole economy, energy types available are 
total energy, electricity, kerosene, diesel, gasoline, gas and coal. They are total 
energy, electricity, diesel, gas, kerosene and coal for manufacturing; total 
energy, electricity, diesel, kerosene and coal for agriculture; total energy, 
electricity, liquid petroleum and coal for mining. All energy types are 
measured in Tera Joules (TJ). Energy types are considered in net of uses in the 
energy sector!O 
GDP and capital formation and total government expenses (both in million at 
constant 2000 ZAR) are from the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) 
dataset. The SARB reports total private sector, manufacturing and mining 
employments, but only in indices (from 1971 to 2006) at 2000 base year. 
Statistics South Africa (ST ATSSA) provides total and sector-wise real 
employment figures only from 2000 to 2006. These values are used together 
with the SARB indices to generate real private sector, manufacturing and 
mining employment data (in thousand persons )". 
Agricultural employment data is taken from the Abstract of Agricultural 
Statistics, published by the Department of Agriculture12 Population data is 
from the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank (2008c). 
Aggregate energy price series is measured by Consumer Price Index (CPI) for 
10 For example, coal is taken in exclusion of that used in electricity and petroleum sectors 
11 This is done llllder the assumption that the SARB private sector employment data depicts the actual 
variations in the series. 











energy, taken from STATSSA, electricity prices are from ESKOM Tariffs (in 
South African centsikWh), while prices for the other energy types are from the 
department of minerals and energy and are expressed in indices. 
Data for poverty and inequality are from the South African Development 
Indicators (2009) published by the Ministry of National Planning at the 
Presidency of South Africa. The poverty13 and inequality data in this 
publication are based on the bi-annual (All Media and Products Survey -
AMPS) data, collected by the South African Advertising Research Foundation 
(SAARF). Ail the estimations are done using STATA 9. 
1.6 Definitions and Concepts 
The definitional and conceptual issues in this work relate specifically to 
poverty and its arguments i.e. inequality and growth. These definitions are 
given below, starting with poverty, then inequality and pro-poor growth. 
Poverty 
Poverty defies objective definition because of its multi-dimensional nature. 
Ravallion and Bidani (1994) refer to poverty as lack of command over basic 
consumption needs. Sen (1997) defines it as the lack of certain capabilities, 
such as the inability to participate with dignity in society. The World 
Development Report (1990) refers to poverty as the inability to attain a 
minimum standard of living. However, with Walton (1990), poverty can be 
generalised as insufficient participation in the productive process and the 
benefits of economic growth for one reason or the other. All of these concur to 
the main characterization of poverty, i.e. whether individuals or households 
have enough resources and abilities to meet their current needs. Various 
theories of poverty follow the different definitional choices adopted. 
According to Hagenaars (1987), poverty definitions can be classified 
following their employment in research and policy into three broad categories. 












Poverty as having less than an objectively defined absolute minimum: This 
leads to absolute poverty conceptualisation with indices derived from absolute 
poverty lines. Absolute poverty can be defined as an individual's or a 
household's inability to meet basic consumption needs irrespective of general 
standard of living. This is based on subsistence - as minimum needed to 
sustain life - which implies that anyone is poor if s/he has not got enough to 
live on. The foundational works of absolute or subsistence poverty concepts 
have been attributed to Townsend (1979) and Sen (1984; 1997). Absolute 
poverty comparisons would classify any two individuals with the same 
standard of living into the same category (as poor or non poor), irrespective of 
the time and place considered nor whether any public action had been 
implemented within the domain of reference (Ravallion, 1996). 
Poverty as having less than others in society: Such definition highlights the 
notion of relativity. Relative poverty refers to the position of an individual or 
household in relation to the average income or expenditure of the society. 
Poverty is then a lack or shortfall of means relative to the mean of others. 
Hence the notion of relative poverty hinges on relative deprivation or 
inequality. Sen (1981, pp. 15-16) defines relative deprivation as ' ... situations 
where people possess less of some desired attribute, be it income, favourable 
employment conditions or power, than do others'. In the relative view, welfare 
depends on both own consumption and mean consumption of the society 
(Ravallion, 2008). While Sen (1983) acknowledges the merits of the relative 
views, over the absolute conceptualisation of poverty, he argues that 
ultimately poverty must be seen primarily as a core absolute notion. He 
highlights the notion of capabilities and particularly, that absolute deprivation 
in terms of a person's capability relates to relative deprivation in terms of 
commodities, incomes and resources (Sen, 1983: p. 153). 
Poverty line: Poverty line is a threshold or cut-off point in the distribution of a 
given welfare indicator below which a household or an individual is regarded 
as poor. Efforts of determining poverty line follow various poverty 
conceptions. They can be monetary (consumption-based) or non-monetary. 











(1889) and Rowntree (1901). Both of them used the basic needs approach 
which involves determining the absolute minimum of various basic needs or 
their monetary equivalence. Even though alternative methods exist, there are 
two fundamental ways of setting poverty lines. These are in terms of absolute 
and relative poverty. Although there is a multiplicity of methods for poverty 
line derivation, none is void of criticisms. Once the challenge of deriving 
poverty line is overcome, the next is how to integrate the modalities in 
question with respect to the defined poverty line in order to logically construct 
indices of poverty measure for poverty monitoring. 
Poverty Measurement: Generally, poverty measurement ties closely to the 
definition of poverty that one adopts. In this light, two broad categories exist -
the welfare-based approach, dominated by money-metric standards and the 
non-welfarist or "capability" approach (Lipton and Ravallion, 1995; Deininger 
and Squire, 1998). The welfarist approach makes use of the link between 
income and utility or living standard such that a measure of poverty is 
determined by the relationship between ones income and the poverty line. It 
generally consists of two interrelated steps (Sen, 1976; 1980). The first consist 
of indentifying the poor, requiring the construction of a poverty line to 
distinguish the poor from the n n-poor. The second consist of aggregating 
poverty experiences into a poverty measure, relying on the notions of average 
and relative deprivations!4 (Sen, 1976). Concisely, the evolution of poverty 
measurement has involved the construction of a poverty index that satisfies a 
growing set of ethical properties or axioms. The development of poverty 
measures are reviewed below according to their weaknesses and strengths in 
satisfying various properties or axioms 
The most fundamental, widely used, and oldest poverty index is the poverty 
head count ratio (H). It is a measure of the proportion of people living below 
the poverty line. Even though it has been in extensive use both for inter-
temporal comparison and international contrast of poverty (Sen, 1981: 32), the 
poverty headcount ratio suffers from two main weaknesses. First, it does not 
14 Average deprivation is the proportional deviation of the mean income of the poor from the poverty 











take into account distributional effects among the poor. Secondly, it violates 
two basic axioms proposed by Sen (1976, p.219): Monotonicity Axiom: given 
other things, a reduction in income of a person below poverty line must 
increase the poverty measure; Transfer Axiom: Given other things, a pure 
transfer of income from a person below the poverty line to anyone who is 
richer must increase the poverty measure. 
Another very widely used and equally classical measure of poverty is the 
poverty or income gap (g). It is the measure of the aggregate shortfalls of 
incomes (y) of all the poor from a defined poverty line (z). Unlike the poverty 
headcount, this index satisfies the monotonicity axiom, however, it violates the 
transfer axiom. That is, it is insensitive to transfers among the poor as long as 
such transfers take none of the poor to or above the poverty line. Besides, it so 
focuses on the aggregate shortfall that it fails to account for the proportion of 
the poor. 
Sen (1976, p.223) proposes other axiomatic poverty measures15. However, the 
useful practice of breaking down a population into subgroups (ethnic, 
geographical and others) places an additional requirement to poverty index 
besides these axioms. That is the way a given poverty measure relates 
subgroup poverty to total poverty is important. It should be expected that a 
decrease in poverty of one subgroup, all other things being equal, should 
decrease poverty for the population as a whole. The way to achieve this is to 
adopt a poverty measure such that total poverty is a weighted average of 
subgroup poverty levels, i.e. additively decomposable (Foster, Greer and 
Thorbecke, 1984) 
Foster et al (1984) suggest a set of poverty measures that is additively 
decomposable with population-share weights and satisfies the basic axioms of 
15 Ordinal Rank Weights Axiom" The weights v/z,y) on the income gap of person i equals the rank 
order of i in the interpersonal welfare ordering afthe poor; Monotonic Welfare: the relation> 
(greater than, defined on the set of individual welfare numbers (W/y)} for any income configuration y 
is a strict complete ordering, and the relation> defined on the corresponding set of individual incomes 
{Yi} is a subset afthefarmer, i.e., jar any i,j: ify!>Y;, then WJy»rTj(y). Normalised Poverty Value 
Axiom" If all the poor have the same income, then P = HI where P is poverty index, His headcOllllt 











Sen and justified by a relative deprivation concept of poverty. For an 
increasing ordered vector of household incomes (Yl' y2 .... ' y"), a strictly 
positive poverty line z, /h household's income shortfallg, = z - y" number of 
poor households q = q(y;z) and total number of households n = n(y) and for 
a 2': 0, the FGT class of poverty measures Pa is defined as: 
I q (g Ja 
Pa(y;z) = - L -' 
n 1=1 z 
(1.01) 
The parameter a can be considered as a measure of poverty aversion, with 
larger values laying greater emphasis on the poorest of the poor. Po is poverty 
headcount ratio (or incidence); P 1 is poverty gap and P2 is poverty severity, 
obtained when a = 2. Although other poverty measures have been proposed16, 
The Foster Greer and Thorbecke (FGT) class of measures has been the most 
popularly used. In addition to its simplicity of computati n, its attraction lies 
in its satisfaction of most of the desirable properties, decomposability and 
subgroup consistency. No index of poverty is without criticism. In a nutshell, 
the choice of a particular type of index for academic and policy exercise 
depends on the case being studied, data availability and ease of manipulation, 
while meeting minimum basic criteria. For data availability reasons, the choice 
for this work is the FGT class of measures. 
Inequality 
Inequality is a broader concept than poverty in that it is defined over the entire 
population. Inequality may be appraised in various domains. However, the 
most considered dimension is that of income, obviously because of the 
consideration of income as an indicator of welfare. Inequality in income may 
simply mean differences in income, without regard to their desirability as a 
system of reward or undesirability as a scheme running counter to some ideal 
of equality (Kuznets 1953, p.27). Some of the common indices developed to 
16 For instance UNDP (1999) constructs five indices based on the capability approach - the HDI, 
Human Poverty Index (HPI-I) for developing cOlllltries, HPI-2 for OEeD cOlllltries, Gender Related 
Development Index (GDJ) and Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM). The shortfall of the HDR 
indices is that it lacks fine-tuning of conceptual llllderpinning, development of better measurement 











capture these differences are Lorenz curve, the Gini, Theil index and the 
Atkinson family of indices. 
The Lorenz curve, named after Lorenz (1905) has been for several decades, 
the most popular tool especially for income inequality comparison. For 
incomes Q( q) and bottom p proportion of the population, the Lorenz Curve 
(L(P)) can be defined as: 
p 
f Q(q)dq 
1 rp L(p) = 0, = - Jr Q(q)dq 
lQ(q)dq Jl ° 
(1.02) 
where f1 is the sum of incomes over all the population. The Lorenz curve is 
therefore the cumulative share of all income held by the cumulative proportion 
(P) of the population when individuals are ordered in increasing income. The 
Lorenz Curve ranges from 0 (L(O)) to 1 (L(l)), is increasing in p: 
dL(p) = Q(p) and convex: d
2 
L(p) 
dp Jl dp2 
dQ(p) > 0 
pdp 
The Gini coefficient is the most widely used measure of inequality with 
attractive properties for policy analysis. If there is perfect equality in income, 
then the cumulative share of total income held by any bottom p proportion of 
the population would be p. Then, L(p) = P since the population shares and 
shares of total income would be identical. With respect to perfect equality, 
inequality deducts p - L(p) share of total income from the bottom 100p% of 
the populations. Therefore the wider the shortfall between p and L(P), the 
wider the inequality of income. The Gini coefficient is given by the average 
distance between cumulated population shares and cumulated income shares, 
which is twice the aggregation of the deficit between population shares and 
income shares across all p from 0 to 1. This is equivalent to the ratio of the 
area between the line of perfect equality and Lorenz curve and the area under 












A value of 0 corresponds to perfect equality (everyone having exactly the 
same income) and I corresponds to perfect inequality!7 (where one person has 
all the income, while everyone else has zero income). 
Theil's (1967) measure of inequality sterns from the information theory, 
which incorporates three main components. The first is a set of possible events 
each having a given probability of occurrence. The second is an information 
function (h) to evaluate events according to their associated probabilities. The 
third is the concept of entropy, which is the expected information in the 
distribution. The specification of h then relies on three axioms: 
a. An event of certain occurrence has zero valued information: h(l) = 0 
b. There is diminishing valuation of information with 
. . 
mcreaslng 
probability: p'> p ~ h(p') < h(p). 
c. Information (events) are additively independent m probabilities: 
h(pp') = h(p) + h(p') 
Theil (1967) defines an information function based on the three axioms above: 
h(p) = -Iog(p). For an ordered distribution of incomes y = (y, ... y")with 
mean fl, in a population of n individuals, the first Theil's index is given as: 
I Y Y 
T, (y: n) = - L-' log-' 
n,1l Il 
(1.04) 
And also the second Theil's index or mean logarithmic deviation (MLD): 
T2 (y: n) = -.!. Llog~ 
n, Il 
( 1.05) 
The interesting characteristic of the Theil indices of inequality measures is that 
of satisfaction of basic properties and particularly, decomposability. This 
property is very useful when analysing inequality in a population partitioned 
along identifiable characteristics such as race, gender, occupation, geographic 
17 In cases where per capita income or consumption includes negative values - such as the case of self 
employed workers or fanners who may occasionally suffer net loss of income - the Gini index may be 











location etc. The Theil measure is preferred over Gini index in this work 
because it satisfies the property of decomposition into within and between-
groups, which is very relevant for the case of South Africa. 
Pro-poor Growth 
The debate over the conditions necessary for economic growth to improve the 
lives of the poor or circumstances under which growth can be declared pro-
poor has resulted in some consensus. The first is that the poor evidently share 
in increasing aggregate income as well as suffer from economic slow-downs 
(Dollar and Kraay, 2002). However, there are different view points over the 
exact conceptualization and measurement of pro-poorness of growth. The 
absolute and relative concepts have been the most prominent in policy arena. 
The absolute concept constitutes the strong absolute - which requires that the 
absolute income gain of the poor be more than those on the average or of the 
rich (Klasen, 2005) - and the weak absolute - which requires that growth be 
pro-poor if the suitably aggregated growth rate of the poor is greater than zero 
(White and Anderson, 2000). With the relative concept, growth has to be 
relatively biased towards the poor, leading to faster poverty reduction 
(Kakwani and Pernia, 2000). 
The second consensus is that poverty reduction is fastest in situations where 
income growth is accompanied by falling inequality (Bourguiguon, 2004). 
However, it is difficult to argue that inequality reduction in the absence of 
growth can result in poverty reduction. Ravallion (1997), Bourguignon (2004) 
and Son and Kakwani (2003) have established that high inequality reduces the 
impact of growth on poverty reduction. It has also been noted that poverty 
reduction depends on poverty line. Son and Kakwani (2008) suggest a pro-
poor growth rate as the difference between the growth rate of societal mean 
income and the rate of change of inequality, such that if inequality decreases 
(increases) in a given period, then the pro-poor growth rate is greater (less) 
than the actual growth rate for that period. This is the approach from which the 











1.7 Outline of Thesis 
This thesis is organised into six chapters. The general introduction to the thesis 
has been done in chapter one, with the statement of the research problem, 
objective and a brief overview of methodology. Chapter Two briefly examines 
the position of growth and poverty reduction debates in recent literature. It 
first looks at two main theoretical views in investigating the role of energy in 
production - the mainstream (neoclassical) and biophysical theoretical 
perspectives. It then explores the literature on non-theoretical methods (of 
Vector Auto-Regressive). It follows with a critical review of production 
functions, while highlighting the benign option - Variable Elasticity of 
Substitution production functions - to be used. The literature examination 
continues with the linkages between energy, inequality and poverty, followed 
by pro-poor growth debates, before concluding with highlights of unresolved 
Issues. 
Chapter Three tackles the relationship between energy types, Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), and other factors of production (capital and labour). It first 
examines the question of causality in a more novel - Lag-Augmented 
Causality - than the traditional Granger approach. This IS followed by co-
integration analysis in a relatively more advantageous Auto-Regressive 
Distributed Lag - approach, compared to the traditional V AR frameworks. 
Related data is discussed followed by interpretation of analysis; while in 
conclusion, the main findings of the chapter are highlighted. 
In Chapter Four, V inod (1972) type YES production function is adapted to 
energy and production. In this framework, the issues of factor substitutability, 
Returns to Scale (RTS) and economic growth are addressed with emphasis on 
the role of the respective energy types in the various economic sectors. A two-
input model is first developed, with capital and labour only. In the next stage, 
the substitution elasticity between the two factors helps to specify the 
appropriate YES functional form with three inputs (including energy). The 
three inputs YES is then estimated jointly with a classical energy demand 











main findings of the chapter are highlighted, comparing the results with the 
findings of Chapter Three. 
Chapter Five extends a per capita Cobb-Douglas production function to 
include inequality and energy. This is estimated jointly (in simultaneous 
equations framework) with energy demand, inequality and poverty equations. 
Data issues specific to this chapter are dealt with, followed by analysis and 
interpretation of results. Highlights of main findings conclude the chapter. 
Chapter Six concludes the thesis by recapitulating the main issues and findings 












2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to briefly examine the position of growth and 
poverty reduction debates and the relationship with energy in literature. There 
is consensus in theory and experience that economic growth and the resulting 
distribution of its fruits are the two means by which poverty reduction occurs 
(Easterly, 2002; Ravallion, 2004; Bourguignon, 2004). It follows that the 
analysis of the impact of any policy or activity on poverty reduction should 
naturally look at the corresponding effect on production (growth) and 
inequality. It is in this manner that the role of energy is surveyed. Mainstream 
economic growth theories have relegated energy as a factor of production, to a 
dismal position. This is mainly due to three assumptions - notably, that the 
productivity of the different factors of production be equal to their respective 
cost shares; that technological progress can effectively decouple energy use 
from economic growth and that energy be regarded as an intermediate factor 
of production. However, the biophysical theory drops these assumptions and 
accords a more central role to energy in the production process. Apart from 
few studies that have documented the benefits of electrification, the role of 
energy in inequality and poverty is not well exploited (Prasad, 2006; World 
Bank, 2001) 
Literature related to energy and production is discussed in section (2.2). 
Production frameworks (with their relative weaknesses and strengths), from 
which a basis will be chosen for the analysis of production and growth impacts 
of energy, are explored in section (2.3). Following this, is the review of the 
role of energy in poverty (section 2.4). The notion of pro-poor growth is 
explored in section (2.5), where the interaction between growth and inequality 
is surveyed, followed by the formalisation of pro-poor growth in an empirical 
framework. Section (2.6) concludes the chapter by highlighting unresolved 











2.2 Energy and Production 
Historical facts have shown the importance of energy as a driver of economic 
growth. The first example that sparked the industrial revolution is the 18th 
century Britain, which due to scarcity of charcoal, adapted to the use of coal as 
an alternative fuel. Coal-fired (capital) equipments like the stearn engine 
replaced the horse-powered pumps, allowing for increase in productivity. The 
resulting general fall in prices (including coal itself) led to increase in demand 
for all goods. Again in the 19th century in Western Pennsylvania, the discovery 
of petroleum stimulated the development of the internal combustion engine. 
Again, falling costs boosted the demand for both energy and other goods. 
Clearly, since the 18th century, fossil-fuel and electric power driven capital 
machinery have been both substitute and booster of human and animal labour 
(Ayres, 2001). 
Increasing research is being done on the role of energy in economic growth or 
at least output, following the works of Schurr (1982; 1984), which hypothesise 
that in the early twentieth century, electrification contributed significantly to 
the growth of labour and multifactor productivity in the U.S. economy. 
Conceptual approaches that have been followed for empirical works in 
literature can be classified into three broad categories - neoclassical, 
biophysical and non-theoretical. 
2.2.1 Mainstream Theoretical Perspectives and Empirics 
The distinction between primary and intermediate inputs has played a major 
role in how mainstream growth theorists view the role of energy in production. 
They consider capital, labour and land as primary inputs and energy and 
material as intermediates. This implies that return to different factors of 
production accrue eventually to the three primary inputs (Stem, 2004). The 
result of the neoclassical assumption that the productivity of a factor be equal 
to its cost share in production is that only the primary inputs - capital and 
labour - receive all the focus, with energy receiving a dismal and indirect role 
(Stem and Cleveland, 2004). Growth theorists have always assumed variously 











However, technical progress is one of the major energy using processes of 
development (Jorgenson, 1984). 
Empirically, a number of works have added energy to the traditional capital 
and labour, in either a Cobb-Douglas or Constant Elasticity of Substitution 
(CES) production frameworks. The first to take this approach was Berndt and 
Wood (1975) who also included material and services in the so-called 
KLEMS 18 production function. Following this, others have analysed 
previously ignored substitution and complementarity possibilities. These 
works like the mainstream foundation, still constrain the marginal productivity 
(output elasticity) of each input to be proportional to its cost share. As such, 
energy elasticity was found to be low (0.04 for the US and 0.058 for OECD). 
By implication, energy prices could not have a significant effect on economic 
growth (Denison, 1979; Gallop and Jorgenson, 1973). Hannon and Joyce 
(1981), with various Solow-like model specifications, augmenting with 
energy, or electric power or combination (capital + energy) obtained similar 
results in the above, for the US. Later, Jorgenson (1984; 1988) used a 
transcendental logarithmic production function type of KLEMS with electric 
energy. He observed that energy prices had a very strong negative effect on 
economic growth in the US and Japan during the energy crisis in the 1970s. 
However, this has been refuted by many economists (Ayres, 2001), since 
falling energy prices in the 1980s did not boost real growth. 
2.2.2 Biophysical Theoretical Perspectives and Empirics 
The biophysical (ecological) school has proposed a heterodox approach to 
production theory in response to the mainstream formulation. The main 
characteristic is the abandoning of the assumption that factor productivities 
must be equal to factor shares. This view follows on the work of Georgescu-
Roegen (1971). Biophysical Models (with empirical variants based on the 











Leontief's input-output production function!9) argue that energy is the 
fundamental (at extreme, sole) factor of production in an economy. In the 
biophysical view, the necessity of labour, capital or exogenous technical 
progress is not required to characterise the best fit of historical output data, not 
just in the US, but also in other economies (Cleveland et al 1984; Constanza 
and Heredeen, 1984; Constanza, 1991; Cleveland, 1992 and Kaufmann, 1992). 
Empirically, these works find strong correlation between energy (in heat 
value) and economic growth, with little or no role for capital or labour. 
However, as Ayres (2001) remarks, a simple correlation between energy 
consumption and growth does not necessarily imply causality. This fact could 
as well mean that energy use is the consequence and not the cause of 
economic growth. The address to this concern is explored in the non-
theoretical approaches. 
More recent works have explored two more types of production functions, 
both of which drop the assumption of equality of factor productivities and cost 
shares. The one is Beaudreau (1998) who suggests an output production 
function of two factors - physical work W(t), with direct relation to efficiency-
adjusted energy consumption, and Supervision S(t), which refers to 
organisational or managerial activities. For empirical purpose, he takes 
electricity generation as proxy for physical work and indirect production 
labour20 as proxy for supervision. Specifying a Cobb-Douglas with capital, 
labour and electric power, he finds electric power productivity of 0.537, 0.606, 
and 0.747 for US, Japan and West Germany respectively. 
The other is the suggestion of Daly (1992 and 1997), Georgescu-Roegen 
(1970, 1971 and 1979) and Kummel (1989), to start from a KLE-type generic 
production function, satisfying the conditions for constant Returns to Scale21 
19 A generalised fonn can be represented in demand (C), with respect to income or output (Y) and 
1 1 
prices (PI and Pl as follows: C = YL L rJ}p~ pJ ' where 11J are parameters. 
20 Calculated as the difference between total manufacturing labour and direct production labour (Ayres, 
2001) 











An interesting possibility of such production function IS the Linear 
Exponential (LINEX) family of functions: 
(2.01) 
Where k. I. e denote capital, labour and energy, a, b, and c are technology 
related parameters and a+~ ~ I-yare productivity parameters. Kummel et al 
(2000) use a two-parameter parsimonious specification of (2.01) in industrial 
production time series for West Germany (1960-1989), Japan (1965-1992), US 
(1960-1993). They find energy productivity of 0.50, 0.45 and 0.54 for the 
respective countries. These estimations have been considered to match the 
observed output with extraordinary precision (Ayres, 2001, p. 827). This has 
led to the conclusion that in the past, energy's contribution (at almost 
negligible cost) to production has been attributed to other factors. However, as 
Ayres (2001) remarks, a simple correlation between energy consumption and 
growth does not necessarily imply causality. 
2.2.3 Non-Theoretical Approaches 
This body of literature avoids the a priori theoretical restrictions applied to 
energy-production/economic growth analyses. This approach involves 
investigation of causality relationship and actual statistical testing in Vector 
Auto-Regression (V AR) time series frameworks. 
Statistical tests that have been carried out to address the question of causality 
make use of the framework developed by Granger (1969) and Sims (1972). 
This is based on the premise that if x causes y, then a change in x will be 
followed by a change in y. These works either found causality running from 
output to energy use or arrived at inconclusive results (Kraft and Kraft, 1978; 
Akarca and Long, 1980; Yu and Hwang, 1984; Yu and Choi, 1985; Arnmah-
Tagoe, 1990). However, accounting for energy quality changed the results of 
subsequent causality findings (Cleveland et ai, 1984). Using US Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) data from 1947 to 1990 in a multivariate framework 











causality tests. The first, without quality adjustment yields causality from GDP 
to energy use. In the second, he uses the Divisia index, in which both standard 
thermal equivalent measures and fuel prices (as proxy for quality) are used for 
weighting the various fuels. Accounting for energy quality caused a reversal in 
the direction of causality. Later, extending the same data to 1994, Cleveland, 
Kaufmann and Stem (2000) confirm the finding. They also argue that the 
decline in energy/GDP ratio in the US can be explained by the quality 
adjustments in energy index in terms of fuel substitution. 
However, later versions of V AR models have produced mixed results in 
developed and developing countries on the one hand and among developing 
countries on the other. In a panel V AR for 22 developed and 18 developing 
countries, Lee and Chang (2007) obtain a two-way causal relationship between 
per capita energy and GDP in developed countries and a unidirectional 
relationship from GDP to energy for developing countries. Earlier, Wolde-
Rufael (2005) finds a mixture of unidirectional, bidirectional and no causal 
relationships in 19 African countries. He explains the different directions of 
causality in terms of country-specific factors. A common factor in these 
studies is the use of aggregate energy measure and aggregate GDP. 
2.3 Review of Production Functions 
Production functions are an important tool of economic analysis (and the role 
of energy), especially in the neoclassical sense. In its fundamental form it is 
generally conceived as the technical relationship between output produced and 
inputs employed. Of the two efficiencies implied by production functions -
technical and allocative - , economists generally assumed technical efficiency 
as achieved (Libenstein et ai, 1988). With this assumption, production function 
is described as the relationship between the maximal technically feasible 
output and the inputs required for that output (Shephard, 1970). Because the 
production process uses several types of inputs in physical units to produce 
(often) several types of output (joint production), the relationship between 
outputs and inputs is essentially physical. Since these various physical units of 

















) is attributed to Phillip Wicksteed in 1894, but also to von 
Thunen in the 1840s in formP = f(F) = AIT~(l- e-"'~), where F, are capital, 
labour and fertiliser inputs, a. are parameters and P is agricultural production, 
A is a productivity parameter and IT a product operator (Humphrey, 1997). 
Between early 1950s and late 1970s, when production functions gained much 
interest among economists, various empirical specifications relating inputs to 
output were proposed. Besides the unitary elasticity of substitution (or Cobb-
Douglas) production function, the wide surge in the formulation of production 
functions and their analysis gave rise to the Constant Elasticity of Substitution 
production (CES) Functions. These two -Cobb-Douglas and the CES -
frameworks are the main functional forms that have gained wider acceptance 
in empirical and theoretical literature, however, due to their limitations, they 
have served as bases for further generalisations to the Variable Elasticities of 
Substitution (VES) production functions. These three groups of functional 
forms are briefly explored in the following sub-sections. 
2.3.1 Unitary Elasticity of Substitution Functions 
The Cobb-Douglas (C-D) production function generally attributed to Cobb and 
Douglas (1928) is also known as unitary elasticity of substitution function 
because it restricts the elasticity of factor substitution to unity. It carne to light 
due to the effort of Paul Douglas and Charles Cobb to fit US manufacturing 
data (from1889 to 1922). The resulting formulation has been extremely popular 
among economists. It can be written as: 
Y = AKa L1- a (2.02) 
where Y is output, K is capital and L is labour, a: (0", a "' I) a parameter and 
A: (A > 0) the level of technology. It is possible to demonstrate that this 
functional form as stated exhibits constant Returns to Scale. If markets are 
assumed to be competitive and factors are rewarded at their marginal products, 
then the parameters a and I - a are synonymous to capital and labour shares 











factor proportions IS exactly offset by corresponding changes in marginal 
productivities of inputs, as such, factor shares remain constant for any capital-
labour ratio, implying also that income shares will be constant over time. 
Arrow et al (1961) argue that the Cobb-Douglas assumption of unitary 
elasticity of substitution leads to unduly restrictive conclusions. They provide 
theoretical examples as to why input elasticity of substitution should also 
assume a zero value. The first is that the Harrod-Domar economic growth 
modee2 depends critically on a zero elasticity of substitution assumption. 
Secondly, varying elasticities among sectors imply reversal of factor 
intensities at different factor pnces, with different consequences for 
international trade and factor returns, but either zero or unitary elasticities of 
substitution lead to constancy in ranking of factor proportions. Thirdly, the 
hitherto perceived constancy of labour share of income in the US that served 
as the basis for assuming unitary elasticity of substitution in the analysis of 
relative shares of factor incomes has been refuted by Solow (1958). 
However, unitary elasticity assumption has no theoretical basis in the Cobb-
Douglas framework. The correct elasticity is purely an empirical question. 
Modern economists (Fraser, 2002; Arrow et ai, 1961) have questioned the 
methodological soundness of the earlier studies that lent support to the initial 
empirical results of Cobb-Douglas (1928). Arrow et al (1961, p.225) have 
argued that technological alternatives are numeroWi and flexible in some 
sectors, limited in others; and uniform substitutability is most unlikely. They 
confirm this by an observation that capital-labour proportions show more 
variation among countries in some sectors more than others. Following these 
criticisms, Arrow et al (1961) develop the Constant Elasticity of Substitution 
(CES) production function, of which the Cobb-Douglas framework is a special 
case. 
22 The Horrod-Domar model is named on the basis of the works of Harrod (1939) and Domar 
(1947). The key parameters of the framework are savings-output and capital-output ratios. The 
characteristic and powerful outcome of the Harrod-Domar logic is that even for the long TIlil, 
the economic system is at best balanced on highly llllstable equilibrium path of grovvth 
(Harrod, 1939, p.16). This outcome is a consequence of the fixed proportion assumption 











2.3.2 Constant Elasticity of Substitution Functions 
The Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function is easily 
derived from the redefinition of the elasticity of substitution. The elasticity of 
substitution (0") between capital (K) and labour (L) for example is the measure 
of the ease with which more capital may be used in the place of labour or vice 
versa, defined as the percentage change in factor proportions resulting from a 
unit change in the Marginal Rate of Technical Substitution23 (MRTS). 
Formally, 




d(K I L)].[MRTS] 
dMRTS (K I L) 
Following Klump and Preissler (2000), equation (2.03) can be rewritten as 
(J" = [d(K I L)].[MRTS] = / (k)[r~k) - k( (k) 1 
dMRTS (K I L) -!if (k)f(k) (2.04) 
where f, f·and/·are zero, first and second order partial derivatives with 
respect to k of the production function f(k), and k = K I L. The solution of 
the underlying partial differential equation III k IS 
y [)/p 
Y= L = f(k) = 7, kP+72 J (2.05) 
or 
(2.06) 
where 7, and 72 are constants of integration, and P = «(J" -I) I (J". If 
a = 1/(1 + 7 2) and C = 7, (I + 72)11 P, then equation (2.06) becomes the standard 
CES production function of Arrow et al (1961): 
(2.07) 
where C is a measure of technical progress, 0 S; a S; I and 1- a are 
distribution parameters that can be used as determinants of factor shares, pis 
23 The MRTS is the rate at which a factor (e.g. labour) can be substituted for another (e.g. capital), 











a substitution parameter, used to derive the elasticity of substitution. Though 
other variants of CES production functions which allow technological change 
to affect factor productivities (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 200424 and David and 
van de Klundert, 196525), have been suggested, the above form by Arrow et al 
(1961) has been prominent. 
There are two main issues related to the CES production function. The first is 
the constancy of the elasticity of substitution (between inputs) along and 
across isoquants. In practice, there is possibility of variations in (J as argued by 
Revankar (1971). This variation depends on output and or combinations of 
inputs (Hicks, 1932 and Allen, 1956). The second issue is the definition of the 
elasticity of substitution when more than two inputs are used in production. 
For example, in case of three inputs, there will be three elasticities, which 
would increase with increase in inputs. It has been shown by Uzawa (1962) 
and McFadden (1962 and 1963) that it is impossible to obtained a functional 
form for a production function with an arbitrary set of constant elasticities of 
substitution when there are more than two factors of production. This is now 
known as the impossibility theorem oJUzawa and McFadden. 
2.3.3 Variable Elasticity of Substitution Functions 
In attempts to overcome the limitations posed by unitary and constant 
elasticities of substation production functions, various studies have 
endeavoured to generalise the CoD andlor CES production functions to give 
room for variability of elasticities of substitution. A renowned generalisation 
is that proposed by Revankar (1971), generalised from CES. In his attempt to 
improve on the simplicity of the expression of the elasticity of substitution and 
to ensure a certain degree of linearity, Revankar (1971) diverges somewhat 
from earlier attempts 26 of Variable Elasticity of Substitution (VES) production 
24 This variant which is formalised as y ~ C[a(bKY + (1- a)((l-b)LY j"P allows for biased 
teclmological change but has been criticised by Klump and Preissler (2000) for not following directly 
from the definition of the elasticity of substitution. 
2S This variant sets AK = 71 and AL = 727;" which are respectively, capital and labour augmenting 
technical progress, to obtain Y = [CAKKY + (ALLY r p 











functions. His variant of YES production functions with two inputs - capital 
(K) and labour (L) -, technology factor (A) and parameters p, ii, and JI. is as 
follows: 
(2.08) 
Revankar (1971) imposes the following restriction on the parameters:A, p > 
0;0 < 0 < 1;0 ~ 01' ~ 1 and L 1-11-- > --. The function for elasticity of 
K 1-0/1 
substitution (a) is given by: 
(J(K, L) = 1 + [:':~lK = 1 + f3 ~ (2.09) 
Though Revanker's YES production function contains the linear production 
function, it still contains a degree of non-linearity in parameters and cannot 
easily be generalised to more than two inputs. Vinod (1972) proposes a Cobb-
Douglas generalisation based on the log-quadratic production function 
suggested by Kmenta (1967). The basic version for two inputs Xl and xz, 
output y and parameters ak(k = 0,1,2,3) is: 
(2.10) 
When al = 1 - az and a3 = 0, (2.10) becomes the Cobb-Douglas function. 
If the terms involving In (xl)Z and In (xz)Z are included, then (2.10) 
becomes the Kmenta (1967) log-quadratic formulation. 
The virtues of Vinod's (1972) version are that (I) it allows for variable 
elasticity of substitution; (2) it imposes no restrictions on data nor parameters; 
(3) the specification is linear in parameter and flexible; (4) can easily be 
extended to more than two inputs (5) it measures other properties of 
production, for example output elasticity, elasticities of substitution and 
Returns to Scale with different factor proportions. Because of these virtues, 
and the fact that it can be estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), and 
can easily be incorporated into simultaneous equations frameworks, it is 











Due to these qualities, various authors find it easier to apply compared to the 
other functional forms (see for example, Lopez, 1997; Kouliavtsev et aI2007). 
2.4 Energy, Inequality and Poverty 
Although energy is crucial for addressing the needs of the poor, its poverty 
impact awareness has been confined largely to abstract conceptualization and 
anecdotal experiences (Ramani et ai, 2003). As a result, the specific 
contributions that energy makes or could make to the lives of the poor are not 
well understood. 
One of the most conceptually comprehensive overview of the role of energy 
choices on poverty is given by the energy ladder model. This model proposes 
three distinct phases in fuel switching. The first is characterised by universal 
reliance on biomass. In the second phase, the model hypothesises movement to 
"transition" fuels such as kerosene, coal and charcoal in response to higher 
incomes, urbanisation and biomass scarcity. The final phase is the switching 
on to LPG, natural gas or electricity for cooking (Barnes and Floor, 1999; 
Barnes and Qian, 1992; Hosier and Kipondya, 1993; Leach, 1992). Using data 
for eight countries, Heltberg (2004) finds that modern fuel use is associated 
with higher incomes. However, the energy ladder model is conceptualised to 
explain more of what determines household or individuals' decision to switch 
from one fuel source to another rather than the impacts of such fuel or their 
substitution on household income (or its arguments). 
ESMAP (2002) has identified large-scale electrification programmes in both 
rural and urban areas in developing countries as a vehicle for promoting equity 
and economic development. The significant areas that electrification affects 
are low cost and expanded use of lighting, access to information (TV and 
Radio), improved return on education and wage income, time saving on 
various household chores and improved horne business productivity. Another 
effect relates to benefits from improved farm income through pump irrigation. 
Depending on farm size and other factors, Barnes, Fitzerald and Peskin (2002) 











Currently (2007), people living below the lower international poverty line 
(US$I income per day) spend up to a third of their income on energy services. 
Using poor quality energy such as biomass and fossil fuels (kerosene and coal) 
in households has led to many health problems such as asthma and increased 
susceptibility to chest infections (Lallement 2005), which impacts human 
capital. 
Macro-economic studies of electrification in the Philippines conducted by 
ESMAP (2002) quantified the benefits that accrue to households following 
electrification. Electricity, which was a cheaper27 form of energy compared to 
traditionally used fuels, allowed household energy budgets to decrease through 
access to higher and less expensive forms of lighting, as well as radio and 
television use. Access to electricity also increased education levels - this also 
led to increased real wages in the newly electrified areas. Productivity gains 
increased for already established businesses and many new small businesses 
were established (Prasad, 2006). 
Other studies have shown that access to electricity, as well as increased 
incomes have enabled households to move away from traditional fuels such as 
biomass and kerosene to electricity (Davis 1998), though multiple fuel use still 
continues in these households. This movement up the "energy ladder" allows 
households to obtain the benefits extended from using electricity, such as 
cleaner air, reduction of fires and poisoning, as well as better services 
provided by schools and clinics due to electrification (DME and ERC, 2002). 
An extensive linkage between energy choice, household poverty according to 
the livelihood approach and possible contribution to women empowerment has 
been established by the World Bank (lEG, 2008). 
World Bank (2008a), in a micro-based study finds that benefits of 
electrification accrue mainly to the non-poor. It suggests that there is a need 
for provision of complementary services to accompany electrification to the 
poor. In general, the effect of energy consumption on inequality seems scarce 
in literature. 











2.5 Pro-poor Growth 
The question of whether economic growth is good for the poor or under what 
circumstances growth can be declared pro-poor has of recent been a subject of 
academic and policy debate (Bourguignon, 2004; Bruno et ai, 1998; Dollar 
and Kraay, 2002; Eastwood and Lipton, 2001; Ravallion, 2001; United 
Nations, 2000 and World Bank, 2002). The answer to this question 
necessitates the clarification of pro-poorness. As a result of the debate, some 
consensus has emerged. 
The First consensus is on the importance of growth on poverty reduction. 
Historically, countries with high and prolonged period of economic growth 
also experienced the fastest reduction in poverty rates (Dollar and Kraay, 
2002). In this light, the poor evidently share from increasing aggregate income 
as well as suffer from economic slow-downs. However, despite consensus 
over this point, there is a great deal of debate concernmg the exact 
conceptualisation and measurement of pro-poorness of growth. Though a 
number of pro-poor concepts have been put forth28, the absolute and relative 
concepts have been the most prominent in policy debates. 
The absolute concept is of two types. The first - the strong absolute - requires 
that the absolute income gain of the poor be more than those on the average or 
of the rich (Klasen, 2005). White and Anderson (2000) demonstrate that this 
requirement implies that growth rate of the poor would have to be larger by a 
factor of the ratio of the initial incomes of the non-poor and the poor. As such, 
it is a difficult requirement to meet. The second - the weak absolute - requires 
the suitably aggregated income growth rate of the poor be greater than zero. 
Proponents of the latter subclass argue that for poverty reduction, only high 
income growth for the poor matters, not the relative position to the non-poor29 
The relative concept suggests that growth is pro-poor if the growth of income 
of the poor is higher than the average income growth rate. This implies that 
28 Ravallion and Chen (2003). Son (2004). Kakwani and Pemia (2000). Hanmer and Booth (2001). 
McCalloch and Baulch (1999). White and Anderson (2000). Klasen (2003). Duclos and Wodon (2004). 
29 For example, high but llllequal grovvth recorded in China can be considered preferable to low but 











growth has to be relatively biased towards the poor, such bias (with constant 
average growth would lead to faster poverty reduction. Proponents of relative 
concept of pro-poor growth - among whom are Kakwani and Pemia (2000), 
McCulloch and Baulch (1999), Ravallion and Chen (2003) - argue that such 
will be the case only if inequality reduces. This leads to another consensus. 
The second consensus is that poverty reduction is fastest in situations where 
income growth is accompanied by falling inequality (Bourguignon, 2004). 
However, it is difficult to argue that inequality reduction in the absence of 
growth can result in poverty reduction. Ravallion (1997), Bourguignon (2002) 
and Son and Kakwani (2003) have established that high inequality reduces the 
impact of growth on poverty reduction. It has also been noted that poverty 
reduction depends on the poverty line. 
However, the main challenge - as noted by Bourguignon (2004) - in 
establishing development policies is whether or not there is any interrelation 
between growth and inequality. 
2.5.1 Growth - Inequality Nexus 
The type of relationship that may exist between growth and inequality is very 
crucial to the pro-poor debate. If there is no link between both quantities, then 
it will be possible to pursue growth and redistribution policies separately 
without jeopardising either. On the other hand, if there is a link between them, 
then there must be some trade-off. The nature of the trade-off will depend on 
the type of link. Empirically, the specification of pro-poor regression models 
will depend on the nature of relationship existing between growth and 
inequality. There has been increasing interest on the investigation of the 
growth-inequality nexus in recent literature. On the one hand are those who 
pursue the Kuznets' (1955) inverted V-shape hypothesis, which seeks to 
deepen understanding on the distributional consequences of growth 
(Ahluwalia, 1976a; Justman and Gradstein, 1999). On the other hand and 
relatively recently, are those who look at feed-back in the above relationship, 
i.e. the growth impact of inequality (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Persson and 











2.5.1.1 Inequality Impact of Growth 
The first influential argument for the impact of growth on inequality is the 
work of Kuznets (1955). He hypothesises that at the early stages of growth in 
developing countries, inequality increases, and then starts to fall. Since then, 
this hypothesis has gained interest among researchers (Oshima, 1970; 
Ahluwalia, 1976a; Robinson, 1976). Basic mechanisms have been proposed 
to explain this hypothesis. First, Kuznets suggests labour market 
imperfections, productivity differentials across economic sectors and the 
changing importance of the various sectors in the economy. Particularly, in a 
two-sector economy - low inequality, poorer rural sector and high inequality, 
richer urban sector -, growth occurs by rural-to-urban labour migration. The 
model starts with all population in the rural sector. As the first workers 
migrate, inequality first increases, and then falls with the last workers leaving 
the rural sector. Stiglitz (1969) explained the same hypothesis within a 
neoclassical framework of growth and distribution in which individual 
accumulation behaviour and changing factor rewards (due to diminishing 
returns to capital) account for the V-shape in the evolution of inequality with 
development. 
Besides the basics, other directly or indirectly related mechanisms have been 
suggested. One is the institutional channels in which institutions, social 
relations, culture etc, tend to be modified by growth through various ways. 
The most simple, exemplified in Justman and Gradstein (1999) is by means of 
non-homothetic30 preferences such that the demand for social services changes 
with income growth. People subsequently become politically more active, 
leading to change in the distribution of political power and evolution of 
institutions. North (1990) has highlighted the possibility of transaction costs -
which hinder institutional change - becoming more affordable with economic 
growth. Bourguignon (2004) observes that the process of urbanisation that 
follows economic development occurs naturally with the evolution of social 
relations. 
30 Preferences or utility is homothetic when the expenditure shares of different consumption goods are 











Empirical works that lend support to this hypothesis made use of cross-country 
datasets from 1950s to 1970s and regress a measure of inequality against 
suitable function of mean income. Some examples are Adelman and Morris 
(1973), Ahluwalia (1976b) and Ram (1995). Ahluwalia (1976b) estimates 
inequality as a function of log of per capita income and its square to capture 
the quadratic effect in a cross section data, and confirms the existence of an 
inverted V-shaped relationship. Anand and Kanbur (1993a and 1993b) 
propose other functional forms and show that Ahluwalia's (1976) estimates 
are not robust to functional form variations. Bruno et al (1999) argue that 
there may be important country-specific factors (including past inequality), 
determining current inequality, which may also be correlated with current 
income levels, leading to biased estimates. This relationship was verified for 
the 1970s, but as more and better data became available, it was not verified for 
later periods. Bruno et al (1999) replicated the specifications and found no 
evidence of inverted V -shape in latter cross-sections. Bourguiguon and 
Morrisson (1998) use unbalanced panel data for developing countries and 
found that this hypothesis is not verified. Deininger and Squire (1996a) use 
unbalanced panel with about ten year intervals31. A simple pool regression of 
Gini with respect to per capita income and its inverse give a siguificant 
inverted V-shape. However, decadal differencing to account only for time 
changes gives an insiguificant curvature. The introduction of country fixed-
effects 32 causes the V-shape to disappear completely. 
As Bourguiguon (2004) remarks, all the above discussions do not imply that 
growth has no significant impact on inequality, but rather much presence of 
country-specific factors in the inequality impact of growth. This call for more 
country-specific (obviously time series) case studies. Bourguignon et al (2003) 
suggest that indeed growth impacts inequality, a major contributing factor 
being the difficulty of the poorest households to incorporate themselves into 
the labour market in the advent of slow growth. 
31 considered problematic with possible measurement errors (Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001) 











2.5.1.2 Growth Impact ofInequality 
Even if growth has any impact on income distribution, one other major is 
whether there is reverse impact. The works of Galor and Zeira (1993), Persson 
and Tabelini (1994) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994) are pioneers in this area. 
Though a number of channels exist through which reverse causation could 
happen, two prominent ones have often been highlighted in literature - credit 
constraints and political economy - both of which have implications for human 
and physical capital accumulation. 
Credit, Savings and Investment Channel 
The underlying mechanism here can be typified by the following: In the credit 
market, if 10 and 50 percent are the respective interest rates of rich and poor 
individuals (due to lack of collateral by the poor), then all projects with return 
rates of 10 percent and above will be undertaken by the rich while only 
projects of 50 percent and above return rate will be carried by the poor. But if 
there is redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poorer individuals, it will 
reduce their need to borrow while allowing them to undertake projects with 
returns lower than 50 percent. As such, redistribution will lead to higher 
investment andlor higher return to capital (Bourguignon, 2004: 17). More 
formalised models (like Galor and Zeira, 1993; Banerjee and Newman, 1993; 
Aghion and Bolton, 1997) put information asymmetry at the centre of credit 
constraints. In these models, the evolution of inequality and output is 
influenced by the limited choice by poor people (and possibly middle class) of 
occupations and investment due to credit rationing. When the poor are thus 
prevented from making productive investment (that would benefit them and 
the society), a low and inequitable growth process can result. Besides, in a 
Keynesian economy where marginal rate of savings increases with income, or 
with higher propensity to save from capital returns than labour returns, those at 
the top end of the distribution may represent the main source of savings 
(Voitchovsky, 2005). The suggestion here is that growth is not only affected 











Skills, Incentives and Innovations 
In situations where ability is rewarded, there is incentive for more effort, risk 
taking and higher productivity, resulting in higher growth but with higher 
income inequality. In such cases, talented individuals will tend to seize higher 
return to their skills. The resulting concentration of talents and skills in the 
advanced technology upper income sector becomes conducive for further 
innovation and growth (Hassler and Mora, 2000). Such incentive can induce 
greater effort in all parts of the distribution (Voitchovsky, 2005). However, 
frustration in the lower end of the distribution resulting from perceived 
unfairness (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990) may counteract the innovation gains. 
Along the same line, Schwabish et al (2003) find that top end inequality 
(measured by 90/50 percentile ratio) strongly and negatively impacts social 
expenditures while the bottom end (captured by 50/10 percentile) show a small 
positive effect. They suggest that high top end inequality reduces social 
solidarity, with the rich trying to pull out of publicly funded programs such as 
health care and education, in preference to private provision. 
Though these models do not explain the historical origin of high inequality, 
they establish the link between persistently high inequality, inefficiencies and 
slower production. 
Political Economy 
In this view, high inequality sets the stage for the adoption of distortionary 
policies which adversely affects investment and generates political instability 
leading to stifled growth. Two main channels are identified here. 
One relies on the notion of the median voter, where wealth inequality 
increases the gap between the median voter and the average capital 
endowment of the economy. This leads him to support higher capital tax rates, 
which in tum reduces incentives to invest in physical and human capital hence 
reducing growth. Persson and Tabelini (1994) suggest an alternative along this 
line, in which the rich spend their wealth to lobby for preferential (tax) 











The other channel is the social conflict and political instability. Alesina and 
Perotti (1993) have argued that higher political instability can result from high 
inequality, the resulting uncertainty then reduces investment levels. Rodrik 
(1996) has noticed that divided societies with weak institutions also witnessed 
the sharpest fall in post-I975 growth. This situation brought about a weakness 
in their capacity to effectively respond to external shocks. Also, recent sharp 
increase in violence in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa has been 
matched with their high inequality. Another channel makes use of possible 
positive externalities in the consumption of certain goods, whose demand may 
be reduced by high inequality (Schleifer et ai, 1989). 
Empirical attempts have been made to test the hypothesis - that high inequality 
leads to low investment in physical and human capital, resulting in slower 
growth - which, like the case of the Kuznets hypothesis have also tended to be 
inconclusive or even contradictory. Various authors have found negative 
impact of initial inequality on growth. Persson and Tabelini (1994) using data 
for nine OECD countries found that a one standard deviation increase in 
income share of the top quintile reduces growth rate by half a percentage 
point. Other verifications have been made, for a sample of developing 
countries (Clarke, 1995) and a combination of both, in an extended dataset 
(Deininger and Squire, 1996b). 
Other works have nuanced and even contradicted the above. Fishlow (1996) 
for example, casts doubt on the robustness of the above stndies by controlling 
for Latin America in the cross-section data used by the above stndies. He finds 
insignificant effect of inequality on growth. Forbes (2000) estimates fixed 
effect models using decadal country data and find a positive association 
between inequality and growth. Voitchovsky (2005) controls for the shape of 
income distribution33 using the Luxemburg Income Stndy dataset and 
recommends that a combination of average, top and bottom end inequalities 
are necessary to efficiently captnre the effect of inequality on growth. 
However, It can be said that the investigation of the growth impact of 











inequality also suffer from the same problems of the Kuznets case, requiring 
more country-specific case studies. 
2.5.2 Pro-poor Growth Modelling 
In a review of the poverty-growth-inequality relationship by Bourguignon 
(2004) and Son (2004), the impact of growth on poverty is shown to be a 
decreasing function of inequality. Building on Kakwani (1993), Kakwani and 
Pemia (2000) developed an operational pro-poor growth framework. The 
framework was later updated by Son and Kakwani (2008) as follows. Suppose 
the degree of poverty P measured by average deprivation is given in terms of 
poverty line (z) and income x by 
p = s: p(z, x)f(x)dx (2.11) 
Where p (z, x) is a general family of additive poverty indices such as Foster et al 
(1984), and f(x) a probability density function. Let L(P) be the percentage 
share of the income of the bottom p percent of the population. For societal 
mean income Jl = fo" x(q)dq, 
1 rP 
L(p) = ;;-Jo x(q)dq (2.12) 
WhereL(p) = 0 whenp = 0; L(p) = lwhenp = 1; L(p) ~ 0 forO ~ p ~ 1; 
and dL(p) = x(p) > 0 and d'L~) > 0: L(p) = P gives perfect equality in 
dp /l dp 
income distribution. Based on Atkinson's (1987) relationship between second 
order dominance and poverty reduction, if !1 (JlL (p )) 2 0 for all p, then 
change in poverty is negative i.e. !1P ~ 0 for all poverty line and the entire 
family of poverty measures in (2.11). From the definition of Lorenz curve with 
mean income of the bottomp percent of the population as: Jlp =; fo" x(q)dq, 
(2.12) can be rewritten as: 
L(p) = /lpP 
/l 












In(,up) = In(,uL(p)) -In (p) (2.14) 
Taking the first difference of (2.14) gives: 
g(p) = L1ln(f1I(p)) (2.15) 
where g(p) = Mn (f1p) is the growth rate of the mean income of the bottomp 
percent of the population when individuals are ranked by their per capita 
income, also called the poverty growth curve (Son, 2004). Son and Kakwani 
(2008) show that if g(p) > 0 « 0), for all p, then poverty has decreased 
(increased) unambiguously between two periods. They suggest a pro-poor 
growth rate (y' ) in terms of the area under the poverty-growth curve: 
or y' = y - Mn (G') (2.16) 
where y is the growth rate of societal mean income and Mn (G') is the rate of 
change of inequality. If inequality decreases (increases) in a given period, then 
the pro-poor growth rate is greater (less) than the actual growth rate for that 
period. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter aimed at examining the existing literature on production, 
inequality and poverty reduction while situating the role of energy. The 
generally agreed theory in literature is that poverty reduction comes from two 
prerequisites - high and sustained economic growth and reduction of 
inequality. After reviewing the various issues related to energy and the 
production process, production functions were briefly explored. The literature 
on pro-poor growth was then reviewed, looking specifically at the debate on 
the growth-inequality nexus, and the modelling of pro-poor growth. 
It follows from the literature review that there are five unaddressed issues. The 
first is to control for endogeneity of production/growth and inequality in the 
pro-poor growth framework. The second is the need for country-specific time 











for endogeneity of energy and production in production and poverty 
frameworks. The fourth is to consider energy types in disaggregation. This can 
be equivalent to controlling for quality and is necessary because different fuels 
may have different effects in production, with the possibility of cancelling out 
when aggregated. The fifth is to look at the effect of various fuels in the 
different productive sectors of the economy. This is needed because various 
fuels can also have different effects in different sector. 
The question of quality of energy and complementarity or substitutability with 
other factors of production - capital and labour - would appear to go hand in 
hand for pro-poor effects. This raises three important issues. If energy and 
capital are complements, then only access to both will result in effective 
participation in production. Therefore electrification efforts will not have pro-
poor effects without capital availability and vice-versa. If energy (in 
association with capital) is a substitute to labour (not skills), the increased use 
of energy and capital in production may result in less employment of unskilled 
labour34 Because technological progress can move capital away from less 
efficient to more efficient fuels, lack of access to more efficient fuel can be a 
poverty trap, where the poor are trapped in obsolete technologies. 
The contribution of this thesis is to address the above issues. First, the 
question of substitutabil ty will be investigated in a LAC and ARDL 
frameworks and then in Variable Elasticity of Substitution (VES) production 
functions. The results will be used for further specification of capital, labour 
and energy in empirical frameworks of growth and pro-poor growth. In both 
frameworks, the possibility of feedback will be controlled by estimating 
simultaneous equations for production and energy demand on one hand, and 
production, inequality, energy and poverty on the other. GDP will be 
disaggregated into sectors in order to detect sector-specific effects and energy 
will be disaggregated to different fuels to detect the effect of varying quality 
energy types. These will be done for time series South African data. 
34 This implies that skill development must go alongside efforts to improve access to efficient forms of 











3. ENERGY AND GROWTH IN SOUTH 
AFRICA: CAUSALITY AND CO-
INTEGRATION 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter tries to address some of the outstanding issues on energy and 
economic growth highlighted in the literature. Specifically, it revisits the 
Vector Auto-Regressive (V AR) approach of causality and co-integration using 
disaggregated energy types and economic sectors. The purpose is twofold. 
First, is to determine the degree and direction of causality between various 
energy types and real GDP (in aggregate and various productive sectors) on 
one hand, and between energy and other factors of production (labour and 
capital) on other hand. This is done in the Lag-Augmented Causality (LAC) 
framework developed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) which presents clear 
advantages over the traditional Granger causality method due to Granger 
(1969) and Sims (1972). 
Second is to assess whether the energy types co-integrate with GDP and other 
factors of production. Co-integration relationships are investigated using the 
Auto-Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) or bound test approach developed 
by Pesaran et al (2001). This method has several advantages over the 
previously applied tests (Engle-Granger, 1987; Johansen, 1988; and Johansen, 
1995 and Johansen and Juselius, 1992). 
The rest of the chapter is outlined as follows: section two discusses the details 
of the methodology and data used. In section three, the results and 
interpretations are presented while section four concludes the chapter. 
3.2 Methodology 
The review of the methodology used in this chapter follows a twofold purpose. 
First is to investigate causality and second to analyse co-integration 












The notion of Granger causality, after Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) is based 
on the premise that if x causes y, then a change in x will be followed by a change 
in y. A simple functional form for the determination of causal relationship (in 
the Granger sense) between variables X and Y is as follows: 
m m 




Y, = /30 + L a 2,XH + L /32'YH + By, 
1=1 1=1 
where ex and ey are uncorrelated error terms, m is maximum number of lags, and 
a and /3 are parameters. This is a Wald test of restrictions o  a2i and /31i 
respectively for X causing Y and vice versa. One of the major setbacks of this 
test is the difficulty of its applicability in situations where variables are 
integrated or co-integrated. It has been shown (Park and Phillips, 1989 and Sims 
et al 1990) that conventional F-statistics does not have the standard distribution 
and therefore not applicable for levels V AR. For a known order of integration 
with no co-integration, an appropriate order difference of the V AR may be 
estimated. In cases of co-integrated series, an error correction model (ECM) can 
be estimated. However, unit root tests are known to under-perform especially in 
the presence of structural breaks (Toda and Yamamoto, 1995). Existing test for 
co-integration (particularly the Johansen-type ECM) is not quite reliable since it 
has been shown to be very sensitive to values of the nuisance parameter in finite 
samples (Reimers, 1992 and Toda, 1995). Besides, the ECM-based Granger test 
involves non-linear parametric restrictions implying that such test may be 
affected by size distortions due to rank deficiency (Toda and Phillips, 1993). 
Toda and Yamamoto (1995) proposed a version of Granger causality which fits 
level V AR, reducing the risk of wrongful identification of integration order. 
This approach relies on artificial augmentation of the correct lag order (m) by 











m dmao: m dmao: 
X t = a o + L a IJ X t_1 + L a 1j X t _ j + L PIJ Yt-1 + LP1jYt - j + Ext 
1=1 j=m+l 1=1 j=m+l 
(3.02) 
m dmao: m dmao: 
Y, = /30 + L a 2,XH + L a 2}X,.} + L /32'YH + L /32}Y'.} + 8y, 
1=1 j=m+l 1=1 j=m+l 
The mam Issues about the estimation of the above system are the 
determination of the maximum order of integration (dmm) and the true lag 
length (m). 
3.2.1.1 Order of Integration 
Determining the order of integration of series consists of analysing whether 
the Data Generating Process (DGP) is stationary or not. Maddala and Kim 
(1998) give an overview of the various statistical tests for stationarity analysis 
that have been proposed in literature. The various tests have their strengths and 
weaknesses under different conditions. The most easily applied and widely 
used of them are the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test after Dickey and 
Fuller (1979) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) test, after Phillips and Perron 
( 1988). 
The ADF test is augmented from an earlier version known simply as Dickey 
Fuller test. Suppose for example, a first order Auto-Regressive AR(I) process 
ofy: 
(3.03) 
where U are parameters and 8 a white nOise. The senes Y IS said to be 
stationary if it does not possess a unit root, i.e. the characteristic root of the 
process al: -l<Ul<l, and non-stationary if ul=l. By subtracting Yt-l from 
(3.03), the basic test is carried on: 
(3.03a) 











null hypothesis H 0 : P = 0 against the alternative H, : P < 0 35. ADF 
parametrically corrects for higher order AR process by assuming an AR(p): 
(3.04) 
Like Dickey and Fuller (1979), the Phillips and Perron (1988) test relies on the 
basic AR(l) specification of (3.03a). The Difference arises from the fact that 
while ADF parametrically corrects for higher order serial correlation, PP 
applies a non-parametric correction on the t-statistics of the characteristic root 
of the AR(l) process p to account for serial correlation in the error term 8. This 
method makes PP test more robust to heteroskedasticity and unknown order 
autocorrelation. Generally, PP test is viewed as more reliable because contrary 
to ADF, it is known to be robust to a nuisance parameter and it is not affected 
by weak dependence and heterogeneity of sample data (Katafono, 2000). 
3.2.1.2 Lag length Selection 
Selection of the appropriate lag36 order is another crucial issue in V AR 
analysis. Information criteria are a standard tool for model selection, 
specifically, the determination of the appropriate lag length (Lutkepohl, 1991). 
Information criteria compare the gains (in terms of reduction of residual 
variance) of using a more generous lag order against the cost of loss of degrees 
of freedom in a regression model. Suppose an estimated regression variance 
0-2 which depends on lag order of the model p, sample size and number of 
usable observations T, and a loss function depending on p and T. The 
Information Criteria (IC) which must be minimised is given by: 
JC(p) = Tln0-2(p)+ p[f(T)] (3.05) 
3S Only the one sided alternative is specified since explosive series are not conceivable in economic 
related processes. 
36 It is important to make a little distinction between lag length for V AR (or VECM) and lag length for 
unit root test. The fonner is done so as to eliminate autocorrelation in the error term of the entire model 











Various choice of f(T) give different information criteria. There are three most 
prominent ones in literature. The Akaike Information Criterions (AlC) results 
when f(T) = 2, i.e., 
AlC = Tlnif2(p) + 2p (3.05a) 
The Schwarz (Bayesian) Information Criterion (SBIC) is obtained by taking 
f(T) = In(T), 
SBlC = Tin if2 (p) + P In(T) (3.05b) 
Taking f(T) = In(lnT) results III the Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion 
(HQIC): 
HQlC = Tin if2 (p) + P In(lnT) (3.05c) 
In cases where the information criteria disagree, the question anses as to 
which one to use. While SBIC adopts a stiffer penalty or loss term than AlC, 
HQIC lies between both. Therefore the trade-off is between the extremes. It 
has been shown that as T --> co, AlC tend to positively overestimate the true 
lag length than SBIC while on average, for different samples of a given 
population, the variation in the selected model orders will be greater for SBIC 
than AlC (Brooks, 2008: 233). Therefore, in finite samples, the AlC might be 
considered. 
3.2.2 Co-integration 
When variables are non-stationary, differencing is often applied to achieve 
stationarity. If this is achieved after first differencing, the variable is said to be 
integrated of order one 1(1) and so on. However, the cost of differencing to is 
the loss of information about the long-run relationship. Engle and Granger 
(1987) show that a linear combination of two or more non-stationary series 
may be stationary (i.e. series are co-integrated). The co-integrating 











The commonly used method to determine the long-run relationship is 
Johansen (1988; 1991 and1995) test based on restrictions on the V AR by co-
integration of the series. A V AR that incorporates such long-run equilibrium 
relationship among variables is known as Vector Error Correction Model 
(VECM). Suppose an m-order VARas follows: 
m-l 
Y, = I A'YH +BX, + 8, 
1=1 
(3.06a), 
where Y, and X, are vectors of I( I) and deterministic variables respectively, A 
and B are vectors of parameters. The corresponding VECM can be specified as 
follows: 
m-l 
t.Y, = ITYc-! + Ir,t.Y,_, +BX, + 8, (3.06b), 
1=1 
m m 
with IT = I A, -J , the long-run multiplier matrix and r = - I A] the short-
I~ J=I~ 
run response matrix, and I is an identity matrix. According to Granger 
representation theorem, if the matrix IT h s reduced rank, i.e. the rank r<k 
variables in the vector Y" then k x r matrices a and ~ exist such that I]"Y, is 
stationary and IT = al]". The rank of IT also represents the relations, each 
column of ~ gives a co-integrating vector, while a is known as the 
adjustment'7 parameter. Johansen (1995) suggests testing for co-integration by 
estimating an unrestricted IT, then imposing the restrictions of reduced rank 
and testing by way of Likelihood Ratio (LR). 
However, Johansen's method requires that all underlying series candidate for 
co-integration analysis must be integrated of order one (1(1)). In practise, this 
is not often the case. For instance in investigating the relationship between 
energy and other factors of production, capital formation is often 1(2). In such 
case like any other where the order of integration is above one, the Johansen-
type test is not suitable (Wolde-Rufael, 2005). Further, given that unit root and 
co-integration tests are very low against the alternative hypothesis of trend 
37 In case of any shock, causing deviation of the system from the long-nm equilibriumP'y
t
, a tells 











stationarity for unit root and no co-integration for co-integration test, and 
particularly, Johansen's co-integration test is sensitive to the value of nuisance 
parameters in small samples (Toda, 1995), the robustness of such test can be 
significantly attenuated. 
Pesaran et ai, (2001) developed an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) 
approach to long-run relationship among variables. The basic ARDL 
framework in error correction (ECM) is as follows: 
m m 
,1.Yt = Co + IIyyYt _1 + IIyxXt _1 + L ry/~~Yt_J + L rXJAY"t_J +8t (3.06c) 
1=1 1=1 
The methodology of Pesaran et al (2001) consists of the following: (I) 
Estimating the unrestricted VECM of (3.06c); (2) Testing the hypothesis of 
joint significance of the restriction of all the parameter elements of the vector 
IT to zero (no co-integration) against non-zero (co-integration) i.e. 
H 0 : IT = 0' against HI: IT "" 0' . 
The test statistics underlying this procedure is the usual Wald or F -statistics 
used in conditional unrestricted error correction model for lag level 
significance test such as the ADF case in (3.04). However, under the null 
hypothesis of no co-integration between the included variables, the asymptotic 
distribution of the F-test is non-standard. Pesaran et al (2001) have derived 
two sets of critical values: one which is applicable when all the series are 1(0) 
and the other when all are 1(1). These two sets cover all possible 
classifications of series into 1(0), 1(1) or mutually co-integrated. If the 
computed F-statistic lies above the both critical bounds, then conclusively, the 
null hypothesis of no co-integration is rejected irrespective of whether the 
series are 1(0) or 1(1). Alternatively, if it lies below the lower critical bound, 
then the hypothesis of level relationship is accepted irrespective of order of 
integration of series. In contrast, when the F-statistic lies within the upper and 
the lower bounds, a conclusive inference will only be made if the integration 











The ARDL co-integration procedure has several advantages over the 
previously applied tests (Engle-Granger, 1987; Johansen, 1988; and Johansen, 
1995 and Johansen and Juselius, 1992). First, the ARDL procedure can be 
applied whether the regressors are 1(0), 1(1) andlor mutually integrated. This 
implies that it can avoid unit root pre-testing since it does not need the 
classification of variables into 1(1) or 1(0). Second, while the Johansen co-
integration techniques require large data samples for validity, the ARDL 
procedure can be more suitably applied to determine the co-integration 
relation in small samples. Third, while it is not possible to use conventional 
co-integration procedures with different optimal lags in previous methods, the 
ARDL procedure allows such. Finally, the ARDL procedure employs a single 
reduced form equation, while the traditional co-integration procedures 
estimate the long-run relationships within a context of system equations. These 
advantages give the approach of Pesaran et al (200 I) more ease of 
computation and robustness, which makes it suitable for application in this 
work. 
3.2.3 Variables and Data 
F or this chapter, annual energy data from the International Energy Agency 
spanning 1971 to 2005 are used. Complementary energy data for 2006 is 
sourced from the South African Department of Minerals and Energy. 
Productive sectors analysed are whole economy, manufacturing, agriculture 
and mining. For the whole economy, energy types available are total energy, 
electricity, kerosene, diesel, gasoline, gas and coal. They are total energy, 
electricity, diesel, gas, kerosene and coal for manufacturing; total energy, 
electricity, diesel, kerosene and coal for agriculture; and total energy, 
electricity, liquid petroleum and coal for mmmg. Ail energy types are 
measured in Tera Joules (TJ). Energy types are considered in net of uses in the 
energy sector38 
GDP and capital formation (both in million at constant 2000 ZAR) are from 
the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) dataset. The SARB reports indices of 











total private sector, manufacturing and mining employments (from 1971 to 
2006) at 2000 base year. Statistics South Africa (STATSSA, 2007b) provides 
total and sector-wise real employment figures only from 2000 to 2006. These 
values are used together with the SARB indices to generate real private sector, 
manufacturing and mining employment data (in thousand persons)39 The 
SARB employment data for the entire economy does not include agriculture 
and the informal sector so total labour force series are taken from World 
Development Indicators (2008). Table 3.1 presents the summary statistic of 
variables considered in this chapter. 
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variable Obs I Mean I Std. Dev. I Min Max 
Whole Economy 
GDP 36 7.62E+05 1.70E+05 4.96E+05 1.18E+06 
capital 36 1.29E+05 2.78E+D4 9.39E+04 2.21E+05 
Labour 36 1.42E+07 3.61E+06 9.40E+06 2.01E+07 
Total energy 36 2.01E+06 3.59E+05 1.38E+06 2.72E+06 
electricity 36 4.36E+05 1.64E+05 1.68E+05 7.77E+05 
Kerosene 36 6.29E+D4 2.65E+D4 3.62E+04 l.07E+05 
Gasoline 36 2.63E+05 7.64E+D4 1.56E+05 3.87E+05 
Diesel 36 1.95E+05 4.43E+D4 1. llE+05 3.20E+05 
Gas 36 9.51E+D4 1.17E+D4 7.02E+04 1.35E+05 
Coal 36 6.27E+05 5.41E+D4 5.23E+05 7.30E+05 
Manufacturing Sector 
GDP 36 l.33E+05 2.73E+04 7.90E+04 1.92E+05 
Capital 36 2.47E+04 7.88E+03 1.12E+04 4.49E+D4 
Labour 36 1.79E+03 1.70E+02 1.46E+03 2.05E+03 
Energy 36 8.44E+05 l.OlE+05 6.00E+05 l.07E+06 
Electricity 36 2.66E+05 8.61E+04 1.17E+05 4.20E+05 
Kerosene 36 3.14E+03 2.29E+03 5.99E+02 1. llE+D4 
Diesel 36 2.73E+04 5.46E+03 1.74E+04 3.60E+D4 
Gas 36 8.73E+04 1.22E+04 6.50E+04 1.21E+05 
Coal 36 3.82E+05 7.89E+04 2.36E+05 5.44E+05 
Agricultural Sector 
Value Added 36 3.27E+03 5.83E+02 2.30E+03 4.21E+03 
Capital 36 5.88E+03 1.90E+03 3.35E+03 1.15E+D4 
Labour 36 8.62E+02 2.23E+02 3.99E+02 1.15E+03 
Energy 36 5.72E+04 1.53E+04 3.61E+04 8.56E+D4 
Electricity 36 1.14E+04 6.62E+03 2.27E+03 2.22E+D4 
Kerosene 36 1.47E+03 l.05E+03 3.51E+02 3.07E+03 
Diesel 36 3.99E+04 5.60E+03 3.29E+04 5.45E+D4 
Coal 36 2.92E+03 2.07E+03 8.19E+Ol 8.16E+03 












GDP 36 6.68E+04 2.71E+03 6.1SE+04 7.46E+D4 
Capital 36 1.20E+04 3.53E+03 3.97E+03 1.78E+D4 
Labour 36 8.62E+02 2.23E+02 3.99E+02 1.1SE+03 
Energy 36 l.SOE+OS 3.82E+04 8.11E+04 2.19E+OS 
Electricity 36 9.67E+04 2. 23 E+04 4.99E+04 1.2SE+OS 
Liquid petroleum 36 1.62E+04 S.86E+03 1.12E+D4 3.24E+D4 
Coal 36 2.61E+04 1.2SE+D4 3.96E+03 S.77E+D4 
3.3 Results and Interpretation 
This section presents the results and interpretation of the analysis done in this 
chapter. Causality results are presented fIrst, followed by co-integration results 
for the whole economy, manufacturing, agricultural and mining sectors. The 
results of the unit root test that helped to determine the order of integration are 
in the Tables Al to A4 of appendix. 
3.3.1 Causality Results 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 respectively report the long-run and short-run results of 
multivariate optimal lag length (LL) for both Akaike (AlC) and Schwarz 
Bayesian (SB) information criteria. Both tables also present the respective 
probability values of Wald test of time trend in the various causality equations 
(under the t-columns). 
Table 3.2: Long-Run Multivariate LL and Significance of Time Trend 
Whole Economy Manufacturing Agriculture Mining 
AIC 5B t AIC 5B t AIC 5B t AIC 5B t 
Energy 2 1 0.001 2 1 0.000 2 1 0.000 3 1 0.000 
Coal 2 1 0.000 3 1 0.000 2 1 0.098 3 1 0.000 
Gasoline 2 1 0.000 
Diesel 2 1 0.000 3 1 0.000 2 1 0.079 LP2 1 0.000 
Electricity 3 1 0.000 3 1 0.000 2 1 0.120 3 1 0.279 
Kerosene 3 1 0.000 3 1 0.000 2 1 0.005 - - -











Table 3.3: Short-Run Multivariate L L and Significance of Time Trend 
Whole Economy Manufacturing Agriculture Mining 
AIC 5B t AIC 5B t AIC 5B t AIC 5B t 
Energy 1 a 0.362 a a 0.055 a a 0.719 2 a 0.048 
Coal 1 a 0.491 a a 0.014 a a 0.731 2 a .0143 
Gasoline a a 0.324 - - - - - - - - -
Diesel a a 0.218 a a 0.031 3 a 0.000 LP 1 a 0.352 
Electricity 1 a 0.009 a a 0.014 a a 0.227 a a 0.000 
Kerosene 1 a 0.086 a a 0.046 a a 0.553 - - -
Gas 1 a 0.044 a a 0.039 - - - - - -
Note: values llllder the t-colunms are probabIlITIes that the tIme trend t IS not slgmficant 
Models in which the trend variable is significantly different from zero are 
estimated with trend. This is the case for long-run models of the whole 
economy, manufacturing, agriculture and mining (except electricity for both). 
Trended models are specified for all energy types in manufacturing; 
electricity, kerosene and gas for the whole economy; diesel in agriculture; and 
total energy and electricity in mining. The dm,", is the maximal integration 
order of the variables in each model, (generally one, according to the unit root 
results in the Tables Al to A4 in Appendix). The SB information criterion is 
used for optimal LL for reasons of reducing lost of degree of freedom. These 
results are used to specify the appropriate long and short-run causality 
frameworks. 
3.3.1.1 Long-run Causality Results 
The null hypothesis that there is no causal relationship (in either direction) 
between energy, output and other inputs is tested and the results reported in 
Table 3.4. The analysis is done in a multivariate framework. The first rows 
present the significance probability for causality running from energy to GDP 
(Y), capital (K) and labour (L). The second set of rows shows causality results 


























Table 3.4: Long-run Causality Results 
Whole Economy Manufacturing Agriculture Mining 
Y K L Y K L Y K L Y K 
From Eta Y, K, L 
0.057 0.001 0.309 0.458 0.011 0.712 0.091 0.459 0.000 0.001 0.001 
0.679 0.010 0.219 0.069 0.000 0.339 0.016 0.269 0.038 0.098 0.643 
0.001 0.067 0.019 - - - - - - LPO.023 0.003 
0.754 0.456 0.341 0.092 0.004 0.755 0.031 0.122 0.000 - -
0.060 0.015 0.021 0.048 0.012 0.437 0.104 0.112 0.000 0.055 0.000 
0.001 0.105 0.085 0.085 0.664 0.060 0.000 0.174 0.135 - -
0.183 0.070 0.039 0.150 0.000 0.001 - - - - -
From Y, K, L to E 
0.809 0.334 0.062 0.007 0.110 0.026 0.000 0.175 0.002 0.034 0.596 
0.771 0.182 0.003 0.001 0.266 0.001 0.334 0.079 0.528 0.005 0.701 
0.286 0.610 0.615 - - - - - - IpO.034 0.085 
0.506 0.360 0.028 0.000 0.088 0.071 0.000 0.006 0.022 - -
0.856 0.652 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.138 0.639 0.675 0.489 0.202 
0.004 0.034 0.104 0.144 0.191 0.097 0.002 0.401 0.337 - -
0.062 0.049 0.000 0.220 0.093 0.070 - - - - -
Note. figures are probabIlITIes of rejectIon of causahty. Values III bold are slgmficant at 10% 
level and less. 
In the whole economy, the long-run results show causality runnmg from 
aggregate energy use to GDP, capital and labour. Electricity causes GDP, 
capital and labour, but feedback is only for labour. Further, there IS no 
evidence of causality between GDP and coal and diesel. Gas and kerosene, 
each with GDP are mutually causing each other. There is causality from total 
energy (coal, gasoline and electricity) to capital formation, without feedback, 
while no evidence of causality exist between diesel and capital formation. 
There is one way causality from capital to kerosene and mutual causality 
between gas and capital formation. Causality runs from labour to total energy, 
coal and diesel (but from kerosene to labour) without feedback. Gas and 
labour are mutually causative. 
In the manufacturing sector, causality runs from manufacturing GDP to total 
energy and from kerosene to GDP. There is mutual causality for coal, diesel 
and electricity each with manufacturing GDP, but no causality between gas 
and manufacturing GDP. There is mutual causality between diesel, (electricity 
and gas) and capital. Unidirectional causality runs from total energy and coal 


























Causality runs from manufacturing labour to all the energy types used in the 
sector, but only kerosene and gas show feedback 
In the agricultural sector, there is bidirectional causality between value added 
and total energy (and diesel and kerosene). Unidirectional causality runs from 
coal to value added and no causality with electricity. Only one direction 
causality runs from coal and diesel to agricultural capital formation. Total 
energy use and all energy types (except kerosene) cause labour in agriculture, 
with total energy and diesel showing feedback. 
Total mining energy and all energy types (except electricity) show 
bidirectional causality with mining GDP. There is bidirectional causality 
between liquid petroleum and capital formation, unidirectional from total 
energy and electricity to capital formation and none for coal and capital. 
Mutual causality occurs between mining labour and total energy use and one 
direction from labour to coal. 
3.3.1.2 Short-run Causality Results 
In Table 3.5, the multivariate short-run causality results are presented. The 
table is organised in the same rder as Table 3.4 and the figures are the 
respective significance probabilities. The short-run analyses involve the 
differencing of the variables in the equations of model (3.02). Differencing a 

























Table 3.5: Short-run Causality Results 
Whole Economy Manufacturing I Agriculture Mining 
Y K L Y I K L I Y K L Y I K 
From Eta Y, K, L 
0.168 0.001 0.129 0.321 0.285 0.579 0.139 0.172 0.043 0.448 0.357 
0.169 0.000 0.067 0.487 0.339 0.335 0.681 0.318 0.066 0.498 0.633 
0.060 0.149 0.200 - - - - - - LpO.832 0.078 
0.702 0.161 0.883 0.315 0.059 0.871 0.009 0.784 0.141 - -
0.105 0.105 0.986 0.959 0.723 0.253 0.644 0.219 0.018 0.798 0.173 
0.317 0.306 0.128 0.850 0.361 0.581 0.658 0.061 0.236 - -
0.934 0.632 0.983 0.580 0.425 0.009 - - - - -
From Y, K, L to E 
0.929 0.043 0.056 0.122 0.279 0.172 0.001 0.249 0.919 0.126 0.710 
0.052 0.111 0.031 0.004 0.999 0.022 0.482 0.138 0.143 0.060 0.448 
0.277 0.385 0.588 - - - - - - IpO.523 0.060 
0.879 0.261 0.447 0.109 0.114 0.723 0.000 0.000 0.542 - -
0.990 0.326 0.005 0.297 0.094 0.095 0.319 0.429 0.744 0.456 0.663 
0.003 0.011 0.596 0.086 0.052 0.838 0.002 0.404 0.434 - -
0.059 0.433 0.875 0.737 0.838 0.103 - - - - -
Note: figures are probabIlITIes ofreJectton of causalIty. Values III bold are slgmficant 
The whole economy shows unidirectional causality from gasoline to GDP, 
GDP to coal, kerosene and gas. There is mutual causation for total energy and 
capital formation, and unidirectional from coal to capital and capital to 
kerosene. Labour causes total energy, electricity and coal, but only coal shows 
feedback effect. 
In the manufacturing sector, all causality detected are unidirectional, running 
from GDP to coal and kerosene; capital to electricity and kerosene; diesel to 
capital; gas to labour and labour to coal and electricity. In the agricultural 
sector, there is short-run bidirectional causality between diesel and agricultural 
value added. The rest are unidirectional, from agricultural value added to total 
energy and kerosene; from kerosene to agricultural capital formation and 
capital to diesel; total energy, coal and electricity to labour. In the mining 
sector, short-run mutual causality is between capital formation and liquid 
petroleum. One-way causality runs from mining GDP to coal, labour to total 














































3.3.2 Co-integration Results 
This paragraph presents the results of bound test to determine whether or not 
there is co-integration between energy and GDP and energy and other factors 
of production - labour and capital - for the whole economy, manufacturing, 
agriculture and mining. The analysis is also done with disaggregated energy 
types. The F-statistics are reported after the long run results for each energy 
type under the various sectors. The F -statistic is non-standard, so the critical 
values considered are those tabulated in Pesaran et al (2001, pp. 300-301). The 
level and ECM results are also reported. Multivariate frameworks are 
estimated for energy types and GDP. Relationships between energy types and 
factors of production (capital and labour) in the various sectors of the 
economy are investigated in a bivariate framework. 
3.3.1.3 Whole Economy 
Table 3.6 shows the multivariate bound test, level and ECM results for the 
whole economy. 
Table 3.6: Multivariate Bound Test Results for Total GDp40 
Normalised on Energy I Normalised on Y 
Ga Ker Gas I Energy Coal Ga EI Ker Gas 
Long-run relationshi(2 GOP 
1.7310 -4.4030 1.908b 0.0820 -1.0880 -0.139b 0.1960 -0.1150 0.092b 
-0.45r 1.1350 -0.294' 0.048b 0.8850 0.1380 0.1910 0.2130 0.1640 
-0.3690 -0.177 0.268' 0.161b 0.296' 0.1280 0.0940 0.052' 0.096b 
-3.83 0 -168.40 260.00 -3.4980 16.230 -29.820 -11.310 -30.940 -24.800 
- 0.1440 -0.0360 - - - 0.0100 0.0220 0.0180 
4.23' 4.14' 4.58' 4.39b 5.83b 6.44b 3.38' 6.35' 6.50' 
ECM-GDP 
-0.452 -1.096 1.605' 0.133 -0.015 -0.036 0.134 -0.093b 0.039 
-l.522b -1.657b 0.669 -0.075 -0.150 0.154 0.199 0.104 0.090 
0.378' 0.590b -0.116 0.162b 0. 142b 0. 131b 0.1580 0.2030 0.138b 
0.276 0.357 -0.178 0.004 0.003 0.025 -0.022 0.015 0.011 
0.064 -0.094 0.121 -0.049 -0.080 -0.063 -0.059 -0.060 -0.074 
-0.208 -0.143 -0.113 0.118' 0. 131b 0.092' 0. 140b 0.074 0.116b 
0.105 0.040 -0.126 -0.037 -0.045 -0.055 -0.038 -0.036 -0.025 
40 The energy types for which bOlllld test and lor ECM term does not reveal any level relationship are 














-0.370b -0.286' -0.7520 -0.151b -0.467b -0.5860 -0.6950 -0.748b -0.454b 
0.056b 0.080b -0.030 0.0190 0.0180 0.0190 0.010 0.0210 0.0180 
0.51 0.20 0.26 0.56 0.56 0.62 0.64 0.61 0.57 
." " , , , , Notes. , ,and denote slgmficance at 1 Yo, 5 Yo, and 10 Yo levels respectIvely. Non-slgmficant 
equations have been dropped, this explains why total energy, coal and kerosene does not 
feature on the left hand-side of the Table. 
The F-test suggests that there is co-integration between total energy and GDP, 
but none between diesel and the latter. The F-statistics for electricity fell 
between the 1(0) and I( I) critical bounds. In such case, the significance of the 
ECM term is used for inference. This indeed suggests that electricity has 
significant level relationship with GDP when normalised on GDP. Other 
energy types are revealed to have significant co-integration relationship with 
national GDP. When GDP is normalised on, coal, gasoline and kerosene each 
show negative long and short-run relationship with GDP (but short-run 
relation is significant only for kerosene). The disequilibrium adjustment rates 
are 47%, 59% and 75% respectively. Gas use shows a significant and positive 
level effect on GDP with disequilibrium adjustment rate of 45%. When energy 
is the dependent variable, GDP exhibits significant positive level relationships 
with gasoline and gas and negative with kerosene. The respective adjustment 
rates are 37%, 75% and 29%. The case of gasoline suggests that in the long-
run, while economic growth increases gasoline consumption, such increase has 
a slow down effect on production. 
The relationship between energy and other factors of production is analysed at 
the bivariate level. Tables 3.7 and 3.8 present the bivariate results for capital 











Table 3.7: Bivariate Bound Test Results for Total Capital4 ! 
Normalised on Energy 
Energy Coal Ga Die EI I Gas 
Long-run relationshi(2-Ca(2ital 
Y, O.13r -0.2010 -0.2640 0.4380 1.3010 0. 220b 
C -16.6r 10.980 -45.33 0 -20.86b -2.3r -8.8660 
t - - 0.0310 0.0140 - -
F-stat 5.66' 3.54 5.50b 5.51' 7.01' 3.45c 
ECM-Ca~ital 
tK, 0.183








2 -0.093 -0.045 0.020 -0.022 -0.113 -0.056 
ECTt _1 -0.36
b -0.293b -0.393b -0.270b -0.0530 -0.408b 
C 0.0150 -0.006 0.020b 0.0210 0.0420 0.012 
R2 0.37 0.31 0.24 0.38 0.33 0.15 
. " 0 • , , , Notes. , ,and denote slgmficance at 1 Yo, 5 Yo, and 10 Yo levels respectIvely 
When normalised on capital, no energy type is shown to have significant co-
integration relation with total capital formation. However, normalising on 
energy reveals that total energy use, diesel, electricity and gas have significant 
long-run relationship with capital. Negative level relationship is revealed 
between coal (and gasoline) respectively and capital. All short-run 
relationships are positive but non-significant for gasoline and gas. The 
disequilibrium adjustment rates range from 5.3% (for electricity) to 40.8% (for 
gas). No relationship was detected between capital and kerosene. 
41 The energy types for which bOlllld test and lor ECM term does not reveal any level relationship are 











Table 3.8: Bivariate Bound Test Results for Total Labour 
Normalised on Energy Normalised on L 
Coal Die EI Gas Ga I Die Ker Gas 
Long-run relationship-Labour 
Y, 0.225b 0.38r 1.4980 0.5600 -0.751b 0.9650 -0.4450 0.7330 
C 18.350 -21.220 5.7610 15.240 -44.280 12.58' -39.310 -18.610 
t 0.0160 -0.003' 0.0290 -O.OlOb 0.0250 0.0080 
F-stat 3.98 4.22 b 30.83' 6.35b 5.22b 2.50' 1.68 3.75 
ECM-Labour 
M, 0.485
b 0.292b 0. 212b 0.161 -0.16 0.407' -0.103 0.108 
M t_1 0.045 0.023 -0.008 -0.091 0.628




b -0.224' -0.0400 -0.6840 -0.227b -0. 185b -0.184' -0.269b 
C -0.006 0.0220 0.0390 0.015 0.007 -0.002 0.011 0.004 
R2 0.26 0.17 0.30 0.32 0.37 0.37 0.29 0.31 
. " " , , , , Notes. , ,and denote slgmficance at 1 Yo, 5 Yo, and 10 Yo levels respectIvely 
Although the F -statistic does not reject the hypothesis of no level relationship 
between energy and labour, the error correction term is not significant, 
implying no level relationship. The results suggest the uses of gasoline and 
kerosene are associated with less employment in the long-run. Diesel and gas 
use have positive level effect on employment. When normalised on energy, 
labour shows positive and significant co-integration effect with coal, diesel, 
electricity and gas. 
3.3.1.4 Manufacturing Sector 
In the manufacturing sector, bound test, long-run and ECM formulations in 
ARDL are estimated for total manufacturing energy, coal, diesel, electricity, 
kerosene and gas. Each model is estimated first normalising on energy, then 
on GDP (capital and labour). Tables 3.9 to 3.11 respectively give the bound 
test and ARDL results for energy types and GDP (in multivariate framework), 











Table 3.9: Multivariate Bound Test Results for Manufacturing GDP 
Normalised on Normalised on Y 
Energy 
Diesel E Coal Die EI Ker Gas 
Long-run relationshi(2 GOP 
E, 0.8520 0.4300 0.2500 0.3000 0.50r -0.050 0.2590 
K, 0.019 0.053 0.052 0.080b 0.1200 0.1310 0.082b 
L, 0.302 0.2850 0.3800 0.253 0 0.079 0.5610 0.2990 
C -1.441 -26.830 -34.120 -18.140 3.8960 -21.890 -27.920 
t - 0.0160 0.0200 0.013 0 - 0.0150 O.01r 
F-stat 8.79 4.63 4.44 9.27 7.22 4.85 5.58 
ECM-GDP 
"1; 0.877 0.169
b 0.083' 0. 131b 0.121 -0.019' 0.127b 








0 -0.1410 -0.1490 -0.1310 -0.1460 -0.1380 
f,L. 0.231 0.5040 0.5020 0.6200 0.6250 0.5950 0.5850 
EC'f-l -0.685
0 -0.317b -0.322b -0.3920 -0.3950 -0.220 -0.239b 
C 
R2 
-0.011 0.0200 0.0220 0.0210 O.017b 0.0210 0.0210 
0.33 0.58 0.54 0.61 0.62 0.51 0.58 
. " " , , , , Notes. , ,and denote slgmficance at 1 Yo, 5 Yo, and 10 Yo levels respectIvely 
When normalised on GDP, all energy types (except kerosene) m the 
manufacturing sector have significant positive co-integration relationship with 
manufacturing GDP. In line with the results of the whole economy, kerosene 
has a negative short and long-run relationship with manufacturing GDP. The 
equilibrium correction rates vary from 22% to 39.5% in absolute terms. When 
normalised on energy, positive level relationship is shown only for diesel, with 











Table 3.10: Bivariate Bound Test Results for Manufacturing Capital 
Normalised on Energy Normalised on K 
Energy Die EI Coal 
Long-run relationshi(2-Ca(2ital 
K, 0.1940 0.4100 0.7050 0.424b 
C 11.690 6.0700 5.340 -46.660 
t - 0.0260 
F-stat 3.63 2.38 3.57 3.06 
ECM-Ca~ital 














b -0.095b -0.275b 
C 0.015 0.016 0.0410 0.009 
R2 0.16 0.10 0.19 0.44 
, 
Notes: a, b, and denote slgmficance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectIvely 
Normalised on capital, only coal shows positive co-integration relation with 
manufacturing capital. Normalising on energy suggests that significant 
positive level relationships exist between capital and total manufacturing 
energy, diesel and electricity. For the rest of manufacturing energy types, the 
hypothesis of no level relationship with capital is not rejected at 10% and less 
significance level. 
Table 3.11: Bivariate Bound Test Results for Manufacturing Labour 
Normalised on Energy Normalised on L 
Energy Coal Die I EI Gas Die EI Gas 
Long-run relationshi(2-Labour 
L, 0.334' 0.158' 0.6350 0.7600 0.558b 0.343 0 0.7230 0.291b 
C 1.037 12.090 -24.6r -55.940 8.760 11.630 42.250 1.359 
t 0.0060 - 0.0160 0.0330 -0.005b -0.023 0 
F-stat 4.75 6.02 4.01 2.13 3.69 5.79 2.91 8.21 
ECM-Labour 
!>.L, 0.859b 2.05r 0.877 0.565b 0.341 0.063 0.213b -0.053 
ECTt _1 -0.211b -.0230
b -0.414b -0.233' -0.292' -0.147b -0.176b -0.1910 
C 0.012 0.002 0.014 0.0340 0.010 0.003 -0.004 0.005 
R2 0.20 0.35 0.18 0.15 0.05 0.13 0.23 0.22 
. " 0 
, , , , Notes. , ,and denote slgmficance at 1 Yo, 5 Yo, and 10 Yo levels respectIvely 
Significant positive level relationships exist between labour and 











manufacturing energy types, the hypothesis of no level relationship IS not 
rejected at 10% and less significance level. 
3,3,1,5 Agricultural Sector 
The energy types considered for the agricultural sector are total energy, diesel, 
kerosene, electricity and coal. Tables 3.12 and 3.13 present the results in the 
same way as with the whole economy and manufacturing. 
Table 3.l2: Multivariate Bound Test Results for Agricultural GDP 
I Normalised on Energy Normalised on Y 
I Diesel E Diesel Electricity 
Long-run relationshi(2 GOP 
H, 0.201 ' 0.6100 0.383 b 0.2840 
K, -0.019 -0.087 0.039 0.091 
L, -0.5100 0.252 0.311 ' 0.317' 
C 9.940 14.200 -16.260 16.280 
t 0.0160 
F-stat 5.15 3.78 3.97 4.93 
ECM-GDP 
"1; 0.350
0 0.121 0.306 0.007 
"K, 0.127 0.159 0.136 0.299b 
"L. -0.161 0.114 0.064 0.102 
EC1,"1 -0.511
0 -0.56r -0.723 0 -0.755 0 
C 0.001 0.012 0.014 0.017 
R2 0.44 0.33 0.45 0.43 
. " 0 
, , , , Notes. , ,and denote slgmficance at 1 Yo, 5 Yo, and 10 Yo levels respectIvely 
The agricultural model suggests that there are significant level relationships 
between GDP and total energy, diesel and electricity in agriculture when 
normalised on GDP, with disequilibrium adjustment rates of 57%, 72% and 
76% respectively. Diesel use also shows significant positive level relationship 




















Table 3.13: Bound Test Results for Agricultural Capital and Labour 
Capital Labour 
Normalised Normalised on K Normalised on Energy Normalised on, L 
on Energy 
Die EI Ker Energy Die Energy Die EI Ker 
Long-run relationship-Capital 
0.198b 0.2940 0.1490 -0.58r -0.6500 -0.4920 -0.6740 -0.1630 -0.0940 
12.290 11.310 61.1190 -17.9r 15.1810 12.440 23.910 8.55 7.7340 
-O.D2r O.01r - -0.005b 
3.92 5.07 4.39 4.29 4.57 9.02 6.59 3.85 2.77 
ECM-Capital 
0.188b 0.206 0.030 -0.160 -0.195 -0.044 -0.158 -0.078 0.014 
-0.258b -0. 331b -0.365b -0.273' -0.4950 -0.48r -0.4840 -0.347' -0.236' 
0.007 -0.025 -0.014 0.018 0.003 -0.011 -0.011 -0.007 -0.012 
0.27 0.18 0.18 0.03 0.018 0.25 0.22 0.15 
. " c 
, , , , Notes. , ,and denote slgmficance at 1 Yo, 5 Yo, and 10 Yo levels respectIvely 
As for agricultural capital, positive level relationship is shown with electricity 
and kerosene when normalised on capital and with diesel when normalised on 
energy. Long-run relationship exists between labour and total agricultural 
energy, diesel, electricity and kerosene when labour is the dependent variable 
and diesel when energy is the dependent variable. However, all the long-run 
relationships detected are negative. This implies the energy use is associated 
with lower employment in agriculture. 
3.3.1.6 Mining Sector 
The results of the mining sector are reported in Tables 3.14 and 3.15. The 
energy types considered are total mining energy, coal, electricity and liquid 
petroleum. Analysis is done for GDP in multivariate framework (with mining 












Table 3.14: Multivariate Bound Test Results for Mining GDP 
Normalised on Energy Normalised on Y 
E Coal EI LP E Coal LP 
Long-run relationship GDP 
E, 0.9680 7.7580 1.6300 0.2240 0.0320 0.2160 
K, 0.102' 0.620' 0.112' -0.067b -0.032b -0.061b 
L, 0.3950 -2.0620 -0.7880 -0.031 0.0720 0.2180 
C -62.020 -2.006 -34.310 21.2r 10.730 13.520 
t 0.0300 -0.035' 0.0150 -0.006b -0.003' 
F-stat 3.07 2.81 2.32 6.59 6.76 6.43 8.49 
ECM-GDP 
"1; 0.869' 7.425' 0.758 0.092' 0.016
b 0.098' 
"K, -0.016 0.159 0.253b -0.068b -0.053' -0.092b 
t1K t _1 0.121 0.551 -0.152 -0.060
b -0.049 -0.040 
t1Kt _ 2 -0.087 -0.054 0.096 -0.003 -0.035 -0.013 
f,L. 0.231 -1.598 -0.204 0.3360 0.2800 0.3160 
ECf-l -0.610
0 -1.016b -0.6460 -0.7430 -0.6730 -0.6250 
C 0.032b -0.037 0.019 0.002 0.007' 0.004 
R2 0.28 0.33 0.31 0.50 0.49 0.38 
. " c 
, , , , Notes. , ,and denote slgmficance at 1 Yo, 5 Yo, and 10 Yo levels respectIvely 
Total energy use in the mining sector shows a significant positive level and 
short-run relationships with mining GDP when normalised on GDP. However, 
when various energy types are considered, the bound test fails to reject the 
hypothesis of no level relationship between GDP and electricity. Liquid 
petroleum shows significant level and short-run relationship with mining GDP 
when both GDP and energy are taken turn by turn as the dependent variables. 












Table 3.15: Bivariate Bound Test Results for Mining Capital and Labour 
Normalised on Energy Normalised on K, L 
Energy I Coal I EI LP E I EI I LP 
Long-run relationship-Capital 
K, 0.2240 0.37r -0.2350 1.0160 1.111 0 0.5300 
C -29.040 -13.46b -53.160 -2.74' -3.389b 4.224b 
t 0.0200 0.0110 0.0330 
F-stat 4.28 8.05 3.49 5.39 3.98 6.03 
ECM-Capital 
f..K, -0.080 0.043 0.155 -0.080 0.616 0.132 
t1K t _1 0.061 0.020 -0.187 0.583
0 0.526b 0.462b 
t1Kt _ 2 -0.165 -0.90 0.123 -0.256 -0.289 -0.360
b 
ECTt _1 -0.405
b -0.169b -0.255' -0.346b -0.24 -0.2720 
C 0.034b 0.025b 0.024 0.040 0.021 0.046' 
R2 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.37 0.28 0.42 
Long-run relationship-Labour 
L, 0.5130 1.308b -0.6480 1.1440 
C -56.420 57.50b -20.420 79.700 
t 0.0330 -0.021' O.01r -0.0440 
F-stat 4.51 3.15 5.59 2.80 
ECM-Labour 
I>L, 0.494b 1.284 0.180 0.266b 
ECTt _1 -0.488
0 -0.591b -0.4980 -0. 184b 
C 0.030b 0.014 O.027b -0.017' 
R2 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.16 
. " , , , , Notes. , ,and denote slgmficance at 1 Yo, 5 Yo, and 10 Yo levels respectIvely 
The bivariate results for capital and labour in Table 3.15 suggest that total 
energy, electricity and liquid petroleum use in the mining sector show 
significant positive level relation with capital when normalised both on energy 
and capital. Total mining energy has positive level relationship with mining 
labour whe  normalised on both. Except for electricity with a non-significant 
ECM term, coal and liquid petroleum show significant positive and negative 
relationships respectively with labour when normalised on energy. 
3-4 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was twofold. First, it investigated the causality 
between GDP (and capital and labour) and disaggregated energy types by means 
of Toda and Yamamoto (1995) version of Granger causality. Secondly, it 
investigated level relationships among energy types and the respective variables 











sectors III South Africa. The analyses are done for the whole economy, 
manufacturing, agriculture and mining in multivariate frameworks (and bivariate 
for energy types with capital and labour). In line with Wolde-Rufael (2009) who 
also used the same multivariate causality framework, this work establishes a 
significant causal relationship, running from total energy to GDP, capital and 
labour (and labour to total energy) in the entire economy. Causality runs from 
energy to capital formation and from GDP, capital and labour to total energy in 
the manufacturing sector. In the agricultural and mining sectors, there is 
bidirectional causality between total energy and GDP (and labour). Total mining 
energy causes capital formation without feedback. 
The analysis in disaggregation reveals that there are differences in effects. 
Gasoline, kerosene and coal show long-run GDP slow down effects. Gasoline 
and coal equally have negative employment effects. Except for kerosene with no 
effect, these energy types also slow down capital formation in the long-run. 
Electricity, diesel and gas are associated with increase in employment in South 
Africa. Any reduction in electricity (and gas) supply will adversely affect capital 
formation, employment and growth in the long-run and vice versa. In the 
manufacturing sector, kerosene has a negative short and long-run relationship 
with manufacturing GDP, but all the others enhance production. Total 
manufacturing energy, coal, diesel and electricity co-integrate positively with 
capital. The same is the case between labour and manufacturing energy, coal, 
diesel and electricity. In the agricultural sector, production co-integrates 
positively with diesel and electricity. Positive level relationships exist for 
electricity, diesel and kerosene with capital. Labour negatively co-integrates 
with total energy, diesel, electricity and kerosene. This implies the energy use is 
associated with lower employment in agriculture. Liquid petroleum and coal 
uses in mining sector show significant level and short-run relationship with 
mining GDP. Total energy, electricity and liquid petroleum use in the mining 
sector have positive level relation with capital and labour (but negative for coal). 
These results have to be compared with theory-based analysis, which is the 











4. ENERGY AND GROWTH IN SOUTH 
AFRICA: FACTOR SUBSTITUTABILITY 
AND RETURN TO SCALE 
4.1 Introduction 
In chapter three, the causal and level relationships between various energy 
types and GDP (and capital and labour) for selected economic sectors were 
analysed in Lag-augmented causality and bound test frameworks. These 
approaches do not strictly rely on existing theories. Neoclassical (long-run 
Solow) growth theory has corne to the conclusion that increase in economic 
growth rate can only corne about through technical progress (Solow, 1956). 
Various works have highlighted the importance of energy in technical 
progress. The first is that of Schurr and Netschert (1960), which hypothesises 
that increase in electrification, enhances both labour and total factor 
productivity. The second is the finding by Jorgenson (1988) that technical 
progress is energy using. Despite these, energy is still being given a dismal 
consideration in mainstream production theories (Stern and Cleveland, 2004). 
The incorporation of energy as an input in production has been done either in a 
unitary elasticity (Cobb-Douglas) or Constant Elasticity of Substitution 
production functions. Few works that used the KLEM framework are not 
recent, and do not consider developing countries. 
This Chapter adapts Vinod (1972) type non-homogenous production function 
to three inputs (capital, energy and labour) and classical energy demand 
framework in simultaneous equations settings to reconcile growth and energy 
demand theories. The framework can generate three important parameters of 
production theory. First are the elasticities of substitution between (total and 
dis aggregated) energy types and other factors of production (capital and 
labour). Second are the output elasticities of respective inputs. Third are the 
Returns to Scale (RTS) with and without the energy types. In such framework, 
these parameters are also allowed to vary with factor proportions and time. 











agriculture and mining sectors. The rest of the chapter is structured as follow: 
section (4.2) explains the methodological approach and adapts the framework. 
Section (4.3) presents the results while section (4.4) concludes the chapter 
comparing the theory-based outcomes with the lag-augmented causality and 
bound test results of chapter three. 
4.2 Methodology of Analysis 
The model used in this chapter is based on a Variable Elasticity of Substitution 
(VES) production function. As stated in section (2.3) of chapter two, the 
Cobb-Douglas (C-D) and Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production 
functions have two main weaknesses. One is that they impose restrictions on 
the value of elasticity of substitution (oJ The other is that both assume fixed 
RTS. In practice, there is possibility of variations in (J as argued by Revankar 
(1971). This variation depends on output andlor combinations of inputs 
(Hicks, 1932 and Allen, 1956). The YES production function is combined with 
energy demand framework in simultaneous equations models, which are 
estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) or Three-stage least squares (3sls) 
depending on the outcome of endogeneity tests. The next subsections present 
the YES production function (adopted within the appropriate structural 
equations including energy demand), estimation techniques and data issues. 
4.2.1 The frameworks 
The frameworks are developed in two steps. In the first, the appropriate YES 
production function that accommodates capital, labour and energy is specified. 
In the second, energy demand function is proposed and combined with the 
YES in structural equations for estimation. The structural equations are 
specified for total and each energy types, in the whole economy, 
manufacturing, agricultural and mining sectors. 
4.2.1.1 YES Production Functional Fonns 
Revankar (1971) develops a class of YES production functions in which (J 
varies with input ratio. However, this form is less malleable for empirical 











inputs by Vinod (1972) and Christensen et al (1973). Such functional form is 
linear in parameters and can be conveniently estimated by OLS. The latter is 
the basic form considered for this work, and extended to three inputs (capital, 
labour and energy). The model has fourfold virtue. First is that it allows for 
variable elasticity of substitution amongst inputs. The second is that it imposes 
no restrictions in the data. The third is flexibility in specification. Lastly, it can 
generate other properties of production such as output elasticities of factors 
and Returns to Scale, with different factor proportions. The model 
specification is as follows: 
Let Y denote output, and K, L, E denote capital, labour and energy 
respectively, t and a are time trend and parameters respectively, subscript i, a 
particular energy type. The process of model specification is divided into two 
stages. In the first stage, a two-input (capital and labour) model is estimated. 
This derives the capital-labour elasticity of substitution «(JId). In the second 
stage, the average value of capital-labour elasticity of substitution helps to 
determine the way capital and labour are specified in the three-input functional 
form. 
Two Inputs VES 
Based on Vinod (1972), the two-inputs non-homogenous production function 
proposed is as follows: 
(4.01) 
Whereas Vinod's specification does not include time trend, equation (4.01) 
accommodates time trend exogenously in order to depict exogenous time 
dependent technological progress by way of a, . Since (4.01) is multiplicative, 
it can be written in double logarithmic format, with.5" as error term and In 
denoting natural log: 
lnY, = aD + a/+ a 2 lnK, + a 3 lnL, + a 4 lnK,.lnL, +.5" ( 4.02) 
The output elasticity of capital (E k) and labour (E, ) are defined as partial 






















1nK ( 4.03b) 
The capital-labour elasticity of substitution is defined as the percentage change 
in capital labour ratio (KIL) divided by the percentage change in marginal rate 
of technical substitution (MRTS): 
(J" = _L'l(,-K_I_L-,-) 1....:.( K_I L--,),-
H /l,MRTS H I MRTS H 
( 4.04a) 
In (4.04a), L'l is a difference operator and MRTS is marginal rate of technical 
substitution between capital and labour. MRTS is the ratio of prices and also 
the ratio of marginal productivities of both factors, which is K. El I L. Ec. From 
the definition of elasticity of substitution 42, equation (4.04a) is equivalent to: 
( 4.04b) 
This is YES because (J depends onE, which varies with the levels of K and L. 
Though there may be five possible domain of interpretation of (J (Henderson 
and Quandt, 1980), for empirical convenience, analyses of production 
functions emphasise three. The first case is when (J" H = 0 where substitution 
between inputs is impossible and the production process is characterised by 
fixed factor proportions in an L-shape isoquants (Leontief) function. Because 
this is inconsistent with first and second order partial derivatives, economists 
avoid it. The second case is when 0 < (J" H < I, where substitution is possible 
but limited, with negatively sloping isoquants and positive marginal 
productivities 43 The last case is when (J" H = I , implying perfect substitutability 
with non-intersecting isoquants. The last two cases are of interest for the 
specification of three inputs YES production function. 
Three Inputs VES 
The general form of a three-input multiplicative YES production function with 
capital, labour and energy is as follows: 
( 4.05a) 
42 See Hicks, 1932 and McFadden, 1963. 











In double log form, (4.05a) becomes: 
InY = aD + a/+ a 2 lnK, + a 3 lnL, + a 4 lnE, + a,lnK,.lnE, + 
a,lnL,.lnE, + a 7 InK,.lnL, + By, 
( 4.05b) 
The output elasticities of capital (E k ), labour (E, ) and energy (E,) are as 
follows: 
E k = 81nY /81nK = a 2 + a,lnE + a 7 1nL 
E , = 81nY /81nL = a 3 + a,lnlnE + a 7 lninK 




If from (4.04b), tJkl is (on average) closed to, equal to or above unity, then 
a 7 = 0 and capital and labour are perfect substitutes in (4.05b), otherwise 
a 7 "" 0 . The scale elasticity or Returns to Scale (RTS) is: 
( 4.06d) 
The elasticities of substitution are evaluated only for energy and capital, and 
energy and labour respectively. It is defined as in (4.04a): 
(Yex, 
f..(EI X )/(EI X) , , 
( 4.07) 
f.MRTS I MRTS 
e,x, e,x, 
In (4.07), X is input and i is subscript for capital and labour, taken turn by turn. 
4.2.1.2 Energy Demand and Structural Model 
Energy demand equations are constructed following classical demand theory. 
Considerable attention has been paid to energy demand, focusing on gasoline 
in both developed and developing countries (Akinboade, Ziramba and Kumo, 
2008; Drollas, 1984; Graham and Glaister, 2002). The simplest form of energy 
demand models in empirical literature specifies demand as a function of real 
income and prices (Akinboade et ai, 2008; Eltony and AI-Mutairi, 1995; Birol 
and Guerer, 1993; Ramanathan, 1999). Other works have included automobile 
stock (Bentzen, 1994; Eltony, 1993; Polemis, 2006) and lor real alcohol prices 
(Alves and Bueno, 2003). However, for the purpose of gaining degrees of 
freedom in limited observations dataset, the parsimonious specification 











energy prices, prices of other energy types (P E) and error term (od) at time t, 
and parameters j3 . 
InE" = /30 + /3, lnY, + /32InPOF; + I /33, InPE" +od 
;=1 
( 4.08) 
In (4.08), i is the energy type in consideration (total energy 44, coal, gasoline, 
diesel, electricity, gas and kerosene). The framework is based on a standard 
aggregate demand theory, in which individual demand for a good (derived 
from objective utility maximisation subject to budget constraint) are summed 
over identical consumers. One can arguably state that energy is more a choice 
variable than capital and labour. This is bases on the supposition that unlike 
energy, the process of capital accumulation and rigidities in the labour market 
institutions can render capital and labour exogenous. Therefore, the final 
functional form in structural specification is the combination of equations 
(4.05b) and (4.08), which gives: 
InY = a o + a,t+ a 2 1nK + a 3 1nL + a 4 1nE + a,lnK .lnE t t t It t It 
+ a,lnL,.lnE" + a 7 InK,lnL, + BY' 
InE" = Po + p,lnY, + P2 InPOF; + IP3' InPE" +od 
;=1 
( 4.09) 
Theoretically, capital and labour are expected to have positive output 
elasticities. After disaggregation of energy types, their individual impacts may 
not be easily predictable. However, efficient energy types like electricity are 
expected to have positive effect on production. Energy types such as liquid 
fuel for luxury cars 45 and those mainly used by the poor 46 may have 
44 In the model for total energy, only the energy price index is used as price variable. 
4S This may be the case at least in the short TIlll. In the long TIlil, it may be argued that luxmy goods 
bring about lmowledge spill-over, resulting in more grovvth (see Matsuyama, 2002; Kuwahara, 2006) 
46 This applies for fuel like kerosene, mainly used by the poor in the residential sector. Its negative 
effect may indicate the fact that their user participate less in productive activities and also that it affects 
human capital of the poor negatively. However, some kerosene is used as jet fuel in the transport 











insignificant andlor negative effect on production. For energy demand, the 
effect of income also depends on energy type types. According to classical 
demand theory, energy prices are expected to have negative impact on energy 
use, the sign of the coefficient of cross prices depend on whether the energy 
types are substitutes or complements. Population is expected to have positive 
effect on demand. 
4.2.2 Estimation Techniques 
The main concern with the application of Ordinary Least Square (OLS) to the 
single equations of model (4.09) is endogeneity between GDP and energy 
demand. It is important to decide whether or not OLS will be consistent. 
Davidson and Mackinnon (1993) propose an augmented regression or Durbin-
Wu-Hausman (DWH) test. This test consists of applying OLS to generate the 
residual of the endogenous right hand side variables, then including the 
residual as a function of all the exogenous. In other words to test for the 
endogeneity of GDP in energy demand equation, one would regress the 
following: 
( 4.10) 
In equation (4.10), liyt is the residual of production equation. The next is to 
conduct a Wald test for the significance of/3,. If it is significantly different 
from zero, then energy and production are endogenous and OLS IS 
inconsistent. In such case, a simultaneous equation estimation method of 
(4.09) would be necessary, with the application of 3sls. The final specification 
of model (4.09) is done after Wald test of coefficients. It is likely that the 
coefficients of some energy types or interactive terms are insignificant. This 
may also be the case with some cross price coefficients. In such cases the 
insignificant coefficients are excluded from the model in order to improve the 











4.2.3 Variables, Data and Summary Statistics 
The data used in this chapter span 1971 to 2006. Annual energy data obtained 
from the International Energy Agency spans 1971 to 2005. Complementary 
energy data for 2006 are from the South African Department of Minerals and 
Energy. Energy types available are total energy, electricity, kerosene, diesel, 
gasoline, gas and coal for the whole economy; total manufacturing energy, 
kerosene, diesel, gas and coal; aggregate agricultural energy, electricity, coal, 
diesel and kerosene; and mining energy, coal, electricity and liquid petroleum. 
Their units of measurement are harmonised47 to Tera Joules (TJ). Energy types 
are considered in net of uses in the energy sector48 
GDP and capital formation (both in million ZAR at constant 2000) are from 
the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) dataset. Data from STATSSA 
(2007b) are combined with SARB employments indices to generate real 
private sector, manufacturing and mining employment data (in thousand 
persons )49 For the whole economy, labour force series is from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI, 2008). 
Agricultural employment data is from the Abstract of Agricultural statistics, 
published by the department of agriculture'O Population data is from the WDI 
(2008). Aggregate energy price series is measured by Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) for energy, taken from STATSSA, electricity prices are from Eskom 
Tariffs (in South African cents/kWh), while prices for the other energy types 
are from the Department of Minerals and Energy and are expressed in indices. 
47 Coal is sum ofbiturninous coal (comprising hard coal) and coke oven coal and lignite coal. Hard 
coal is made of three components with net calorific value (NCV) as follows: Anthracite: 28.95 - 30.35 ; 
Coking coals: 26.60 - 29.80; Bituminous: 22.60 - 25.50 Averages of NCV were taken for each sub 
category of coal and the average of the averages calculated and used to convert units of coal from kilo 
tOIliles (kt) to Tern Joules (TJ). Gasoline: NCV is average for aviation gasoline and motor gasoline. 
Gas is sum of LPG, gas works gas and coke oven gas. LPG unit of measurement was changed from kt 
to TJ using NCV of 46.15 GJ/t and density of 522.2 kg/m3, assuming a mixture of 70% propane and 
30% butane by mass. IGJ = (x 1000tOImesc46.15GJ/t)11000. Electricity consumption was multiplied 
by its 3.6 conversion equivalent to convert from GWh to TJ. (see lEA, 2005, Energy Statistic manual) 
48 For example, coal is taken net that used in electricity and petroleum sectors 
49 Assuming that the SARB private sector employment data depicts the actual variations in the series. 











No price data was available for gas, so aggregate energy price index was used. 
Table 4.1 gives the summary statistics of natural log of variables . 
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Log of Variables 
Log of Variable Obs I Mean I Std. Dev. I Min Max 
Whole Economy 
GDP 36 13.521 0.220 13.115 13.977 
Capital 36 11.746 0.197 11.450 12.305 
Labour 36 9.439 0.087 9.269 9.572 
Total energy 36 14.499 0.178 14.138 14.815 
Electricity 36 12.909 0.411 12.030 13.563 
Kerosene 36 10.966 0.408 10.498 11.579 
Gasoline 36 12.437 0.300 11.961 12.866 
Diesel 36 12.154 0.221 11.620 12.677 
Gas 36 11.455 0.121 11.159 11.810 
Coal 36 13.345 0.087 13.168 13.500 
Manufacturing Sector 
GDP 36 11.774 0.216 11.277 12.163 
Capital 36 10.065 0.328 9.324 10.712 
Labour 36 7.486 0.096 7.285 7.626 
Energy 36 13.639 0.126 13.305 13.886 
Electricity 36 12.435 0.361 11.671 12.948 
Kerosene 36 7.793 0.771 6.395 9.312 
Diesel 36 10.193 0.219 9.761 10.492 
Gas 36 11.368 0.138 11.083 11.703 
Coal 36 12.832 0.210 12.372 13.207 
Agricultural Sector 
Value Added 36 8.078 0.184 7.741 8.346 
Capital 36 8.634 0.300 8.117 9.348 
Labour 36 7.004 0.228 6.443 7.402 
Energy 36 10.920 0.264 10.495 11.357 
Electricity 36 9.118 0.751 7.729 10.007 
Kerosene 36 7.006 0.800 5.862 8.031 
Diesel 36 10.584 0.134 10.400 10.906 
Coal 36 7.671 0.925 4.405 9.007 
Mining Sector 
GDP 36 11.108 0.040 11.027 11.220 
Capital 36 9.332 0.371 8.286 9.787 
Labour 36 6.720 0.299 5.988 7.047 
Energy 36 11.879 0.285 11.304 12.295 
Electricity 36 11.448 0.269 10.817 11.739 
Liquid petroleum 36 9.637 0.320 9.323 10.386 












Population 36 17.371 0.233 16.956 17.693 
Energy price 36 3.390 1.151 1.344 4.955 
Coal price 36 4.987 0.241 4.359 5.397 
Gasoline price 36 4.211 0.625 3.528 5.673 
Diesel price 36 4.169 0.683 3.360 5.924 
Electricity price 36 2.773 0.184 2.535 3.058 
4.3 Empirical Results 
In this section, the results of the analysis are outlined following the economic 
sectors considered - whole economy, manufacturing, agriculture and mining. 
For each sector, the two-input production function with capital and labour is 
presented first. From this, the capital-labour elasticity of substitution is 
calculated. This enables the formulation of appropriate three-input functional 
form. This is followed by the presentation of the estimates of the structural 
equations with endogenous test results which helps to decide whether to use 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) or three-stage least squares (3sls) techniques. 
4.3.1 Whole Economy 
4.3.1.1 No-Energy Scenario 
The results of the estimates of the two-input model (capital, labour) equation 
(4.02) (with t-values in parentheses) are as followsS!: 
Y = - 85.0346 + 0.017' t+ 5.370' k + 6.559' 1- 0.541' kl 
(-2.82) (32.80) (2.03) (2.01) (-1.94) 
The adjusted R-square of 0.92 suggest a high explanatory power52 of the 
model and a significant F -statistic of 1378.95 further supports the validity of 
51 Figures in bracket are t-statistics. a, b, C denote that coefficient is significantly different from zero at 
1 %, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
52 It is noteworthy that the variables have not been corrected for unit root. Though it may be important, 
however, the usual methodology involving differencing till the achievement of stationarity is done at 
the expense ofinfonnation about the long-nm, with consequent loss of degrees of freedom. Besides, 











the regression model. The values of the t-statistics show that the individual 
variables are statistically significant, at 10% level of significance. The time 
trend, which captures the effect of technology, is also statistically significant at 
I % level. The output elasticities, scale elasticity and capital labour elasticity of 
substitution - evaluated at mean values of the variables - are presented in 
Table 4.2, along with their domains of variation. 
Table 4.2: Capital-Labour YES Parameters - Whole Economy 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ek 0.259 0.047 0.189 0.353 
El 0.190 0.107 -0.101 0.361 
RTS 0.449 0.141 -0.017 0.694 
tJH 
0.804 0.351 0.160 1.937 
The output elasticities of capital (Ek) and labour (El) evaluated at the mean 
values of the data are respectively 0.259 and 0.190. While the output elasticity 
of capital varies less (within 0.189 and 0.353), with standard deviation of 
0.047, that of labour has relatively higher variation (within -0.101 and 0.361), 
with standard deviation of 0.107. The average value of RTS is 0.449. This 
implies that (without the consideration of energy) when capital and labour 
both increase by one percent, output mcreases on average by 0.449. A 
magnitude less than unity imply diminishing return in South African 
Economy. However, the RTS varies over time, starting from a high of 0.714 
and undulating downward to a local minimum of 0.210 in 1981 before 
increasing to 0.514 in 1993. From then, it has steadily dropped to -0.017. The 
RTS appears to closely mimic variations in output elasticity of labour (Figure 
4.1). Finally, the capital-labour elasticity of substitution (Eskl) is 0.804 at 
average evaluation. However, this parameter varies quite siguificantly over 
time, starting at 1.937 in 1971, and decreasing to 0.438 in 1981, then rises and 
fluctuates around 0.7 till 2001, when it gradually falls to 0.160 in 2006. 
The capita-labour elasticity of substitution also varies with the ratio of the 
inputs as suggested by theory. This variation is shown in figure 4.2. The 











and K-L elasticity of substitution evolve in phase. The more capital can 
substitute for labour, the higher the productivity of labour53 and hence RTS. 
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The mean value of the K-L elasticity of substitution of 0.804, with subsequent 
fluctuations above 0.5 gives a strong basis for assuming that a
7
in Equation 
(4.09) is not statistically different from zero. This assumption is supported by 











Wald test on a
7
. Based on this, (4.09) is estimated without capital-labour 
interactive term for total energy and all energy types. 
4.3.1.2 Estimation with Total Energy 
The 3sls estimation results for aggregate energy, capital and labour are 
presented below. The DWH test result is significant, suggesting that the 
residuals of energy demand equation are significant in the production 
equation. This implies that OLS is not consistent for single equations of model 
(4.09). Both energy demand and production equations have high explanatory 
power with R-squares of 0.97 for both, and significant chi2. Based on the t-
values in parentheses, all the individual coefficients are significant54 Wald test 
on the coefficient of capital-labour interactive term shows that it is not 
statistically different from zero, confirming the assumption of unitary capital-
labour elasticity of substitution based on the evaluation of (4.04b). So the term 
was excluded from the empirical specification. 
{
y = -78.8286 + 0.016' /-7.157' k + 15.207' 1+ 3.817' e + 0.505' ke-1.029' Ie 
(-2.88) (13.13) (--4.13) (2.01) (1.73) (4.27) (-3.20) 
e =-13.9886 + 0.494' y+1.296' pop-0.2046 pe 
(-2.00) (4.86) (2.97) (-2.42) 
R2 = 0.97; Chi2 = 6429.5; R' = 0.97; Chi2 = 1072.64; DWHs/a/ = 765.88(0.000) 
y y e e 
N=36 
The energy demand equation obeys the classical demand theory with energy 
demand elasticity of income being 0.494, suggesting energy as essential good 
in the South African economy. Equally, the price elasticity of energy demand 
of -0.204 suggest that energy demand is inelastic. The coefficient of 
population show that one percent rise in population brings about 1.3 percent 
increase in energy demand. 
S4 Figures in bracket are t-statistics. a, b, C denote that coefficient is significantly different from 











Table 4.3: YES Parameters with Total Energy - Whole Economy 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
E c 0.168 0.090 -0.014 0.328 
E, 0.283 0.183 -0.042 0.655 
E 0.036 0.141 -0.201 0.300 
e 
RTS 0.488 0.121 0.278 0.703 
tJCe 
0.195 0.121 0.054 0.534 
tJ'e 
0.153 0.120 0.003 0.383 
Table 4.3 gives the results of output elasticities of capital, labour, energy, 
RTS, capital-energy and labour-energy elasticities of substitution evaluated at 
mean values of variables for YES model with total energy. The productivity of 
capital drops while that of labour rises slightly after introduction of energy. 
The RTS increases by about the value of output elasticity of energy (0.039)". 
Since the scale elasticity determines the economy's expansion path, one can 
conclude that this is aggregate energy's contribution to economic growth. 
Figure 4.3 shows that RTS and output elasticity of energy evolve in phase. 
This may suggests that though energy's share in R TS is small, it is the most 
important limiting factor for growth. 
Figure 4.3: Elasticities of Energy with Time- Whole Economy 
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The average values of capital-energy and labour-energy elasticities of 
substitution (0.195 and 0.153) seem to suggest that both capital and labour are 
not substitutes with energy, but this may be misleading because both series 
vary significantly (Figure 4.3). From 1971 to 1994, energy and capital seem to 
complement each other, but the elasticity of substitution increases to about 0.4 
in 2006. However, the reverse holds for labour, which seems to be substitute 
with energy from 1971, and the substitution elasticity decreasing (from 0.6) to 
about 0.1 in 1988. From then to 2006, labour and energy have been more of 
complements. The evolution of capital-labour elasticity seems to corroborate 
this, where capital seems to complement labour towards 2006. This evolution 
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The evolution of capital- energy (K-E) and labour-energy (L-E) elasticities of 
substitution with capital-energy (K/E) and labour-energy (LIE) ratios in figure 
(4.4) cannot give any meaningful information. However, it seems to suggest 
that in times of high labour availability relative to energy, energy and labour 
tend to be less complements while capital and energy tend to be more 
complements at low and high capital-energy ratios. However, aggregate 
measure of energy may mask differences in effects of various energy types. 
4.3.1.3 Estimations with Disaggregated Energy 
The results of estimates of model (4.09) for electricity, diesel, gasoline, gas, 












Table 4.4: YES Estimates with Energy types - Whole Economy 
Electricity Diesel Gasoline Gas Kerosene Coal 
R' , 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.95 
Chi2 3.69E7 7309.38 13186 7001 12569 833.42 , 
R2 0.96 0.95 0.92 0.68 0.96 0.61 
e 
Chi2 12108 646.52 1474 80.20 767.19 12.26 , 
DWH". 830.27 474.42 166.65 2.62 103.49 0.01 
(P-VAL) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.115) (0.000) (0.929) 
Parameters 
a o -55.945 -91.764
b -34.029' 87.101' -28.922' 46.531 
(-1.61) (-2.27) (-18.98) (3.34) (-19.25) (0.52) 
a, 0.014' 0.015' 0.022' 0.018' 0.019' 0.018' 
(3.49) (19.72) (22.47) (0.56) (21.07) (34.13) 
a
2 
-4.451' -3.197b -2.561' 1.779' -1.655' -0.051 ' 
(-3.82) (-2.52) (-3.21) (1.67) (-3.56) (-1.70) 
a 3 9.829
b 11.803b 3.854' -24.712' 2.572' -7.346' 
(2.26) (2.10) (3.91) (-3.80) (4.42) (-1.88) 
a 4 2.995' 5.881 ' 
- -18.710' - -5.533' 
(0.081) (1.80) (-3.80) (-1.83) 
a, 0.354' 0.275
b 0.220' -0.136' 0.170' 0.020b 
(4.05) (2.64) (3.46) (-1.68) (4.07) (1.97) 
a, -0.739
b -0.956b -0.288' 2.173' -0.218' 0.569' 
(-2.23) (-2.06) (-3.70) (3.83) (-4.29) (1.84) 
/30 -18.236' 0.821 -9.155' 11.106' -11.241' 18.463' 
(-48.39) (0.92) (-11.20) (8.92) (-6.66) (18.86) 
/3, 1.092' 1.583' 0. 134b 1.368' -0.970
b 0. 524b 
(11.15) (6.87) (0.028) (4.07) (-2.23) (2.49) 
/32 0.931' 0.582' 1.431' -1.098' 2.106' -0.745' 
(12.35) (3.23) (8.69) (-4.38) (6.24) (-4.24) 
/331 0.162' 0.021 -0.338' 0.157 -0.632' -0.163
b 
(5.23) (0.30) (-5.07) (1.52) (-4.57) (-2.69) 
/332 0.039 -0.029 0.364' 0.235 -0.674 -
(0.78) (0.08) (3.28) (1.44) (-1.31) 
/333 -0.119
b 0.027 -0.483' -0.347' -0.163 -
(-2.04) (0.20) (-3.82) (-1.86) (-0.62) 
/334 - - - 0.946' -
(1.85) 
/335 - - - 0.195
b -0.238' 
(2.51) (-3.65) 
. " , , , , Notes. , ,and denote slgmficance at 1 Yo, 5Yo, and lOYo levels respectIvely. Parentheses contam 
t-values. P3J are the coefficients of energy prices: I = 1 for electricity; 2 for diesel; 3 for gasoline; 
4 for kerosene and 5 for coal. Gas prices are not available. Sample size is 36 obseIVations. 
The model statistics for production and energy demand equations for all sub 
models are satisfactory. The goodness of fit for production equation (R 2) 
Y 
S6 Insignificant DWH test implies that OLS is consistent; model (9) is estimated with the OLS option 











ranges from 94 to 96 percent. That of energy demand equation is 0.96 for 
electricity and kerosene, 0.95 for diesel, 0.92 for gasoline, 0.68 for gas and 
0.61 for coal. The DWH test shows that OLS is applicable only for gas and 
coal models. Wald test on a 4 indicates that it is not statistically different from 
zero for gasoline and kerosene and were excluded. This means that gasoline 
and kerosene impact GDP through their effect on capital and labour 
productivities. All the individual variables in the production functions have 
significant t-statistics. 
Income is significant in all energy equations. Electricity, diesel and gas behave 
more like luxury goods (with elasticity greater than one). This is conceivable 
because these energy types are likely to complement most luxury goods in 
South Africa. Gasoline and coal have essential goods characteristics (elasticity 
less than one but greater than zero) while kerosene proves to be an inferior 
good (with negative income elasticity). Most of kerosene demand (on average 
30% over the data span) is from the residential sector and mainly by the poor 
for cooking, heating and lighting. As income increases, people move away 
from kerosene to more modem forms of energy such as electricity. 
The coefficients of own prices for the different energy types are significant. 
Diesel, gasoline and coal all face relatively inelastic demand (prices elasticity 
of -0.029, -0.483 and -0.238 respectively). Electricity price has a positive 
coefficient. This should be the consequence of various government subsidies 
on electricity to the poor such as the free basic electricity (FBE) programme 
and or long time low electricity prices. Kerosene price exhibits the same 
effect, but is significant only at 10%. Cross price elasticities seem to suggest 
that electricity complements gasoline, kerosene and coal. Gas and gasoline 
seem to also complement each other, but this could not be verified in the 
gasoline equation for lack of data on gas prices. 
Population has significant effect on all the energy types, but is negative on gas 
and coal. One percent increase in population results in 2.11%, 1.43%, 0.94% 












From the YES production function for the respective energy types, the output 
elasticities of capital, labour and energy, return to scale and capital-energy and 
labour-energy elasticities of substitution have been calculated at mean levels 
of variables. These parameters are presented in Table 4.5. In general, 
compared to Table 4.2, the output elasticity of capital has fallen across all 
energy types, with the most significant fall in the presence of electricity, 
followed by diesel, while the output elasticity of labour has slightly improved. 
On average, the scale elasticity is higher for electricity, gas and coal, relative 
to the no energy scenario. This suggests that the marginal productivities of 
these energy types were accorded to capital. Gasoline and kerosene have 
negative average output elasticities, resulting in lower RTS. From their YES 
specification, and from the sign of a, (-0.288 and -0.218 respectively), it is 
evident that they reduce labour productivity57 
Table 4.5: YES Parameters with Energy types - Whole Economy 
Model parameter Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Output Elasticity of Capital (N=36) 
Electricity 0.120 0.146 -0.191 0.352 
Diesel 0.146 0.061 -0.001 0.290 
gasoline 0.164 0.066 0.060 0.258 
Gas 0.219 0.016 0.171 0.259 
Kerosene 0.208 0.069 0.128 0.312 
Coal 0.214 0.002 0.211 0.217 
Output Elasticity of Labour 
Electricity 0.288 0.304 -0.195 0.938 
Diesel 0.186 0.211 -0.314 0.696 
Gasoline 0.276 0.086 0.153 0.413 
Gas 0.175 0.263 -0.470 0.945 
Kerosene 0.186 0.089 0.053 0.288 
Coal 0.246 0.049 0.146 0.335 
output Elasticity of Energy 
Electricity 0.178 0.100 0.010 0.363 
Diesel 0.089 0.104 -0.082 0.257 
Gasoline -0.136 0.052 -0.222 -0.018 
Gas 0.196 0.193 -0.133 0.495 
Kerosene -0.059 0.040 -0.125 0.032 
S7 Kerosene's association with ill health and poverty is a possible channel by which it reduces labour 











Coal 0.070 0.049 -0.032 0.145 
Scale elasticity 
Electricity 0.587 0.155 0.403 0.946 
Diesel 0.451 0.144 0.201 0.866 
gasoline 0.305 0.047 0.223 0.393 
Gas 0.589 0.382 -0.343 1.206 
Kerosene 0.334 0.031 0.278 0.397 
Coal 0.531 0.065 0.408 0.673 
Energy-Labour elasticity of Substitution 
Electricity 0.656 0.760 0.128 3.327 
Diesel 0.190 0.172 0.003 0.829 
Gasoline 0.368 0.257 0.030 0.832 
Gas 0.095 0.054 0.008 0.192 
Kerosene 0.487 0.349 0.052 1.109 
Coal 0.216 0.035 0.146 0.286 
Energy-Capital Elasticity of Substitution 
Electricity 0.271 0.134 0.011 0.502 
Diesel 0.280 0.117 0.079 0.484 
Gasoline 0.160 0.100 0.010 0.353 
Gas 3.804 4.271 0.867 23.350 
Kerosene 0.278 0.132 0.077 0.501 
Coal 0.875 0.020 0.820 0.900 
Apart from gas and coal (which seem to be strong substitutes with capital), all 
the other energy types complement capital. The energy-labour elasticity of 
substitution show that on average, electricity is more a substitute to labour 
while the other energy types seem to complement labour. All these quantities 
prove to vary significantly over time. Figures 4.5 shows the variations in RTS, 
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The figure suggests that in the early years of the series (1971 to about 1987), 
electricity, gasoline and kerosene are more substitutes to labour than the rest of 
the data span. Except for gas with high variations in energy-capital elasticity 
of substitution, showing more substitutability around 1973-1978, 1997-1999 
and 2005, all the energy types are less substitutable with capital over the years. 
Figure 4.6 suggests that though electricity complements capital, high capital-
electricity ratio reinforces the complementarity. On the contrary, electricity 
tends to substitute labour more at high labour-electricity ratio. This implies 
that less electricity relative to labour will lead to high unemployment. This 
tendency holds for diesel (Table Cl in appendix). However, kerosene and coal 



















associated with the activities of the poor who are less endowed with capital, 
and therefore in high labour intensities, labour complements kerosene. 
Figure 4.6: Energy Elasticity of Substitution and Factor Ratios - Whole 
Economy 
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4.3.2 Manufacturing Sector 
4.3.2.1 No-Energy Scenario 
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The estimates of manufacturing sector without energy types - two-input model 
(capital, labour) - are presented below5s: 
y = -164.466' + 0.010 ' t+ 15.248' k+ 20.554' 1- 2.008' kl 
(-7.00) (7.48) (5.99) (6.09) (-5.94) 
58 Figures in bracket are t-statistics. a, b, C denote that coefficient is significantly different from zero at 1, 











R2 ~ 0.97: AR2~0.97: F-stat~242.62; N ~ 36 
The overall model statistics shows a satisfactory model performance, with 
adjusted R-square of 0.97 and F-statistics of 242.62. The individual variables 
are equally statistically significant as indicated by the t-values (in 
parentheses). The coefficient of time trend is significant at 1% level, with 
magnitude of 0.0 I, depicting the effect of technology in the manufacturing 
sector over time. The various elasticities evaluated at mean values of variables 
(with standard deviations and range of variability) are presented in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6: Capital-labour YES Parameters - Manufacturing Sector 
N~36 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ec 0.216 0.193 -0.064 0.620 
E f 
0.343 0.658 -0.955 1.832 
RTS 0.559 0.673 -0.679 1.964 
tJH 
0.233 0.263 0.002 0.957 
The output elasticities of capital and labour suggest that without the inclusion 
of energy types, output responds by 0.216% and 0.343% following one percent 
increase in capital and labour respectively. As is the case with whole economy, 
capital elasticity varies less, with standard deviation of 0.193, but that of 
labour has a greater variability with a wider range of variation and standard 
deviation of 0.658. Scale elasticity (RTS) shows that one percent increase in 
capital and labour results in 0.559 percent increase in manufacturing output. 
Because this quantity is less than unity, there is diminishing return in the 
manufacturing sector, though with less magnitude than the case of the whole 
economy. The evolution of RTS appear in phase with marginal productivity 
of labour, which agrees with some elements of South African history, notably 
the significant fall (-32%) in male labour participation in the last part of the 
20th century compared to the 1960s (Feinstein, 2007). This fall is the 
consequence of increasing unemployment due to widespread rise in black 
wages during the same period. The period also corresponds to falling marginal 
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--+- capital ____ labour .........- RTS ........- K-L 
Contrary to the result of the whole economy, manufacturing capital-labour (K-
L) elasticity of substitution is 0.233. In the major span of the series, variation 
is below 0.5, with standard deviation of 0.263 and range of (0.002 and 0.957). 
This suggests that capital and labour are more of complements than substitutes 
in the manufacturing sector a 7 in Equation (4.09) is expected to be statistically 
significant in the framework with energy types. The evolution with capital-
labour ratio shows that in situations of capital intensity, labour complements 
capital. 
Figure 4.8: K-L Elasticity of Substitution and K-L Ratio - Manufacturing 
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4.3.2.2 Estimation with Total Energy 
The estimates for model with aggregate energy, capital and labour in 
manufacturing sector are presented below. The DWH statistic suggests 
endogeneity between total energy and GDP in manufacturing, which serves as 
the basis for application of 3sls. Both equations have acceptable explanatory 
power (as shown by the R-squares), with significant model Chi2. 
y=97.920 + 0.011'1+ l7.264' k-14.148' 1-21.357' e 
(0.94) (17.16) (3.09) (-1.71) (-1.87) 
- 2.363' kl + 0.048 ke + 2.812' Ie 
-2 .. 91 (0.78) (1.91) 
e = - 2.777 + 1.453' y - 0.204' pe 
(-1.42) (8.30) (-6.28) 
R 2 =095; Chi2 =2006.71; R'=069; Chi2 =94.96; DWHstat=31.21(0.000) 
y y e e 
N=36 
Except for all the constant terms and the capital-energy interaction term, all 
coefficients are significant as suggested by the t-values in parentheses. The 
capital-labour interaction term is significant, confirming the result of capital-
labour elasticity of substitution above. The estimates of the energy demand 
equation fits the classical demand theory. Manufacturing GDP is the major 
determinant of manufacturing energy demand, with elasticity of 1. 5% 
implying that as income increases, energy demand increases more than 
proportionately. The coefficient of energy pnce suggests inelastic 
manufacturing energy demand, with magnitude of -0.204. 
Table 4.7: YES Parameters with Total Energy - Manufacturing Sector 
N=36 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ek 0.225 0.225 -0.102 0.684 
E
f 
0.417 0.669 -0504 2.333 
E 0.179 0.270 -0.411 0574 
e 
RTS 0.821 0.668 -0.132 2.748 
tJke 
0.806 0.021 0.740 0.831 
tJ
fe 
0.108 0.081 0.001 0.329 
tJH 











Table 4.7 has the results of output elasticities of capital, labour, energy, RTS, 
capital-energy and labour-energy elasticities of substitution evaluated at mean 
values of variables. The average elasticity of capital remains relatively 
constant after the introduction of energy, while that of labour increased 
slightly. The marginal productivity of energy is higher in the manufacturing 
sector (0.179%) than the whole economy. The scale elasticity is far higher 
(0.82%) for manufacturing sector compared to the whole economy. Total 
energy appears to be substitute for capital and complement for labour, 
however this may not say much given that capital-energy interaction 
coefficient is insignificant. Meaningful information can only be achieved at 
the dis aggregated energy level. The capital labour elasticity of substitution 
(0.199) agrees with that obtained from no-energy scenario model, suggesting 
that they are more of complements than substitutes. The variability over time 
of capital, labour and scale elasticities are similar to the case without energy, 
with manufacturing R TS evolving in phase with labour elasticity. The 
elasticities of substitution between labour and energy and labour and capital 
seem to also evolve in phase. However, it is not possible to say much from 
this, including capital-energy elasticity of substitution, since capital-energy 
interaction coefficient is not significant and therefore dis aggregating energy 











Figure 4.9: Evolution of (Energy) Elasticities over Time - Manufacturing 
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The pattern makes economic sense in that coefficients of labour productivity, 
RTS and K-L elasticity of substitution evolve in phase. The more capital can 
substitute for labour, the higher the productivity of labours9 and hence RTS. 
This explanation is based on the fact that capital intensive processed require 
more skilled labour, hence higher labour productivity. This co-evolution is 
more pronounced in manufacturing, but also present in agriculture and mining. 
4.3.2.3 Estimations with Disaggregated Energy 
The Durbin-Watson-Hausman statistics for endogeneity test suggest that OLS 
is consistent for models with gas and coal, but inconsistent for the rest of 











manufacturing energy types. Therefore 3sls method is applied to models with 
electricity, diesel and kerosene, while OLS is applied to models with gas and 
coal. For the OLS, the two Chi2 columns report model F-statistics. The overall 
model statistics for all the respective production and energy demand equations 
are satisfactory, with significant Chi2 and F-statistics. 
Table 4.8: YES Estimates with Energy types - Manufacturing Sector 
Electricity Diesel Gas Kerosene Coal 
R' , 0.97 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.94 
Chi2 1654.35 1984.97 2006.71 763.48 358.02 , 
R2 0.95 0.84 0.69 0.43 0.43 
e 
Chi2 746.45 190.18 94.96 26.85 4.52 , 
DWIt°. 928.33 144.38 1.90 5.65 1.80 
(P-VAL) (0.000) (0.000) (0.177) (0.023) (0.189) 
Parameters 
a o -70.133 -88.419' 36.036 -204.94' 30.763 
(-3.01) (-1.84) (0.77) (-3.67) (0.97) 
a, -0.000 0.001' 0.011' 0.013' 0.013' 
(-0.05) (6.83) (7.14) (6.94) (8.9) 
a
2 
6.024' 12.433' 16.461' 13.559' 10.460' 
(1.69) (3.27) (6.94) (3.58) (4.86) 
a 3 13.039' 14.347
b -5.286 23.970' -5.047 
(3.73) (2.25) (-0.69) (3.70) (-1.08) 
a 4 -0.159 -6.702 -19.649' 7.998' -12.744' 
(-0.06) (-0.87) (-4.84) (1.68) (-5.29) 
a, -1.079' -1.991 ' -2.296' -1.646' -1.509 ' 
(-2.50) (-4.04) (-5.40) (-3.63) (-4.54) 
a, 0.176
b 0.260b 0.083 -0.135 0.077 
(1.97) (1.99) (0.50) (-1.12) (0.76) 
a 7 -0.159
b 0.585 2.530' -0.890b 1.601' 
(-0.38) (0.58) (4.60) (-1.81) (5.61) 
/30 -8.680' -2.218' 9.255' 5.418 16.331' 
(-8.55) (-1.90) (6.65) (0.69) (7.18) 
/3, 1.879' 1.069' 0.037 1.053 -0.656
b 
(17.20) (8.31) (0.24) (1.21) (-2.61) 
60 Insignificant DWH test implies that OLS is consistent; model (9) is estimated with the OLS option 












b 0.4690 -2.108 0 0.501b 
(-0.08) (2.29) (3.09) (-2.54) (2.03) 
/332 -0.050 -0.125 0.031 -8.243
b -1.014 
(-0.30) (-0.28) (0.55) (-2.70) (1.12) 
/333 - 0.165 - -7.349
b 1.100 
(0.37) (-2.37) (1.19) 
/334 -0.168
b -0.2240 0.225' -0.168 -0.483 b 
(-2.02) (-2.32) (1.90) (-0.26) (-2.52) 
. " , , , , Notes. , ,and denote slgmficance at 1 Yo, 5Yo, and 10 Yo levels respectIvely. Parentheses contain 
t-values. P3J are the coefficients of energy prices: i = 1 for electricity; 2 for diesel; 3 for kerosene 
and 4 for coal. Gas prices are not available. Sample size is 36 obseIVations. 
The main variables of interest to evaluate the parameters of the production 
function are significant for most of the energy types. The estimates of energy 
demand suggest that except for gas and coal, output has significant and high 
positive effect on the demand for energy types. The magnitudes of the 
coefficients of income imply that electricity, diesel and kerosene are superior 
goods, with income elasticities of 1.88, 1.07 and 1.05 respectively. Coal is an 
inferior good in manufacturing production, since a percentage increase in 
income results in 0.66% fall in the demand for coal. The coefficient in gas 
demand equation is weakly positive but insignificant. The coefficients of own 
prices for the various energy types have the expected negative sign in 
accordance with the classical demand theory. However, these coefficients are 
not significant for electricity and diesel. Manufacturing kerosene demand is 
very elastic (with elasticity of -7.35%), while that of coal is relatively inelastic. 
Cross elasticities indicate that electricity and coal are substitutes; diesel 
complements electricity but is a substitute for coal. Gas complements 
electricity and coal, while kerosene is substitute with all energy types. 
Table 4.9 presents the output elasticities of capital, labour and energy, scale 
elasticity and the capital-energy and energy-labour elasticities of substitution. 











Table 4.9: YES Parameters with Energy types - Manufacturing Sector 
Model parameter Mean I Std. Dev. Min I Max 
Output Elasticity of Capital (N =36) 
Electricity 0.133 0.103 -0.008 0.347 
Diesel 0.175 0.178 -0.070 0.499 
Gas 0.226 0.215 -0.089 0.664 
Kerosene 0.191 0.202 -0.107 0.579 
Coal 0.154 0.145 -0.054 0.447 
Output Elasticity of Labour 
Electricity 0.193 0.393 -0.586 0.979 
Diesel 0.269 0.583 -0.843 1.773 
Gas 0.367 0.789 -0.887 2.212 
Kerosene 0.473 0.773 -1.279 1.957 
Coal 0.391 0.632 -0.586 1.675 
output Elasticity of Energy 
Electricity 0.420 0.061 0.274 0.539 
Diesel 0.288 0.099 0.041 0.439 
Gas 0.132 0.243 -0.418 0.489 
Kerosene -0.017 0.094 -0.147 0.229 
Coal 0.066 0.155 -0.295 0.294 
Scale elasticity 
Electricity 0.681 0.063 0.472 0.706 
Diesel 0.455 0.096 0.217 0.605 
Gas 0.601 0.027 0.596 0.716 
Kerosene 0.350 2.500 0.017 3.005 
Coal 0.585 0.034 0.496 0.652 
Energy-Labour elasticity of Substitution 
Electricity 2.922 12.763 0.129 59.113 
Diesel 0.313 0.162 0.030 0.622 
Gas 0.142 0.078 0.008 0.334 
Kerosene 2.151 6.304 0.041 37.143 
Coal 0.166 0.091 0.009 0.365 
Energy-Capital Elasticity of Substitution 
Electricity 0.601 0.063 0.472 0.706 
Diesel 0.455 0.096 0.217 0.605 
Gas 0.680 0.027 0.596 0.716 
Kerosene 3.517 11.585 0.017 70.005 
Coal 0.585 0.034 0.496 0.652 
In general, compared to the no-energy scenano, the output elasticities of 
capital have dropped slightly (except with gas) while those of labour increased 
slightly (except with electricity and diesel) across most of the energy types. 
The output elasticities of energy types are highest for electricity (0.420), 
followed by diesel (0.288) and gas (0.132). It is least for coal (0.066) and 
negative for kerosene (-0.017). This trend also reflects in the scale elasticities 











Figure C3 in Appendix suggests that electricity complements capital in 
manufacturing, but the complementarity is stronger at low and high capital-
electricity ratio, and relatively weaker on average. This may imply that as 
capital intensifies, skilled labour is required which tend to ease the 
complementarity. However, this cannot be verified since there are no data of 
skilled labour in manufacturing. Labour is shown to be strong substitute of 
electricity at all levels of labour-electricity ratio. The variation of capital-coal 
elasticity of substitution shows the same tendency as with electricity. 
However, at higher labour-coal ratios, labour tends to be a stronger substitute 
for coal. Manufacturing kerosene is less of substitute for labour than it is for 
capital. However, at high capital-kerosene ratios, the substitutatibility with 
capital decrease, but increases with labour. This could be explained in terms of 
the fact that when capital increases relative to kerosene, producers move to 
better forms of energy whereas with relatively higher lab ur (unemployment), 
the poor may rely on less capital intensive activities using lesser quality 
energy. 
4.3.3 Agricultural Sector 
4.3.3.1 No-Energy Scenario 
The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimates of two inputs (capital and labour) 
YES production function are shown below61 The R-square and adjusted R-
square of 79% and 76% respectively, with model F-statistics of 29.26 indicate 
a good model performance. 
Y = - 59.990' + 0.016' t+ 4.238b k + 5.175 b 1- 0.599b kl 
(-3.39) (3.50) (2.04) (2.08) (-2.03) 
R2 = 0.79: AR2=0.76: F-stat=29.26: N = 36 
The t-values in parentheses show that the constant term, time trend and all the 
variables and interactive term are significant at five percent level and less. The 
significance of time trend (0.016) may be attributed to technology in 
agriculture. The coefficients of capital and labour are positive while that of the 
61 Figures in bracket are t-statistics. a, b, C denote that coefficient is significantly different from zero at 1, 











interaction term is negative. The output, scale and substitution elasticities are 
presented in Table 4.10. 
Table 4.10: Capital-labour YES Parameters - Agriculture 
N=36 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ec 0.043 0.137 -0.195 0.379 
E I 0.004 0.180 -0.424 0.313 
RTS 0.047 0.272 -0.434 0.518 
tJH 
0.231 0.156 0.001 0.762 
Agricultural output elasticities of capital and labour, calculated at mean values 
of data show that in the absence of energy, one percent increase in capital and 
labour results in 0.043% and 0.004% increase in output respectively. This 
places the scale elasticity at 0.047 on average, implying that a percentage 
increase in both capital and labour (in the absence of energy) brings about 
0.047% increase in agricultural output. The capital-labour elasticity of 
substitution is on average 0.231, implying a strong degree of complementarity 
between both inputs. There is a great deal of variation within the span of the 
parameters as indicated in Figure 4.10. The output elasticities of inputs scale 
and substitution elasticities trend upward. 
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4.3.3.2 Estimation with Total Energy 
The specification ofVES production function with energy includes the capital-
labour interaction term since from the no-energy case, capital and labour 
appear to complement each other. Results of the joint estimates of production 
and energy demand in agriculture are shown below. With a DWH statistic of 
120.18, there is evidence of endogeneity and therefore the estimates reported 
are for 3sls regression. The R-square for production function does not change 
significantly (76%) after the inclusion of energy and that of energy demand 
function is at 84%. With Chi2 of 133.72 and 194.85 for the respective 
equations, the model performance is not questionable. 
y = 243.528 + 0.028' t- 25.997' k - 23.246' 1-18.487' e + 1.578' kl + 
(0.91) (3.95) (-1.66) (-1.91) (1.93) (1.59) 
1.3866 ke + 0.935' Ie 
(2.21) 1.83 
e = 13.067' + 0.377 Y - 0.264' pe 
(3.96) (0.87) (4.28) 
R2 =0.76; Chi2 =133.72; R' =0.84; Chi2 =194.85; DWHstat =120.18(0 000) y y e e 
N=36 
As suggested by the t-values in brackets, apart from the constant term, all 
other coefficients are significant (mostly at 10% level) for production 
equation. In the energy demand equation, income is not significant, but all the 
other coefficients are. The coefficient of agricultural value added (though not 
significant) suggest that energy is an essential input (coefficient is positive and 
less than one). The price elasticity of agricultural energy demand (-0.264) 
confirms this essential input nature of energy, however, detailed interpretation 











Table 4.11: YES Estimates with Total Energy- Agriculture 
N=36 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ek 0.188 0.200 -0.404 0.564 
E f 
0.589 0.377 -0.237 1.604 
E 0.026 0.549 -0.811 1.055 
e 
RTS 0.803 0.839 -0.870 2.743 
tJke 
0.290 0.207 0.037 1.077 
tJ
fe 
0.168 0.142 0.004 0.780 
tJH 
0.192 0.077 0.009 0.349 
Table 4.11 reports output elasticities, scale and substitution elasticities 
evaluated and mean values of data. The output elasticities of capital and labour 
have increased to 0.188 and 0.589 respectively, and that of energy is at 0.026. 
This suggests that energy is important in enhancing capital and labour 
productivities. This results in a scale elasticity of 0.803. The elasticities of 
substitution suggest that all three inputs have high degree of complementarity. 
However, these results can only make sense when the different effects of 











Figure 4.11: Evolution of (Energy) Elasticities with Time - Agriculture 
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4.3.3.3 Estimations with Disaggregated Energy 
While there is evidence of endogeneity between agricultural GDP on one hand 
and electricity, diesel and kerosene demands on the other, there is no 
indication of endogenous relationship between the latter and coal demand. 
Therefore OLS are reported for coal in Table 4.12 and 3sls for other energy 
types. The goodness of fit measures are alright for production equations, but 
for energy demand equations it ranges from 84% for diesel to 43% for coal 











that the models are all trustworthy. Coal model has a low F-statistic (4.52) but 
acceptable, judging from the model P-values. 
Table 4.12: YES Estimates with Energy types - Agriculture 
Electricity Diesel Kerosene Coal 
R' , 0.75 0.98 0.95 0.99 
Chi2 143.36 1984.97 763.48 358.02 , 
R2 0.65 0.84 0.43 0.43 
e 
Chi2, 90.81 190.18 26.85 4.52 
DWH'''. 264.48 32.52 11.31 1.04 
(P-VAL) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.315) 
Parameters 
a o 60.565 89.960 -155.24
b -59.092' 
(0.56) (0.64) (-2.80) (-3.21) 
a, O.Ol1b 0.020' O.023
b 0.020' 
(2.10) (4.80) (2.74) (5.05) 
a 2 -8.386' -7.953' 8.150' l.304 
(-1.79) (-1.69) (1.65) (0.65) 
a
3 
-7. 664b -13.109' 11.817' 2.913' 
(-2.73) (-1.74) (1.67) (1.61) 
a 4 -2.568 -8.721' 10.981
b 2.698' 
(-1.06) (-1.65) (2.06) (4.03) 
a, 0.854b 0.543' -0.586 -0.065 
(1.79) (1.69) (-0.94) (-1.23) 
a, 0.269
b DADS' -0.581 ' -0.096' 
(2.37) (1.91) (-1.88) (1.76) 
a
7 
0.053 b 0.835' -0.862b -0.272' 
(2.38) (1.74) (-2.01) (-3.97) 
/30 -29.095' 4.101' 7.508' 19.839
b 
(-6049) (3.38) (1.67) (2.89) 
/3, 4.814' 0.882' 0.302 -0.040 
(6.87) (5.24) (0.44) (-0.04) 
/331 -0.069 -0.079 -2.931' -4.282' 
(-0.30) (-0.61) (-4.76) (-4.15) 
/332 0.972 -O.104
b 0.094 7.301' 
(0.61) (-2.22) (0.04) (1.89) 
/333 -1.240 - -0.002 -8.597
b 
(-0.75) (0.01) (-2.17) 
/334 0.140 - -0.962b -1.180' 
(0.38) (-2.19) (-1.60) 
" " , , , , Notes: , ,and denote slgmficance at 1 Yo, 5 Yo, and lOYo levels respectIvely. Parentheses 
contain t-values. P3J are the coefficients of energy prices: I = 1 for electricity; 2 for diesel; 3 
for kerosene and 4 for coal. Gas prices are not available. The sample size is 36 observations. 
62 Insignificant DWH test implies that OLS is consistent; model (9) is estimated with the OLS option 











According to the t-values in parentheses, most of the coefficients, especially 
those of interest to the YES production function are significant. In the energy 
demand equations, the intercept is significant for all the energy types. The 
coefficient of agricultural GDP is significant for electricity and diesel, but not 
for kerosene and coal. One percent increase in output brings about 4.81 % 
increase in electricity demand (a luxury good nature), and 0.88% increase in 
diesel demand (an essential input nature). This is not contrary to expectation, 
given that mechanisation makes diesel an essential input in agriculture. In 
electricity demand equation, own price coefficients are negative, but not 
significant. The coefficient of diesel price in diesel demand equation confirms 
the essential input nature, with one percent increase in price resulting in only 
0.102% decrease in diesel demand. Cross price coefficients are not significant. 
The coefficient of own price of kerosene is negative but not significant. 
Electricity and coal prove to be strong substitutes for ker sene, with elasticity 
of -2.931 % and -0.932% respectively. In coal demand equation, one percent 
increase in coal price brings about 1.18% fall in coal demand. The coefficients 
of cross price elasticities suggest that electricity and kerosene are strong 
substitutes to coal while diesel is a strong complement, with elasticities of-
4.282, -8.597 and 7.301 percent respectively. 
Table 4.13: YES Parameters with Energy types - Agriculture 
Model parameter Mean I Std. Dev. Min I Max 
Output Elasticity of Capital (N= 36) 
Electricity 0.048 0.114 -0.221 0.257 
Diesel 0.130 0.103 -0.184 0.271 
Kerosene 0.230 0.384 -0.552 0.575 
Coal 0.111 0.090 -0.005 0.418 
Output Elasticity of Labour 
Electricity 0.198 0.229 -0.219 0.789 
Diesel 0.416 0.152 0.027 0.820 
Kerosene 0.712 0.682 -0.106 1.892 
Coal 0.263 0.253 -0.089 1.155 
Output Elasticity of Energy 
Electricity 0.128 0.087 -0.014 0.322 
Diesel 0.623 0.269 0.063 1.066 
Kerosene -0.079 0.318 -0.620 0.536 
Coal -0.032 0.080 -0.167 0.142 
Scale elasticity 
Electricity 0.374 I 0.276 -0.138 I 1.095 











Kerosene 0.603 I 1.000 -0.523 I 2.603 
Coal 0.342 I 0.358 -0.062 I 1.524 
Energy-Labour elasticity of Substitution 
Electricity 0.746 0.392 0.103 2.191 
Diesel 0.473 0.085 0.268 0.514 
Kerosene 3.402 6.558 0.002 24.005 
Coal 1.547 2.353 0.020 10.617 
Energy-Capital Elasticity of Substitution 
Electricity 0.258 0.100 0.017 0.521 
Diesel 0.257 0.136 0.086 0.423 
Kerosene 0.361 0.371 0.010 2.148 
Coal 2.173 4.970 0.004 28.636 
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Table 4.13 reports the various elasticities. The output elasticity of capital is 
lower in the presence of all energy types relative to the total energy model, but 
higher than for the model without energy. That of labour remained relatively 
high. This suggest that in the analysis with aggregate energy, average effects 
are captured, which results in more importance given to capital than energy. 
The output elasticities of energy types show diesel with the highest coefficient, 
followed by electricity. These parameters are weak and negative for kerosene 
and coal. It should be noted that the capital energy interaction terms (a
j
) are 
not significant while those of labour (a,) are only weakly significant for these 
two energy types. It is expected therefore that these negative effects are not 











its high output elasticity. The elasticities of substitution indicate that all energy 
types have strong degree of substitutability for labour and complementarity for 
capital. However, the substitution elasticities of diesel-labour (and electricity-
labour to a lesser extent) seem moderate, showing signs of some 
complementarity also. This is suggestive of the fact that diesel operated 
machinery requires some labour (more skilled). In contrast, irrigation schemes 
that require electricity use far less labour than diesel operation tasks. 
The evolution over time of output and scale elasticities for the four energy 
types (in figure C3 of Appendix) shows a great deal of variation. While output 
elasticities of electricity and coal have been relatively stable over time, that of 
diesel has been falling and that of kerosene rising. The evolution in opposing 
direction of output elasticities of diesel and kerosene suggests that in periods 
of high diesel prices, some kerosene might be used in place of diesel. 
4.3.4 Mining Sector 
4.3.4.1 No-Energy Scenario 
As with the other sectors, the OLS estimates for two-input YES production 
function without energy for mining sector are reported below. 
y = -16.279' + 2.825' k + 4.100' 1- 0.423' kl 
(-1.82) (3.04) (3.11) (-3.08) 
R2= 0.56: F-stat=7.21:N=36 
The overall model F-statistic is 7.21 and significant, with R-square of 56%. 
The coefficients of individual variables are significant, with (negative) 
constant term at 10% level, capital and labour at I % level and the input 
interaction term (negative) significant at 1% level according to the t-values63 
in parentheses. The time trend coefficient is not significant, and it reduced the 
performance of the model, so it was excluded from the estimation. The non-
63 Figures in bracket are t-statistics. a, b, C denote that coefficient is significantly different from zero at 1, 











significance suggests that there is no significant technical progress III the 
mining sector that could lead to rise in production over time. 
Table 4.14: Capital-labour YES Parameters - Mining Sector 
N=36 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ec -0.019 0.127 -0.158 0.291 
E I 0.150 0.157 -0.042 0.593 
RTS 0.131 0.180 -0.136 0.556 
tJH 
0.336 0.416 0.015 1.915 
The values of output, scale and substitution elasticities are in Table 4.14. The 
marginal elasticity of capital is negative, implying that on average, one percent 
increase in capital results in 0.019% fall in output in the mining sector. This 
coefficient shows that the mining sector is over capitalised. That of labour is 
positive, and a percentage increase in labour leads to 0.15% increase in output. 
One percent increase in both inputs brings 0.131% increase in mining output 
as suggested by the scale elasticity. The capital-labour elasticity of substitution 
indicates that mining capital and labour are complements, though not strongly. 
The variations of these parameters over time are not quite pronounced. 
However, in the early years (1971 to 1976) of the series, capital and labour are 
substitutes, and they exhibit more of complementary relationship till the end of 
the series. 
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4.3.4.2 Estimation with Total Energy 
The inclusion of aggregate energy yields a DWH statistic of 4.41, with 
probability value of 0.043, implying that OLS is inconsistent. The 3sls 
regression was performed with a hundred iterations, which lead to 
convergence and better model performance than simple 3sls. The estimation 
results are presented below. After the inclusion of total energy, the model 
statistics improved for production equation, with R-square of 61 % and Chi2 of 
37.33. The statistics for energy demand equation have Chi2 of 333.65 and R-
square of 90%. 
{
y = 126.85' + 1.858 k + 17.947' 1+ 11.304' e - 0.024' kl- 0.150' ke -1.455' Ie 
(-3.28) (0.95) (4.04) (3.76) (-0.15) (-1.73) (--4.28) 
e = -12.8056 + 2.141' Y - 0.266' pe 
(-2.06) (3.85) (17.07) 
R 2 = 0.61; Chi2 = 37.33; R' = 0.90; Chi2 = 333.65; DWHstat = 4.41(0.043) y y e e 
N=36 
Though capital and capital-labour interaction terms are not significant, all 
other coefficients are. The non-significance of capital is not surprising, 
because the mining sector (though capital intensive) is a very energy intensive 
sector. The operation of capital therefore largely depends on energy, and hence 
the inclusion of energy reduces the significance of capital coefficient. The 
energy demand equation has the expected classical demand behaviour and all 
coefficients are significant. A percentage increase in mining production 
(average price of energy) results in 2.141% (0.266%) rise (fall) in aggregate 
energy demand. However, these are aggregate effects; more meaningful 
interpretation can be possible only after disaggregation. The elasticities of 
inputs, scale and substitution derived at average values of variables are 











Table 4.15: YES Parameters with Total Energy- Mining Sector 
N=36 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ek -0.086 0.040 -0.132 -0.001 
E f 
0.431 0.422 -0.178 1.272 
E 0.126 0.427 -0.386 1.125 
e 
RTS 0.470 0.494 -0.204 1.419 
tJke 
0.296 0.289 0.002 0.964 
tJ
fe 
0.984 1.002 0.027 4.793 
tJH 
1.125 0.417 0.193 2.780 
The marginal elasticity of capital remains negative, that of labour increases 
slightly to 0.0431 and that of energy is at 0.126. The inclusion of energy 
raises the scale elasticity to from 0.131 to 0.470%. Substitution elasticities 
suggest that in the presence of energy, labour is easily substituted for by 
capital and energy, with average coefficients of 1.125 and 0.984% 
respectively. Capital and energy are complements, with elasticity of 0.296. 
The evolution of the parameters over time (Figure 4.14) show that while the 
marginal elasticity of capital is relatively stable, that of labour is constantly 
dropping, but that of energy is rising. This evolution seems to agree with the 
nature of extractive industry like mining, where as more resources are 
exploited, it becomes increasingly difficult to extract more, except with more 
sophisticated capital technique (requiring more energy), therefore the marginal 
elasticity and hence productivity of labour drops. However, this is only 
intuitive and the mechanism could be otherwise. The elasticities of substitution 
are relatively stable over time, except for the period from 1994 to 2006, 
corresponding to the period of the post apartheid era, with major policy 





































0) 0) 0) 
fff , ~ OJ 
~capital -+- Iabour --+- energy --M- RTS 
Elasticities of Substitution 
IJ! 
fa, 
____ L-E --+- K-E --M- K-L 





The endogeneity test for dis aggregated energy types show that OLS is 
inconsistent in all the sub models, requiring 3s1s regression method. The 
results are reported in Table 4.16. The overall model statistics show significant 
Chi2, and satisfactory R -squares. 











Electricity Liquid Coal 
petroleum 
R' , 0.59 0.65 0.99 
Chi2 0.75 71.95 358.02 , 
R2 0.45 0.87 0.43 
e 
Chi2, 48.55 241.77 4.52 
DWH". 22.79 3.46 14.05 
(P-VAL) (0.000) (0.072) (0.002) 
Parameters 
a o -24.880 -47.219 -40.575' 
(-0.73) (-1.60) (-2.87) 
a, -0.001 -0.001 O.OO3
b 
(-0.23) (-0.58) (2.72) 
a 2 -2.606 2.760 4.051' 
(-0.65) (0.96) (3.40) 
a
3 
8.596' 6.441' 3.886' 
(1.94) (2.83) (3.18) 
a 4 3.615' 5.028' 2.446' 
(1.79) (2.57) (3.60) 
a, 0.059 -0.171' -0.309
b 
(1.31) (-1.85) (-2.82) 
a, 0.194
b -0.180' -0.198' 
(2.52) (-1.60) (-3.43) 
a
7 
-0. 792b -0.474' -0. 081b 
(-1.71) (-5.78) (-2.50) 
/30 48.696' 8.237 -246.39' 
(4.41) (0.95) (-6.12) 
/3, 3.723' 0.017 2.913' 
(3.76) (0.02) (6.27) 
/331 -1.231' -O.411
b 3.648' 
(-4.08) (-2.06) (3.96) 
/332 -0.325' -0.302' 0.769
b 
(-3.50) (-5.03) (2.81) 
/334 0.135 0.294' -3.053' 
(0.61) (1.97) (-4.44) 
Notes: a, b, and C denote slgmficance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectIvely. Parentheses contain 
t-values. P3J are the coefficients of energy prices: I = 1 for electricity; 2 average price for liquid 
fuel and 4 for coal price. Gas prices are not available. The sample size is 36 obseIVations. 
In production functions, all coefficients for coal model are significant. The 
constant, trend and capital coefficients are not significant for electricity and 
liquid petroleum. All other variables for the two sub models are significant. In 
the energy demand equations, the constant term is significant for electricity 
and coal, but not for liquid petroleum. The sign of the coefficient of mining 
64 Insignificant DWH test implies that OLS is consistent; model (9) is estimated with the OLS option 











GDP is positive. Mining GDP has significant impact on mining electricity and 
coal demands, with a percentage increase in GDP leading to 3.723% and 
2.913% increase in the demand for the respective energy types. Mining GDP 
coefficient is not significant in liquid petroleum demand. Own price 
elasticities are all significant and negative. One percent increase in prices of 
electricity, liquid petroleum and coal results in 1.237, 0.302 and 3.053 percent 
fall in the demands for the respective energy types. Liquid petroleum portrays 
the nature of essential input in the mining sector. Coefficient of cross prices 
suggest that liquid petroleum and electricity are complements, with 0.325 and 
0.411 percent fall in the demand for electricity and liquid petroleum, resulting 
from one percent increase in the prices of liquid petroleum and electricity 
respectively. Liquid petroleum is substitute to coal, with one percent increase 
in coal and liquid petroleum prices resulting in 0.294 and 0.769 percent 
increase in the demands for liquid petroleum and coal respectively. Coal and 
electricity seem to be substitutes, though the coefficient of coal price is not 
significant in electricity demand equation. When the price of electricity 
increases by one percent, coal demand responds with 3.648 percent increases. 
Table 4.17: YES Parameters with Energy types - Mining Sector 
Model parameter Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Output Elasticity of Capital (N = 36) 
Electricity 0.019 0.052 -0.100 0.091 
Liquid petroleum -0.130 0.022 -0.162 -0.089 
Coal -0.012 0.112 -0.152 0.450 
Output Elasticity of Labour 
Electricity 0.079 0.196 -0.155 0.520 
Liquid petroleum 0.284 0.189 -0.147 0.587 
Coal 0.189 0.117 -0.017 0.475 
Output Elasticity of Energy 
Electricity 0.104 0.262 -0.150 0.771 
Liquid petroleum 0.161 0.143 -0.037 0.469 
Coal 0.052 0.072 -0.039 0.256 
Scale elasticity 
Electricity 0.202 0.236 -0.086 0.738 
Liquid petroleum 0.315 0.194 0.047 0.828 
Coal 0.230 0.204 -0.066 0.761 
Energy-Labour elasticity of Substitution 











Liquid petroleum 0.214 0.221 0.008 0.844 
Coal 3.783 4.344 0.009 19.524 
Energy-Capital Elasticity of Substitution 
Electricity 0.398 0.400 0.034 1.660 
Liquid petroleum 1.253 4.198 0.052 25.342 
Coal 0.409 0.851 0.004 5.109 
The different elasticities at mean values are reported in Table 4.17. The output 
elasticity of capital in the presence of electricity is 0.019%. This elasticity is 
negative in the presence of all other energy types. That of labour is very low 
(0.079) for electricity, this implies that electricity using machines are less 
labour requiring, such that an extra unit of labour will result in only a dismal 
increase in output. This is also confirmed by the positive coefficient of capital 
elasticity, which also suggests that the mining sector can accommodate more 
electrical machines, relative to capital using other energy types. The 
elasticities of energy types show that one percent increase in electricity, liquid 
petroleum, and coal use brings about 0.104, 0.161 and 0.052 percent increase 
in mining output respectively, holding all else constant. The scale elasticity is 
higher for liquid petroleum and coal, mainly due to the contribution of labour, 
but also energy, for liquid petroleum. The magnitude of labour elasticity 
implies that there is room for (production enhancing) employment in the 
mmmg sector, but this can only corne with higher liquid petroleum 
consumption. 
According to the elasticities of substitution, electricity and coal appear to be 
strong substitutes for labour, while liquid petroleum show some 
complementary effect with labour. This tendency is reverse for capital-energy 
substitution elasticity, where electricity and coal show complementarity with 
capital while liquid petroleum shows some substitutionary effect. 
According to the standard deviations and the graphs of figures C4 (in 
Appendix), the variations in output response to energy types and in scale 
elasticities are moderate relative to elasticities of substitution. From 1990, the 
output elasticities of all energy types have been trending upward, with 
electricity rising the fastest, followed by liquid petroleum, and coal is 











but also capacity expansion. This tendency is also suggestive of an extractive 
industry like mining, where, the more exploitation is done, the less easy it is to 
exploit further, and growth then comes with higher effort, indicated by greater 
energy usage. The lesson here is that future growth in the mining sector will 
corne with higher energy requirement, and there will be a tendency to move 
from electricity and petroleum to coal if increases in electricity tariffs and 
current tendencies in liquid fossil fuel prices keep on. 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter had as objective, to use a YES production function in three inputs 
in order to relax the quite often implausible assumptions of unitary (Cobb-
Douglas) and constant (CES) elasticity of factor substitution. The work also 
takes care of endogeneity problems by carrying out a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
for endogeneity and jointly estimating YES production and energy demand 
functions in cases of OLS inconsistency, using 3sls. The estimates also provide 
information on determinants of demand for various energy types. The YES 
production function estimates equally provide useful information on output 
elasticities of labour, capital and the respective energy types, the Returns to 
Scale with and without energy (with growth implications) and nature of 
association between various energy types and capital and labour in the whole 
economy, manufacturing, agriculture and mining sectors. 
The results have various implications. First is that there is endogeneity problem 
for all energy types in production process except for gas and coal. This suggests 
that when this problem is not addressed in estimating production functions with 
energy, bias due to simultaneity might be inherent65 The second is that 
elasticities of substitution among inputs are neither unitary nor constant. There is 
evidence of significant variation over time and with factor proportion. This 
implies that it pays to allow the elasticity to vary in the production function. 
The third is that various energy types have different effects on output (and also 
on growth by their contribution to the scale elasticity). Some energy types 
6S There can be other sources of bias, such as heterogeneity, which is not tackled in this work. 











enhance output to various extends (in order of importance are: electricity, gas, 
coal and diesel), while others hinder production (gasoline and kerosene). 
Though this may be obvious, the finding however stresses the need to 
disaggregate energy forms. The fourth is that some energy types have stronger 
impact in certain productive sectors than others. For instance electricity shows 
stronger effect in manufacturing than agriculture and mining, while diesel shows 
stronger effect in agriculture than any other sector. The growth reducing impact 
of kerosene is stronger in agriculture than manufacturing, while coal has weak 
positive impact in mining and manufacturing but negative in agriculture. This 
implies that it is important to dis aggregate both energy into its constituent fuels 
and the economy into various sectors. 
The fifth is that though the four energy types (electricity, gas, coal and diesel) 
have lower contribution to scale elasticity (which is the determinant of an 
economy's growth path) than capital and labour, the graph of the time evolution 
show that they set the pace for RTS, this implies that if South African Economy 
is less endowed with these resources, economic growth will be inhibited. 
Evaluating elasticity of factor substitution at aggregate energy measure, one 
would conclude that energy is more a complement of labour and capital. 
Disaggregating energy types indicate that electricity is more a substitute for 
labour and complement to capital. These results are consistent within the various 
productive sectors considered, and they imply that benefits of the electrification 
efforts in South Africa are likely to accrue to the (rich) owners of capital and not 











5. ENERGY AND PRO-POOR GROWTH IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters looked at the energy-GDP inter-linkages in both 
non-theoretical and theoretical frameworks. However, it is not automatic that 
any contribution to economic growth (such as the role of aggregate energy and 
various energy types in the different sectors) is translated into poverty effects. 
Some consensus has emerged due to the debate about the necessary conditions 
for economic growth to be considered pro-poor. One is that the poor 
undoubtedly share in aggregate income growth, but also suffer as a result of 
economic slow-downs (Dollar and Kraay, 2002). However, different 
viewpoints exist about pro-poor growth concept and measurement. In general, 
policy debate has highlighted the absolute and relative concepts. There are two 
types of absolute pro-poor concepts. One is the strong absolute. in which the 
absolute income gain of the poor must be more than the average gain or the 
gain of the rich (Klasen, 2005). The other is the weak absolute. in which pro-
poor growth means that the aggregate growth rate of the poor's income is 
greater than zero (White and Anderson, 2000). The relative concept implies 
that income growth has to favour the poor (relative to the rich), leading to 
faster poverty reduction (Kakwani and Pernia, 2000). This leads to the second 
consensus, that fastest poverty reduction occurs in cases where income growth 
is accompanied by falling inequality (Bourguignon, 2004; Son and Kakwani, 
2008). 
Bourguignon, 2004 explains that the question of whether or not there is any 
interrelation between growth and inequality remains a major challenge in 
establishing development policies. In addition to this challenge, Voitchovsky 
(2005) suggests that using a single inequality statistic (like the Gini coefficient 
used in empirical works) in the study of the effect of inequality on growth may 
be misleading. This is because such measure only reflects an average of the 











may imply that inequality within- and between-groups are likely to affect (or 
respond from) growth in different ways. As such, average inequality measure 
may not be able to reveal the effects in and across sub-groups. There are other 
reason consider South Africa for this study. One is that South Africa has been 
excluded in most of the past analyses for lack of data. However, with 
availability of new poverty and inequality data, such research becomes 
possible for South Africa. Second, Kuznets' development-inequality 
hypothesis is based on time series data (for England, Germany and United 
States) rather than cross-section analyses. 
For unbiased estimation of the usual pro-poor framework of Kakwani and 
Pernia (2000) and Son and Kakwani (2008), inequality-growth endogeneity 
must be taken into account. In this chapter, the question of energy, inequality, 
growth and poverty relationship is tackled in simultaneous equations (time 
series) frameworks. Contrary to the production framework in chapter four, the 
production function adopted here is a simple output per worker (per capita) 
version of Cobb-Douglas in two inputs (capital per worker and energy per 
worker). Energy demand is specified in per capita terms, while inequality is 
specified by augmenting Ahluwalia's (1976) formulation with government 
expenses (per unit GDP). The framework from which poverty functional form 
is built is the poverty equivalent growth model due to Son and Kakwani 
(2008). The equations are then jointly estimated in order to control for 
possible production-inequality and energy-production endogeneity. These are 
done for the whole economy, manufacturing, agricultural and mining sectors. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follow: In section two, the models are 
developed and estimation techniques and remainder of data issues explored. 
Section three presents the results while section four concludes the chapter. 
5.2 Methodology 
This section explains the methodology used m the analysis of energy, 
production, inequality and poverty nexus. Though production-energy 
framework has been developed in section 4.2 of chapter four, this section 
rather specifies models with variables in per capita terms, which is suitable for 











required. It proceeds to estimation techniques and to description of variables 
and their sources of data. 
5.2.1 The Frameworks 
5.2.1.1 Production Framework 
Based on the survey of literature, it is assumed that there are two ways through 
which inequality can enter the production function. The first is through the 
credit, savings and investment channel (Aghion and Bolton, Banerjee and 
Newman, 1993; 1997; Bourguiguon, 2004; Galor and Zeira, 1993) and the 
skills, incentive and innovation channel (Hassler and Mora, 2000; 
Voitchovsky, 2005; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Schwabish et ai, 2003). These 
channels suggest that inequality may exert its effects through individual factor 
(capital and labour) productivities. The second is through its effect on the 
production process at large. The proposed avenue is the political economy 
channel66 (Ales ina and Perotti, 1993; Clarke, 1995; Deininger and Squire, 
1996b; Persson and Tabelini, 1994; Rodrik, 1998). Schleifer et al (1989) 
suggest that high inequality may lead to reduction in the demand (and the 
production) of certain goods. These can be suitably captured by overall and 
disaggregated (between-group and within-group) inequality measures. 
Let Y, K, L, Ej and a denote output, capital, labour, energy type j and 
parameters respectively and 81, 82, 83 denote average, bottom and top 
inequalities respectively, and A parameter of technology. The basic Cobb-
Douglas production function can be written as follows: 
aZ+a3+a4 = 1 
From (5.02), equation (5.01) can be expressed as follows: 
Dividing through by L gives output per worker function as follows: 














where lower case letters are variables expressed in per worker terms (if 
population is assumed to be equal to work force, then these are in per capita 
terms). Expressing equation (5.03) in double log with t denoting time gives: 
lny, = ao + al1 lnelt + a1z lnez , + a13 lne3 , + 
(5.04) 
5.2.1.2 Per Capita Energy Demand 
The energy demand equation in (4.08 of Chapter four) can be expressed in per 
capita terms by assuming that per capita energy demand is a function of per 
capita income (y) and energy prices (pe), a measure of inequality (e), an error 
term (8" ) and ~ are parameters67 
(5.05) 
In (5.05), j is the energy type in consideration. The framework is based on a 
standard aggregate demand theory, in which individual demand for a good 
(derived from objective utility maximisation subject to budget constraint) are 
summed over identical consumers. 
5.2.1.3 Inequality Framework 
The discussion on the Kuznets' relationship and the works of Ahluwalia 
(1976) and Anand and Kanbur (1993a and 1993b) suggest that inequality can 
be a non-li ear function of per capita income (y). Literature also suggests that 
another important determinant of inequality is an indicator of redistribution 
policies. Government spending as a ratio of GDP (g) can be a proxy for 
redistribution. This work adopts Ahluwalia's (1976) formulation because of 
the ease with which in can be incorporated in a system of equations such as the 
one to be used in this work. To the framework, an indicator of government 
67 To minimise the lost of degrees of freedom in a more limited observations dataset, cross prices are 
excluded from the framework in this chapter. Chapter four has explored the role of cross prices in the 











expenses to indicate redistribution policies IS added to yield the following 
double logarithmic functional form: 
lne, = Yo + Yilny, + Yz(lny,)z + Y3lng, + Y4lnej' + Ee, (5.06) 
5.2.1.4 Poverty Frameworks 
Based on literature, it has been established that the channels of poverty 
reduction are economic growth and inequality reduction. Let P a (a = 0,1,2) be 
any measure of poverty from the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) family of 
indices, 8 parameters. A framework for poverty based on the pro-poor growth 
theory would be as follows: 
Pa _ £ o'eo, , - uoy, , (5.07) 
For the introduction of energy in (5.07), per capita income is replaced by its 
function (5.03): 
(5.01') 
Simplifying and taking the double log of (5.01') and introducing the error term 
& pi gives the following functional form 
(5.08) 
Similarly, energy types are incorporated turn by turn as factors of production 
whose returns may reduce or exacerbate poverty, depending on how much 
access (or lack) th  poor have to (of) them. 
5.2.1.5 Combined System of Frameworks 
The following combined system of equations incorporating production, energy 
demand, inequality and poverty is considered holistically. 
lny, = aD + all ln8lt + aiz ln8zt + 
a13 ln83, + azlnk, + a3lnei' + Ey ,; 
lnei' = /30 + /3i ln8lt + /3zlny, + /33 lnpei' + Ee,; 
2 
lne, = Yo + yi lny, + y2(lny,) + y3lng, + y4lnej, + Ee,; 













Where s denotes economic sectors (whole economy, manufacturing, 
agriculture and mining sectors) and each equation in the system is separated by 
semicolons. 
5.2.2 Estimation Technique 
The augmented regression test done in chapter four has established at least the 
existence of simultaneity bias between energy types and production. Theory 
strongly suggests another simultaneity bias between production and inequality. 
These constitute the basis of application of simultaneous equations modelling. 
Because of the limited observations dataset to be used, the variables for 
inequality at the top and bottom ends of the income distribution curve are 
dropped and only averaged (total, between-group and within-group) Theil 
indices are considered. In order to estimate a linear simultaneous equations 
system, the quadratic term for income in inequality equation is exogenised by 
lagging it by one period. The following combined frameworks are estimated. 
First with per capita income excluding energy types: 
(S.IOA) 
Second, a system in which per capita income is replaced by its function in the 
poverty equation without energy 
(S.IOB) 











The most suitable method of estimation of systems (S.lOA) to (S.IOC) is a 
three-stage least square (3sls) regression method. The estimation method 
adopted is that which corrects for small sample size and reports student's t-
statistics instead of the normal z-statistics. 
5.2.3 Variables and Data issues 
The following describe the variables and data sources employed in the models: 
Output per capita (y): this is captured by output (GDP) for a given sector 
divided by labour force in that sector. GDP for the whole economy, 
manufacturing and mining sectors and agricultural value added at constant 
2000 prices are from the South African Reserve Bank (SARB). The SARB 
reports indices of total private sector, manufacturing and mining employments 
(from 1971 to 2008) at 2000 base year. Statistics South Africa (STATSSA)68 
provides total and sector-wise real employment figures only from 2000 to 
2006. These values are used together with the SARB indices to generate real 
private sector, manufacturing and mining employment data (in thousand 
persons /9 Agricultural employment data is taken from the Abstract of 
Agricultural statistics, published by the department of agriculture70 Capital 
(k) is the ratio of gross fix capital formation to labour force for the various 
sectors. Government expenses (g) are measured by total central government 
expenses as a ratio of GDP. Both government expenses and capital formation 
data (in million ZAR at constant 2000) are from the South African Reserve 
Bank (SARB) dataset. 
Energy consumption per capita (e): is a given energy type in a given sector 
divided by labour force for that sector. Time series of energy from 1971 to 
200S and 2006 to 2008 are from the International Energy Agency and the 
South African Department of Minerals and Energy respectively. The same 
energy types considered in previous chapter are studied here. These are: total 
energy, coal, electricity, diesel, gasoline, gas and kerosene for whole 
68 Various Labour Force Surveys htlp:!lwww.statssa.gov .zalglfslindex.asp 
69 Assuming that the SARB private sector employment data depicts the actual variations in the series. 











economy; total energy, coal, electricity, diesel, gas and kerosene for 
manufacturing; total energy, coal, electricity, diesel and kerosene for 
agriculture; total energy, coal, electricity and liquid petroleum for mining. 
Energy Prices (pejJ: the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for energy, taken from 
STATSSA, is considered as proxy for aggregate energy price. Electricity 
prices are from Eskom Tariffs (in South African cents/kWh). Indices of prices 
for the other energy types are from the Department of Minerals and Energy. 
Aggregate energy price index is used for gas, due to non availability of gas 
pnces. 
Inequality (8): Due to its advantage of being additive across subgroups, the 
Theil index is preferred over Gini coefficient for the measurement of overall 
income distribution. The use of total, between-group and within-group 
inequalities are done in separate frameworks, such that tum after tum, total, 
between-group and within-group inequalities are employed for the estimation 
of models (S.10A) to (S.10C). This decomposition is relevant for a multi-racial 
society like South Africa where within and between inequalities are likely to 
affect (and respond to) economic growth differently. 
The poverty variable (pa) is captured by the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT, 
1984) family of poverty indices. Poverty incidence, intensity and severity are 
derived for IX = 0, 1 and 2 respectively. These three measures are considered 
tum by tum, together with the three inequality measures considered. Inequality 
and poverty71 data are from the South African Development Indicators (2009) 
published by the Ministry of National Planning at the Presidency of South 
Africa. The dataset is based on the bi-annual (All Media and Products Survey 
- AMPS) data, collected by the South African Advertising Research 
Foundation (SAARF). Although this data is not without controversy 
(Seekings, 2007), it is most suitable for the analysis in this chapter for various 
reasons. The first is that it gives a more comprehensive time series for the 
variables in consideration for this type of work. The second is that the 
alternative - Income and Expenditure Surveys (IES) of the National Statistics 











- are seemingly also plagued with irregularities72 .cArdington et ai, 2005; 
Simkins, 2004; van der Berg et ai, 2006) that make comparison of inequality 
and poverty over time quite unsuitable. 
The span of the dataset in this chapter is limited by poverty and inequality 
series, with only 16 observations each (from 1993 to 2008). In order to 
improve the degrees of freedom, the assumption is made that serious structural 
changes to these variables only started occurring with the phasing out of 
apartheid. This allowed the generation of other observations by replacing the 
values pre-1993 with the mean of the observations between 1993 and 1996. 
With this adjustment, the span of the data is from 1988 to 2008. The summary 
statistics are presented in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics in Per Capita Terms 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total Inequality (Theil) 20 0.94 0.05 0.88 1.03 
Between-group inequality 20 0.49 0.06 0.34 0.55 
Within-group inequality 20 0.45 0.10 0.35 0.61 
Poverty incidence (%) 20 49.06 3.43 41.00 53.00 
Poverty intensity(%) 20 23.79 2.29 19.00 27.00 
Poverty severity(%) 20 14.61 1.78 11.00 17.00 
Government expenses/GOP 20 0.32 0.12 0.15 0.56 
Whole Economy 
Output per worker 20 76.93 13.00 56.15 91.81 
Ca pita I per worker 20 12.23 3.00 7.58 17.25 
Coal per worker(TJ) 20 50.90 6.48 40.33 60.09 
Gas per worker (TJ) 20 7.89 1.29 6.76 10.94 
Gasoline per worker(TJ) 20 28.44 2.71 21.93 31.37 
Diesel per worker(TJ) 20 19.47 3.90 13.15 25.03 
Kerosene per worker(TJ) 20 7.66 1.43 4.33 9.24 
Electricity per worker(TJ) 20 49.69 9.13 34.28 61.07 
Total energy per worker(TJ) 20 196.68 25.82 147.79 228.19 
Manufacturing 
Output per worker 20 90.33 16.56 66.08 110.67 
Ca pita I per worker 20 18.23 4.71 10.49 25.91 
Coal per worker(TJ) 20 186.85 40.93 123.37 288.75 
72 Some of these deficiencies include high number of 'zero income households, missing income data. 
Statistics South Africa also admits that the IES1995 and IES2000 are not directly comparable (van def 
Berg et al, 2006). There is also evidence ofllllderrepresentation of white and overrepresentation of 











Gas per worker(TJ) 20 49.19 10.12 40.69 72.00 
Diesel per worker(TJ) 20 17.58 3.24 11.72 22.00 
Kerosene per worker(TJ) 20 2.04 1.94 0.35 6.39 
Electricity per worker(TJ) 20 199.90 40.15 134.18 244.73 
Total energy per worker(TJ) 20 498.39 82.98 366.19 619.41 
Agriculture 
Output per worker 20 4.44 1.14 2.67 6.71 
Capital per worker 20 5.48 1.27 3.19 7.27 
Coa I per worker(TJ) 20 4.27 2.72 0.61 9.07 
Diesel per worker(TJ) 20 50.94 7.66 32.98 61.42 
Kerosene per worker(TJ) 20 3.09 0.93 0.42 4.34 
Electricity per worker(TJ) 20 21.66 6.55 10.23 31.64 
Total energy per worker(TJ) 20 85.52 16.37 52.01 108.87 
Mining 
Output per worker(TJ) 20 111.71 33.30 71.24 172.46 
Ca pita I per worker(TJ) 20 22.83 9.61 10.08 44.30 
Coa I per worker(TJ) 20 59.20 46.10 6.90 137.77 
Liquid petroleum per worker(TJ) 20 39.56 20.06 12.30 81.27 
Electricity per worker(TJ) 20 183.56 44.26 134.34 284.60 
Total energy per worker(TJ) 20 319.67 120.30 174.55 522.57 
5.3 Results and Interpretation 
The results of the analyses are presented and interpreted according to the 
economic sectors considered. It starts with the whole economy, followed by 
manufacturing, agriculture and mining. For each sector, results without energy 
are presented and analysed, followed by results including total energy and 
respective energy types. 
5.3.1 Whole Economy' 
The pair-wise correlation coefficients and probabilities of non-significance for 
the main variables of concern are presented in Table 5.2 for Production, 
energy, inequality and poverty. Total inequality appears to correlate negatively 
with poverty, but decomposing into between- and within-groups components 
show that respective components are positively and negatively associated with 
all poverty measures. This agrees with the theory of pro-poor growth, in which 
inequality exacerbates poverty. However, in this case, only between-group 











positively with total and within-group inequality, but negatively with between-
group inequality and all measures of poverty. 
Table 5.2: Correlation Coefficients for Whole Economy 
Poverty inequality Poverty Output/ 
T TB Tw pO pi p' worker 
pi -0.532b 0.8830 -0.8100 - - - -
(0.034) (0.000) (0.000) 
p' -0.495' 0.7760 -0.7220 - - - -
(0.051) (0.000) (0.002) 
p3 -0.506b 0.8120 -0.7460 - - - -
(0.046) (0.000) (0.001) 
output per 0.7580 -0.7990 0.933 0 -0. 624b -0.546b -0.524b -
worker (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.029) (0.037) 
Total Energy 0.7060 -0.665b 0.8290 -0.453' -0.362 -0.368 0.9650 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.000) (0.078) (0.169) (0.161) (0.000) 
Coal 0.658b -0.402 0.638b -0.226 -0.158 -0.164 0.8160 
(0.006) (0.123) (0.008) (0.400) (0.560) (0.545) (0.000) 
electricity 0.7800 -0.7660 0.9220 -0.608b -0.531b -0.516b 0.9940 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.013) (0.034) (0.041) (0.000) 
Diesel 0.7800 -0.8150 0.94r -0.667b -0.587b -0.560b 0.9940 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.017) (0.024) (0.000) 
Gasoline 0.595b -0.475' 0. 652b -0.252 -0.137 -0.136 0.84r 
(0.015) (0.063) (0.006) (0.347) (0.614) (0.615) (0.000) 
Gas 0.513b -0.8580 0.8000 -0.83r -0.7850 -0.7260 0.6760 
(0.042) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.004) 
Kerosene 0.585b -0.479' 0.648b -0.256 -0.168 -0.163 0.8550 
(0.017) (0.060) (0.007) (0.338) (0.534) (0.547) (0.000) 
Government 0.7120 -0.8590 0.9320 -0.7480 -0.670b -0.643 b 0.9640 
expenses/GOP (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.007) (0.000) 
. " , Notes. , and denote slgmficance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectIvely. T, TB and Tw 
denote total, between-group and within-group Theil inequality measures. 
All energy types have positive correlation with total and within-group 
inequality and level of output, and negative correlation with between-group 
inequality. Electricity, diesel and gas are negatively correlated with all poverty 
measures, while total energy is significant only on poverty incidence. 
Government expenses correlate positively with total income, total and within-












Estimation without Energy 
Table 5.3 presents the estimation results of production-inequality-poverty for 
total, between-group and within-group inequalities with poverty incidence. 
The overall model statistics seem satisfactory, with R-squares above 50 
percent in most cases. 
Table 5.3: 3sls for GDP-Inequality-Poverty Intensity - Whole Economy 
Variable Total inequalitl3 Between-Group Within-Group 
Coel t-stat Coel t-stat Coel t-stat Coel t-stat 
Production equation (dependent variable: per capita income) 
Inelt 0.296 0.96 0.305 0.98 -0.081' -1.76 0.303b 2.54 
Ink, 0.6250 10.75 0.6230 10.64 0.6310 10.83 0.4210 4.12 
ao 2.8030 17.51 2.80r 17.41 2.7090 28.06 3.53r 10.22 
R2 
y 0.95 162.22 0.95 161.07 0.95 168.32 0.95 139.38 
Inequality equation (dependent variable: Inequality) 
Iny, -5.942b -2.26 -5.368' -2.00 24.2330 5.45 -20.9660 -5.17 
(InY'_1)2 0.734b 2.38 0.670b 2.14 -2.7890 -5.38 2.5250 5.30 
lng, -0.069 -1.05 -0.081 -1.21 -O.44r -4.22 0.196b 2.74 
Yo 11.799b 2.10 10.500' 1.84 -53.8120 -5.63 42.7830 4.99 
R2 e 0.60 11.46 0.60 11.21 0.84 37.77 0.96 126.03 
Poverty Equation (Poverty) 
Ink, -0.232' -1.90 -0.166' -1.95 0.071 1.46 0.4260 3.19 
Ink'_l - - - - - - -0.3080 -3.82 
Inelt -0.240 -0.53 -0.170 -0.37 0.6040 6.94 -0.41r -3.17 
00 4.87r 8.86 4.2900 18.22 4.1560 48.70 3.2450 8.53 
R2 p 0.39 6.22 0.45 6.68 0.76 38.52 0.74 18.84 
Breusch-Pagan 4.45 0.217 3.30 0.348 11.77 0.008 9.76 0.021 
Cbs. 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Joint test on lny, and (lny,)2 5.19 0.010 15.55 0.000 24.58 0.000 
. " 0 
, 
Notes. , and denote slgmficance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectIvely. The Breusch-
Pagan Statistics is for the test of independence of residuals of the equations. F-statistics (llllder 
coef. Colunms) and P-VAL (llllder t-stat columns) for joint Wald test on lnYt and (lnYt)2 are 
presented on the last row. The use of lag value of capital in poverty equation is to test the 
triclde-do\VIl hypothesis within-group. 
Capital per unit labour is significant across all the sub-models. While the 
positive effect of total inequality on per capita income is not significant, 
between-group inequality has negative and significant coefficient. Within-
73 The first two colunms of the table give results that contain per capita income in poverty equation. 











group inequality significantly enhances output per worker. It may be asked if 
there is a good dimension of inequality in a multiracial society like South 
Africa. The significant negative effect of between-group inequality on 
production may be explained in theory by credit constrains, political economy 
(i.e. distortionary policies and socio-political instability) channels, but also 
criminality and between race tensions. Therefore the interracial tensions and 
inequality in access to capital (mostly inherited from the apartheid era) still 
generate significant adverse effects that stifle economic growth. 
However, within-group inequality is shown to impact production positively. 
This does not mean that inequality should be actively promoted within-groups, 
but simply that it should not be a policy concern. The positive effect could be 
capturing the trickle-down effect of the fruits of growth via social capital 
within-group especially in African households where significant remittances 
may go to poorer individuals from the richer and well endowed ones, which 
could serve as capital for productive ventures by the hitherto poorer members 
of the group. However, it is important to note that with the active black 
economic empowerment, increase in within-group inequality does not 
necessarily mean that the poor within-group are getting poorer74 but rather that 
the effect of income at the top tail of within-group inequality is weighing 
positively in the national income. 
Per capita output has significant negative Sign on total and within-group 
inequality. Its square has positive sign on these respective measures of 
inequality. The signs are reversed in between-group inequality equation. These 
suggest that there is an inverted V-shape inequality-per capita income 
relationship for between-group inequality, but a V-shaped one for total and 
within-group inequality. A Wald (significance) test of per capita income and 
its square indicates that they are jointly significant in all the inequality 
equations. Given the short span of the data in question, it may be difficult for 
one to claim that this result is picking the Kuznets V-shaped development-
inequality hypothesis. Ahluwalia (1976, p.335) calculates that for an economy 
growing at a per capita (GNP) rate of 2.5 percent, it will take about 100 years 











to transit from worsening inequality phase to the falling one. However, the 
magnitude of the curvature suggests that the V-shape is a broader one (lower 
magnitude) than that of Ahluwalia (1996) for a panel data. It is a little more 
pronounced when inequality is dis aggregated into sub-groups. The graphs, 
plotting the relationship between per capita income and total, between-group 
and within-group inequalities in Figure 5.1 may seems to indicate that South 
Africa is at the declining phase of the inverted-V for between-group, but at the 
inclining phase of the V for within-group. 
Figure 5.1: Inequality-Development Graph - Whole Economy 
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However, these results seem to agree more with the active post-apartheid 
policies of Black Economic Empowerment, which, while yielding fruits in the 
reduction of between-group inequality, actually increases within-group 
inequality. This is supported by the coefficients of Government expenses with 
significant negative and positive impacts on between-group and within-group 
inequality components respectively. None of the lag values of inequality was 
significant, so is has been excluded from the equations. 
According to the results of impact on poverty, the coefficient of per capita 











capita mcome reduces poverty by 0.232 percent. Regression with income 
substituted by production function shows that capital per worker also has anti-
poverty effects (significant at 10% level). However, this effect disappears 
between-group and turns positive within-group. Between-group inequality (in 
line with theory that inequality exacerbates poverty) has poverty increasing 
effect. A percentage increase in between-group inequality is associated with 
0.60 percent higher poverty incidence. But the same increase in within-group 
leads to 0.542 percent fall in poverty incidence. Table 5.3 indicates similar 
impacts on poverty intensity and severity. Output per worker and capital both 
lost their significance on poverty reduction in total and between-group 
inequality sub-models. However, capital's poverty enhancing effect remains 
significant within-group. One percent increase in between-group inequality 
leads to 0.853 and 1.093 rise in poverty intensity and severity respectively, 
suggesting that the abjectly poor suffer more from inequality than others. This 
effect is reversed within-group, the same increase is associated with 0.632 and 
0.916 percent fall in the respective poverty measures. 
The fact that within-group inequality has positive effect on output and 
negative effect on poverty (with strongest effect on poverty severity), can only 
make sense in terms of within-group solidarity, where growth at first widens 
inequality within-group when the relatively well-endowed individuals access 
some of the fruits of economic growth. The well-endowed individuals then 
remit some of the growth returns to their poorer family members. These 
remittances may then serve as productive capital thereafter. This intuition is 
supported by the fact that regression with the first lag of capital is poverty 
reducing in within-group inequality (Table 5.3 and 5.4). The fact that within-
group inequality has strongest effect on poverty severity implies that within-
group remittances may happen for altruistic motives, with the very poor 
receiving more attention. STATSSA (2002) reports that the most important 
source of income for unemployed South Africans is financial support from 
their working relatives 
By deduction (from the fact that government expenses reduce total and 












government expenses (negative and significant) on all poverty measures, one 
would conclude that government efforts are yielding some anti-poverty fruits. 
However, as the coefficients indicate, these efforts are a little biased towards 
the just poor than the very poor. 
Table 5.4: 3sls Results for Poverty Intensity and Severity - Whole Economy 
Variable Total inequality Between-Group Within-Group 
With capital With income 
pi p' pi p' pi p' pO pi 
Inelt 0.305 0.309 -0080' -0.078' 0.304b 0.311 b 0.306b 0.311b 
Ink, 0.6230 0.6230 0.632' 0.632' 0.4210 0416' 0.4180 0.4130 
ao 2.80r 2.8090 2.708' 2.707' 3.53r 3.557' 3.54r 3.5630 
Iny, - - - -




(InY'_1)2 0. 662b 0.618' -2.691 ' -2.509' 2.5320 2450' 2.3150 2.4000 
lng, -0.083 -0.085 -0441' -0462' 0.171b 0.154' 0.209b 0.198b 
Yo 10.337' 9.499 -51.954' -48.812' 42.6550 40.966' 38.9750 40.4500 
Ink, -0.166 -0.167 0.139 0.201' O.544b 0. 714b 1.011b 0.768 
Ink'_l - - - - -0.317' -0.310 -0.731 -0.154 
Inelt -0.452 -0.746 0.853' 1.093' -0.6320 -0.916' -0.4690 -0.8640 
00 3.5450 3.0390 3.444' 2.975' 2.0780 0.913 2.2710 -0.198 
R2 
y 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
R2 e 0.60 0.60 0.85 0.85 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 
R2 p 0.35 0.31 0.63 0.57 0.66 0.62 0.83 0.74 
. , , , , , , Note. , and denote slgmficance at lYo, 5Yo, and lOYo levels respectIvely. Wltllln-group 
inequality model is estimated with lag-values of capital and income in poverty equations, 
which is not significant in other inequality models. The last three columns have results with 
rows ktand kt_1 bearing the coefficients of income and its one period lag respectively. The sub-
column titled with capital, llllder within-group colunm has income replaced by its fllllction in 
poverty equation, such that kt and kt_1 are coefficients of capital per worker and its first period 
lag respectively. 
Estimation with Energy 
In Table 5.5, the results of system (5.1OC) estimated with total energy are 
reported. The overall model statistics seem satisfactory, with R-squares 
ranging from 0.96 to 0.98 for production functions, 0.93 to 0.97 for energy 
demand, 0.60 for total inequality, 0.87 and 0.96 for between-group and within-
group inequalities respectively, and 0.51 to 0.90 for poverty equations. 
Table 5.5: 3sls for Energy-GDP-Inequality-Poverty - Whole Economy 


























pO pI p2 pO pI p2 pO pI 
Inelt 0.539b 0.547 b 0.542 b -0.3460 -0.347 0 -0.345 0 0.250 0 0.256 0 
Ink, 0.143 b 0.139 b 0.142 b 0.029 0.028 0.031 0.001 -0.009 
Ine, 0.857 0 0.8610 0.858 0 0.971 0 0.972 0 0.969 0 0.999 0 1.009 0 
ao -0.510 0 -0.519 0 -0.512 0 -1.116 0 -1.120 0 -1.110 0 -0.739 0 -0.7610 
Inelt -0.517 b -0.526 b -0.520 b 0.384 0 0.386 0 0.384 0 -0.349 0 -0.353 0 
Iny, 1.181 0 1.164 0 1.175 0 0.973 0 0.972 0 0.983 0 1.029 0 1.018 0 
Inpe, -0.156 -0.145 -0.152 -0.018 -0.019 -0.011 -0.046 -0.055 
Po 0.832 b 0.857 b 0.842 b 1.261 0 1.262 0 1.246 0 0.323' 0.327' 
Iny, -6.151 -5.924 -5.175 12.768b 10.921' 10.222' -11.53 0 -11.877 0 
(InY'_1)2 0.745 0.721 0.639 -1.549b -1.349b -1.271' 1.488 0 1.533 0 
lng, -0.022 -0.025 -0.031 -0.343 0 -0.3210 -0.320 0 0.239 0 0.218 0 
Ine, 0.013 0.000 -0.043 0.787 ' 0.895b 0.931b -0.8810 -0.868 0 
Yo 12.473 12.018 10.535 -31.486 b -27.804b -26.429 b 26.09 0 26.6r 
Ink, -0.549 0 -0.699 0 -0.714 b -0.285 0 -0.379 b -0.273 -0.208 ' -0.279 
Inelt -0.153 -0.444 -0.778 0.42r 0.585 0 0.816 0 -0.422 0 -0.6020 
Ine, 0.7610 1.066 0 1.106 b 0.5510 0.7920 0.691 ' 0.648 0 0.96r 
00 1.226' -0.757 -1.444 2.003 0 0.357 0.302 0.644 -1.735' 
R~ 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
R2 
e 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 
R2 e 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.96 0.96 
R2 p 0.73 0.65 0.51 0.90 0.81 0.69 0.84 0.79 
Breusch-Pagan 19.210 17.56 b 15.75 b 23.620 21.88 0 20.47 0 24.37 0 23.97 0 
. " 0 
, , , , Notes. , and denote slgmficance at 1 Yo, 5 Yo, and lOYo levels respectIvely. Breusch-Pagan 
values are statistics for the test of independence of residuals. 
Compared to Table 5.3 and 5.4, the introduction of total energy reduces the 
coefficients of capital per unit labour in the production equation. Though still 
significant, the coefficient drops from 0.625 to 0.143 for the poverty incidence 
sub-model of total inequality. In the models with between-group and within-
group inequalities, the coefficient becomes insignificant, and drops from 0.631 
to 0.029 and 0.421 to 0.001 respectively for poverty incidence sub-model. This 
implies that in traditional production functions, the high coefficients of capital 
productivities in the absence of energy are often biased, rather picking the 
effect of energy. The coefficient of energy is high and significant, ranging from 
0.857 to 0.861 for total inequality, 0.969 to 0.972 for between-group inequality 
and 0.999 to 1.009 for within-group inequality. 
The per capita energy demand equations also follow the classical demand 
theory as in chapter four, in which the coefficients of prices appear negative, 


































capita energy demand. One percent increase in total (within-group) inequality 
results in 0.517 (0.349) percent fall in total per capita energy demand. The 
same increase in between-group inequality brings about 0.384 percent increase 
in per capita energy demand in the poverty incidence sub-model. The effect of 
income remains strongly positive and significant, with coefficient of 1.181, 
0.973 and 1.029 for total, between-group and within-group inequality in 
poverty incidence sub-model. 
A possible reason why higher (between-group) inequality may be associated 
with increased energy consumption is that while energy consumption does not 
decrease with relatively poorer people, it may increase faster with the richer 
group as inequality widens. This reason is suggested by the coefficients of 
price and income elasticities of demand in chapter four and here. The price 
elasticity suggests that energy is a necessity. This implies that the consumption 
of the various energy types and aggregate energy falls far slower than their 
respective prices increase (inelastic). On the other hand, income elasticity 
shows that one percent increase in income results in more than proportionate 
increase in the demand for energy. This implies that energy consumption 
would increase faster at the top end of income distribution curve, where a 
greater share of the fruits of econ mic growth goes to. 
In the inequality equations, energy use has inequality enhancing (reducing) 
effects for between-group (within-group) inequality, but the effect on total 
inequality is insignificant. One percent increase in total energy use results in 
0.787 percent rise (0.88lpercent fall) in between-group (within-group) 
inequality. This suggests that the fruits of energy's contribution to economic 
growth are still being appropriated relatively more by the richer groups of the 
society. The effect of capital on poverty (particularly poverty intensity) 
remains negative and significant in all inequality sub-models. The coefficients 
of energy show that total energy is associated with higher poverty, with greater 
enhancing effects on poverty severity. The opposing effects of capital and 
energy on poverty may imply that access to productive energy without 











Table 5.6 presents the results for the effect of disaggregated energy types on 
per capita income, total, between-group and within-group inequalities, poverty 
incidence, intensity and severity with feedbacks from per capita income and 
the three measures of inequality. The energy types for which regression 
analyses are performed are electricity, diesel, gasoline, gas, kerosene and coal. 
Table 5.6 is only a synthesis of the overall results. The detailed results can be 
found in Tables D 1.1 to D 1.6 of Appendix. The overall model statistics are 
satisfactory and the Breusch-Pagan test show that the residual are not 
independent in most cases. 
Table 5.6: Disaggregated Energy-GDP-Inequality-Poverty - Whole 
Economy 
Effect of Energy types 
Electricity Diesel Gasoline Gas Kerosene 
Per capita income 1.0020 0.9220 0.459 0 0.315 0 0.318 b 
Total inequality 0.8650 1.175 0 -0.180 -0.052 0.259 
Between-group 1.58r 0.309 0.9710 -0.405b 0.685 0 
Within-Group -0.069 0.939 b -0.684 0 0.236 b -0.424b 
Poverty incidence 0.439b -0.483 0 0.548 0 -0.405 0 0.403 0 
Intensity 0.602b -0.534 b 0.944 0 -0.553 0 0.5680 
Severity 0.414 -0.434 0.849 b -0.687 0 0.603 0 
Effect on Energy Demand 
Per capita income 1.00r 1.042 0 1.216 0 -0.973 2.149 0 
Total inequality 0.394 0 0.413 b -0.197 -0.091 -0.537 
Between-group 0.109 b -0.138 ' 0.337 0 -1.0210 0.595 b 
Within-Group -O.l03 b 0.174' -0.403 0 1.079 b -1.1620 
." 0 













Except for sub-models with electricity and diesel, the coefficients of capital 
per unit labour in the per capita income equations are all high and significant 
in the presence of all the other energy types. This means that only electricity 
(most importantly) and diesel are the energy types whose effects may be 
captured by capital in production functions where energy is not controlled for. 
All the energy types have positive effect on per capita income. One percent 
increase in electricity, diesel, coal, gasoline, kerosene and gas use leads to 
1.002%, 0.922%, 0.459%, 0.523%, 0.318% and 0.315 increase in per worker 
output respectively. 
In chapter four, gasoline and kerosene have negative effects on GDP. While 











the post apartheid era, that of the transport sector has been rising from that 
period (Figure 5.2). Kerosene in transport is mainly used in the aviation 
industry, which contributes significantly to transport GDP. Given that the 
transport sector takes all the gasoline, and more than 50 percent of the 
kerosene, their positive effects on per capita income in this chapter75 can be 
explained by the increasing weight of the transport sector in national income 
(Figure 5.3). 























r-- t"" -.... 
I .. hA. ~ ~ ., ~ 
~ f-. ..... I~ 
• 
~ ~ 
o rl N rt1 <:;f" LI) !.D r--. 00 en 0 rl N rt1 <:;f" LI) !.D r--. 00 en 0 rl N rt1 <:;f" LI) 
co co co co co co co co co co en en en en en en en en en en 0 0 0 0 0 0 
cncncncncncncncncncncncncncncncncncncncnoooooo 
rl rl rl rl rl rl rl rl rl rl rl rl rl rl rl rl rl rl rl rl N N N N N N 
-+- manufacturing ____ Transport .......... Residential ~Agriculture 












o rl N rt1 o:;t LI) !.D r--. 00 en 0 rl N rt1 <:;f" LI) !.D r--. 00 en 0 rl N rt1 o:;t LI) 
co co co co co co co co co co en en en en en en en en en en 0 0 0 0 0 0 
cncncncncncncncncncncncncncncncncncncncnoooooo 
rl rl rl rl rl rl rl rl rl rl rl rl rl rl rl rl rl rl rl rl N N N N N N 
-+- Mining ____ Manufacturing .......... transport """,*,- agriculture 
Income shows significant demand enhancement effects on all energy types 
except gas. Gasoline and kerosene have strong luxury good behaviour. 
Between-group inequality impacts all energy types, with negative effects on 
diesel and gas, and positive effects on electricity, gasoline, kerosene and coal. 
The positive effect of between-group inequality on energy consumption may 











but tends not to decrease among the relatively poorer people as inequality 
rises. Income and price elasticities confirm this fact. 
Except for gasoline and gas, all the energy types show positive effect on total 
inequality, but only diesel, electricity and coal are significant. Except gas, all 
energy types have positive effect on the poverty increasing type of inequality 
(between-group). The impact is highest for electricity (1.587), followed by 
gasoline and kerosene, and lowest but insignificant for diesel. Gas use is 
associated with negative and significant between-group inequality (-0.405). 
The effect of electricity on within-group inequality is weak and insignificant. 
It is significant and positive for diesel (0.939), and gas (0.236), but negative 
for gasoline, kerosene and coal, with coefficients of -0.684, and -0.424 
respectively. 
The combination of high positive impact on per capita income and low and 
insignificant effect on the poverty increasing type of inequality makes diesel 
use in the South African economy a good candidate for poverty reduction. One 
percent increase in diesel use results in 0.483%, and 0.534% fall in poverty 
incidence and intensity respectively. The effect is not significant on poverty 
severity. Gas equally has negative and significant effect on poverty, one 
percent increase in its use resulting in 0.403%, 0.568% and 0.603% fall in the 
poverty incidence, intensity and severity respectively. Though electricity has 
the highest impact on labour productivity, it has poverty increasing effect 
(only on poverty incidence and intensity) due to its relatively higher effect on 
inequality than productivity. This implies that its contribution to production 
goes almost exclusively to the rich owners of capital (and skilled labour). 
Coal, gasoline and kerosene also show significant poverty enhancement 
effects, equally due to their relatively higher impact on between-group 
inequality than on output per worker. The effects of coal and kerosene are not 
surprising, given that the poor rely on kerosene and coal for heating, cooking 
and (to a lesser extent) lighting. These are also lower forms of energy on the 
energy ladder and are theoretically associated with lower income. For 
gasoline, though it has positive effect on per capita income, in chapter four, its 











that gasoline has long-run negative co-integration with labour, and reduces 
labour productivity. Given that per capita income is the ratio of income and 
labour (or population), its positive effect may be better explained by its 
negative impact on labour. This also explains its positive effect on poverty. 
5.3.2 Manufacturing Sector 
The correlation coefficients in Table 5.7 suggest that total and within-group 
inequalities are positive and significantly correlated with manufacturing GDP 
per worker, while between-group inequality is negatively related to 
manufacturing GDP per worker. Manufacturing GDP negatively relates to all 
three measures of poverty. Except for manufacturing kerosene with negative 
correlation coefficient with manufacturing output per worker, total energy and 
all other energy types show positive correlation. Government expenses have 
positive correlation with manufacturing output per worker. 
Table 5.7: Correlation Coefficients - Manufacturing Sector 
inequality Poverty Output/ 
worker 
T TB Tw pO pi p' 
output per 0.7630 -0.8240 0.9500 -0.650b -0.565b -0.535b -
worker (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.023) (0.033) 
Total Energy 0.7920 -0.6920 0.86r -0.603 b -0.546b -0.517b 0.92r 
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.013) (0.029) (0.041) (0.000) 
Coal 0.7940 -0.586b 0.7890 -0.582b -0.538b -0.489' 0.8250 
(0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.018) (0.032) (0.055) (0.000) 
electricity 0.7710 -0.7050 0.8760 -0.554b -0.486' -0.473' 0.9600 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.026) (0.056) (0.064) (0.000) 
Diesel 0.75r -0.7520 0.9000 -0.583 b -O.5lOb -0.498' 0.9680 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.018) (0.043) (0.050) (0.000) 
Gas 0.602b -0.8340 0.8160 -0.8950 -0.8550 -0.7920 0.6740 
(0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
Kerosene -O.511b 0.7220 -0.7280 0.7010 0. 661b 0.616b -0. 621b 
(0.043) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.011) (0.010) 
Government 0.7120 -0.8590 0.9320 -0.7480 -0.670b -0.643b 0.9580 
expenses/GOP (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.007) (0.000) 
. " , , , , Notes. , and denote slgmficance at 1 Yo, 5 Yo, and 10 Yo levels respectIvely. 
Estimation without Energy 
The results of the regression analysis for manufacturing GDP, inequality and 











inequality, between-group and within-group inequalities with poverty 
incidence. Overall, the R-squares vary from 91 to 95 percent for production 
functions, 56 to 98 percent for inequality and 42 to 77 percent for poverty 
equations. 
Table 5.8: 3sls for GDP-Inequality-Poverty Intensity - Manufacturing 
Sector 
Variable Total inequalitl6 Between-Group Within-Group 
Coel t-stat Coel t-stat Coel t-stat Coel t-stat 
Inelt 0.923b 2.33 0.929b 2.34 -0.299b -2.11 0.5090 3.99 
Ink, 0.5420 7.62 0.5410 7.59 0.5400 7.48 0.3110 2.99 
ao 2.9920 13.34 2.9950 13.33 2.7200 19.14 4.0090 10.10 
Iny, -4.575' -1.86 -4.282' -1.73 22.4880 5.38 -17.2150 -6.50 
(InY'_1)2 0.551' 1.99 0.519' 1.86 -2.5280 -5.40 2.0150 6.70 
lng, -0.067 -1.10 -0.072 -1.18 -0.3000 -3.24 0.1610 3.49 
Yo 9.275' 1.69 8.595 1.55 -51.0040 -5.46 35.9890 6.21 
Ink, -0.217' -1.93 -0.127 -1.66 0.072 1.55 0.4120 3.16 
Ink'_l - - - - - - -0.3120 4.00 
Inelt -0.221 -0.49 -0.360 -0.81 0.6080 6.82 -0.393 0 -3.06 
00 4.8490 9.22 4.232 17.41 4.1290 43.64 3.2660 8.12 
R2 
y 0.91 97.09 0.91 96.94 0.93 109.36 0.94 130.50 
R2 e 0.58 11.75 0.58 11.66 0.86 39.71 0.97 206.92 
R2 p 0.42 6.43 0.42 6.42 0.77 37.60 0.72 18.14 
Breusch-Pagan 3.98 0.264 4.20 0.241 7.32 0.062 11.09 0.011 
Joint test on [ny, and (lny,)2 5.62 0.007 14.65 0.000 50.23 0.000 
. " c 
, , , , Notes. , and denote slgmficance at 1 Yo, 5 Yo, and 10 Yo levels respectIvely. The Breusch-
Pagan Statistics is for the test of independence of residuals of the equations. F -statistics 
(under coef. Colunms) and P-VAL (under t-stat colunms) for joint Wald test on 
lnYt and (lnYt)2 are presented on the last row. 
Manufacturing capital per unit labour is significant across all sub-models, with 
coefficient a little lower than those of the whole economy. The results largely 
agree with the suggestion of the correlation coefficients. Unlike the case of the 
whole economy, total inequality is significant in the per capita income 
equation, with positive coefficient. The coefficient of within-group inequality 
is equally positive and significant, but that of between-group is negative and 
significant on per capita income. In general, the coefficients of the different 
76 The first two colunms of the table give results that contain per capita income in poverty equation. 











inequality measures are higher for manufacturing production than for the 
whole economy. In the same way, it can be suggested that growth stifling 
factors seem to act through between-group inequality which may be explained 
in terms of the credit constrains, political economy channels and criminality 
and interracial tensions. The positive effect of within-group inequality could 
equally be capturing a trickle-down effect of the fruits of growth via social 
capital within-group especially in African households where significant 
remittances may go to poorer individuals from the richer ones. 
As with the whole economy, manufacturing per capita output and its square 
have the respective significant negative and positive signs on total and within-
group inequality. The signs are reversed on between-group inequality 
equation. Both per capita income and its square are jointly significant in all the 
inequality equations. an inverted V-shaped relationship for between-group, but 
a V-shaped one for total and within-group inequality with per capita income 
are suggested. The magnitude of the quadratic term suggests a broader V-
shape and more pronounced when inequality is dis aggregated into sub-groups. 
Figure 5.4 plots the relationship and seem to suggest a latter phase of the 
Kuznets process in the manufacturing sector. However, this result may rather 
corroborate the policies of the post-apartheid government of South Africa. 
Policies such as the Black Economic Empowerment measures have enabled 
the hitherto disadvantaged (black) group to access shares in manufacturing and 
other sectors but also at the same time leaving other blacks behind, thereby 
widening the income gap within-group. These may underlie the observed 






















Figure 5.4: Inequality-Per Capita Income - Manufacturing 
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Manufacturing output per worker shows negative effect on all poverty 
measures, but the effect is significant only on poverty incidence (Table 5.8) 
and not on poverty intensity and severity (Table 5.9). One percent increase in 
manufacturing output per worker leads to 0.217 percent reduction in poverty 
incidence, but the abjectly poor do not benefit from manufacturing production. 
Table 5.9: Impact on Poverty Intensity and Severity- Manufacturing 
Sector 
Total inequality Between-Group Within-Group 
With ca pita I With income 
pl p' pl p' pl p' pO pl 
0. 931b 0.936b _0.300b _0.303b 0.513' 0.523' 0.484 ' 0.497' 
0.541' 0.540' 0.539' 0.538' 0.307b 0.298b 0.331 ' 0.320' 





-4.142 -3.917 21.995' 20.986' -16.904' -16063' -16.006' -16.031' -16.466 ' 
0.503' 0.479' -2471' -2.355' 1.981' 1.893' 1.891 ' 1.898' 1.954 ' 
-0.073 -0.074 -0.309' -0.325' 0.156' 0.131 b 0.108 0.090 0.055 
8.280 7.772 -49.953' -47.792' 35.269' 33.246' 32.987 ' 32.950' 33.738 ' 
-0.110 -0.101 0.155b 0.230b 0.716' 0.984' 0.918 ' 1.629' 2.484 ' 
- - - - -0.509' _0.622b -0.595 ' -1.102' -1.763 ' 
















3.4330 2.8940 3.366' 2.853' 2.0660 0.927 1.976 0 0.124 -1.431 
0.91 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 
0.58 0.58 0.86 0.86 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
0.32 0.28 0.65 0.59 0.67 0.65 0.87 0.87 
. , c , , , Note. , and denote slgmficance at lYo, 5Yo, and lOYo levels respectIvely. Wltllln-group 
inequality model is estimated with lag-values of capital and income in poverty equations, 
which is not significant in other inequality models. The last three columns have results with 
rows ktand kt_1 bearing the coefficients of income and its one period lag respectively. The sub-
column titled with capital, llllder within-group colunm has income replaced by its fllllction in 
poverty equation, such that kt and kt_1 are coefficients of capital per worker and its first period 
lag respectively. 
Regression with mcome substituted by production function shows that 
manufacturing capital per worker has no significant anti-poverty effects for 
poverty incidence. However, it enhances poverty intensity and severity in the 
presence of within- and between-group inequality components, with 
coefficients of 0.155 and 0.277 (significant at 10% and 5% respectively) for 
poverty intensity, and 0.230 and 0.391 (both significant at 5%) for poverty 
severity. Introducing the lag value of capital in within-group inequality sub-
model increases the coefficient of capital to 0.716 and 0.984 for poverty 
intensity and severity respectively. However, one percent increase in the lag 
value of capital reduces both poverty measures by 0.508 and 0.622 percents 
respectively. The same behaviour is observed by the lag value of income. This 
strongly supports the suggestion that remittances from wealthier individual 
within-group may be causing within-group inequality to have poverty reducing 
effects. 
Estimation with Energy 
The results with total energy in the manufacturing model are shown in Table 
5.10. The model statistics for all three inequality sub-models are reliable. The 
goodness of fit measures are from 0.90 for per capita output equations, 0.86 to 
0.88 for per capita energy demand equations, 0.71 to 0.98 for inequality and 





































Table 5.10: 3s1s for GDP, Energy, Inequality and Poverty- Manufacturing 
Sector 
Total inequality Between-Group Within-Group 
pO pI p2 pO pI p2 pO pI 
-0.232 -0.227 -0.220 -0.263b -0.261b -0.256b 0.096 0.098 
0.234b 0.230b 0.226b -0.001 0.001 0.008 0.099 0.095 
0.766 0 0.770 0 0.774 0 1.001 0 0.999 0 0.9920 0.9010 0.905 0 
-0.948 0 -0.960 0 -0.974 0 -1.906 0 -1.899 0 -1.871 0 -1.303 0 -1.315 0 
0.854b 0.846b 0.846b 0.408 0 0.403 0 0.398 0 -0.057 -0.055 
0.923 0 0.903 0 0.886 0 0.8010 0.8010 0.7910 0.964 0 0.928 0 
-0.104 -0.091 -0.080 0.171 0.169 0.173 -0.035 -0.015 
2.584 0 2.6120 2.640 2.126 0 2.1310 2.15r 1.985b 2.057b 
-7.179 0 -7.1320 -6.680 0 16.506 0 16.734 0 15.804 0 -23.188 0 -23.277 0 
0.8010 0.796 0 0.747 0 -1.865 0 -1.889 0 -1.785 0 2.665 0 2.674 0 
-0.045 -0.045 -0.047 -0.393 0 -0.397 0 -0.415 0 0.146b 0.147b 
0.3610 0.360 0 0.3510 0.308' 0.308' 0.344' 0.215' 0.218' 
13.6910 13.5890 12.6130 -39.5650 -40.0980 -38.2760 48.3290 48.5230 
-0.167 -0.111 -0.063 0.067 0.231 0.406b 0.033 0.181 
-0.592 -0.992 -1.279 0.61r 0.906 0 1.18r -0.556 0 -0.8310 
0.115 0.056 -0.020 0.022 -0.104 -0.265 0.302b 0.324 
3.620 0 3.072' 2.897 4.014 0 3.811 0 4.0210 1.471 ' -0.039 
0.90 0.90 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 
0.87 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.86 
0.71 0.71 0.72 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.98 0.98 























. " " , , , , Notes. , and denote slgmficance at 1 Yo, 5 Yo, and 10 Yo levels respectIvely. (-1) denotes that the 
variable is lagged by one period and cons. is constant term. 
As with the whole economy, the inclusion of energy causes the coefficients of 
capital per unit labour to drop in all sub-models and to become insignificant in 
between and within-group inequality sub-models. Equally, the coefficients of total 
energy in all sub-models are high and significant, implying that the bias in 
attributing the impact of energy in production to capital is also prominent in the 
manufacturing sector. In per capita energy demand equations, total and between-
group inequality significantly enhances energy demand, while within-group 
inequality is insignificantly negative. The effects of per capita income remain 
significant, but the magnitudes are not as high as in the national economy. 
Manufacturing energy use per capita has enhancing effects on all inequality 
measures, with one percent increase resulting in 0.361% and 0.308% and 0.215% 











manufacturing energy use show positive and significant impact on poverty 
incidence within-group, but is insignificant for the other sub-models. 
Table 5.11 reports the summary statistics for the impacts of (disaggregated 
manufacturing) energy sources on manufacturing output per worker, inequality 
and poverty, with the feedback effect from per capita income and all three 
inequality measures. The energy types considered for the manufacturing sector are 
total energy, electricity, diesel, gas, kerosene and coal. The detailed regression 
tables are shown in Tables D2.1 to D2.5 of Appendix. The overall model statistics 
are good and the Breusch-Pagan tests suggest that the residuals are largely 
interdependent. 
Table 5.11: Disaggregated Energy types- Manufacturing Sector 
Effect of Energy types 
Electricity Diesel Gas Kerosene Coal 
Per capita income 0.856 0 0.9410 0.3640 0.020 0.534 0 
Total inequality 0.525 0 0.317' 0.090 -0.025 0.1880 
Between-group 0.481 0 0.199' -0.259 b 0.055 b 0.112 
Within-Group 0.189 0.178 0.2420 -0.030 ' -0.081 
Poverty incidence 0.425b 0.290 -0.386 0 0.040 0 0.009 
Intensity 0.563b 0.355 -0.568 0 0.0550 -0.021 
Severity 0.568 0.253 -0.699 0 0.063 0 0.008 
Effect on Energy Demand 
Per capita income 0.388 b 1.112 0 -0.011 3.946 -4.871b 
Total inequality 1.131 ' 0.358 1.543 1.288 2.473 0 
Between-group 0.193 0 0.110 -1.256 0 2.825 0.410 
Within-Group 0.092 -0.033 1.765 0 -7.564 ' 0.285 
. " , Notes. , and denote slgmficance at 1 %,5%, and 10% levels respectIvely 
Except for manufacturing electricity and diesel, the coefficients of capital per 
worker are all high and significant in the presence of the other energy types. 
Because of their close complementarity with capital, these energy types are 
those whose effects can likely be erroneously captured by capital in the 
estimation of manufacturing production function. However, the coefficients in 
the models with diesel are far lower than those in the models with electricity. 
The same energy types equally have the strongest impact on manufacturing 
output per worker. One percent increase in manufacturing diesel and electricity 
use per capita results in 0.941 % and 0.856% rise in manufacturing output per 
worker respectively. The rest of the energy types also have positive effects on 











One percent increase in coal and gas uses result in 0.534% and 0.364% 
increase in manufacturing output per capita respectively. 
Except for gas and kerosene with insignificant coefficients, all the energy types 
have total inequality enhancing effects. While gas has negative and significant 
coefficient (-0.259), and coal positive but insignificant, all the energy types 
significantly enhance between-group inequality. One percent nse m 
manufacturing electricity, diesel, and kerosene uses bring about 0.481%, 
0.199%, and 0.055% rise in between-group inequality. However, only gas and 
kerosene have significant effect on within-group inequality, with coefficients 
of 0.242 and -0.030 respectively. Consequently, manufacturing gas 
consumption shows negative and significant impact on poverty, with one 
percent increase resulting in 0.386, 0.568 and 0.699 percent fall in poverty 
incidence, intensity and severity respectively. Coal also shows negative impact, 
but it is not significant. The other resources have positive effect on poverty, but 
only electricity and kerosene are significant. The elasticities of substitution in 
chapter four demonstrate that energy types with poverty reducing effects are 
equally strong complements with labour, while those with positive effects on 
poverty rather substitute labour in production. Therefore the findings of chapter 
four corroborate the poverty effects in this section. The poverty enhancing 
effect of manufacturing electricity is likely due to its strong inequality 
enhancing effects, while that of kerosene is rather due to its weak and 
insignificant contribution to productivity and hence growth. 
Feedback effects show that per capita income is a strong positive determinant 
of manufacturing diesel and electricity demands. A percentage increase in 
manufacturing output per worker brings about 1.112 and 0.388 percent rise in 
manufacturing diesel and electricity demands, but rather a 4.871 % fall in coal 
demand. The effect of income on gas demand is also negative but insignificant. 
The suggestion here is that both gas and coal are likely used by the poor for 
low income businesses such as the case of Small and Medium-Size enterprises 
(SME). Such SMEs are mostly small scale motorcar repairs and art and craft 
sectors. It is worth noting that the manufacturing sector also includes the 











better explain the association of gas with poverty reduction, because it may 
have much to do with livelihood business activities of the poor. Total 
inequality has positive effects on all energy types, but is significant only for 
electricity and coal. Between-group inequality significantly boosts electricity 
demand, but it strongly reduces gas demand. Within-group inequality is 
significant only on gas and kerosene, with coefficients of 1.765 and -7.564 
respectively. It is possible that gas use is encouraged by individuals of poorer 
groups because it is more productive than kerosene. 
5.3.3 Agricultural Sector 
The correlation coefficients of agricultural energy per capita, GDP per worker, 
inequality (total, between- and within-group) and poverty are i  Table 5.12. 
Total and within-group inequality both associate positively with agricultural 
production, but between-group inequality show significantly negative 
association. Agricultural production negatively correlates with all poverty 
measures. Except coal, all agricultural energy types have positive and 
significant correlation with agricultural v lue-added per worker. Coal and 
agricultural value added are negatively correlated. All energy types except 
coal correlate positively with total and within-group inequality and negatively 
with between-group inequality. The correlation coefficients are not statistically 
significant for diesel and kerosene. Coal correlates significantly and negatively 
(positively) with total and within-group (between-group) inequality. Apart 
from coal with positive and significant coefficient, all the energy types in 
agriculture show negative and significant association with all poverty 
measures. Government expenses show a positive and significant relationship 
with agricultural value added per worker. 
Table 5.12: Correlation Coefficients for - Agricultural Sector 
inequality Poverty Outputl 
worker 
T TB Tw pO pi p' 
output per 0.626 b -0.830 0 0.858 0 -0.7510 -0.7220 -0.718 0 -
worker (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
T ota I Energy 0.424 -0.487 c 0.513 b -0.512 b -0.474 c -0.481 c 0.790 0 
(0.102) (0.056) (0.042) (0.043) (0.063) (0.059) (0.000) 











(0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) 
electricity 0.574 b -0.588 b 0.659 b -0.621 b -0.578 b -0.571 b 0.818 0 
(0.020) (0.017) (0.006) (0.010) (0.019) (0.021) (0.000) 
Diesel 0.256 -0.353 0.337 -0.367 -0.336 -0.345 0.680 0 
(0.339) (0.180) (0.202) (0.162) (0.204) (0.190) (0.004) 
Kerosene DADO -00472 0.526 b -0.331 -0.268 -0.286 0.739 0 
(0.125) (0.065) (0.036) (0.210) (0.316) (0.283) (0.001) 
Government 0.7120 -0.859 0 0.9320 -0.748 0 -0.670 b -0.643 b 0.9220 
expenses/GOP (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.007) (0.000) 
. " c , , , Notes. , and denote slgmficance at 1 Yo, 5Yo, and lOYo levels respectIvely 
Estimation without Energy 
Table 5.13 shows the regression results of the framework without energy types 
for agriculture. The overall model statistics are equally satisfactory, with R-
square for agricultural production function ranging from 0.72 to 0.85, while 












Table 5.13: 3sls Results for GDP-Inequality-Poverty Incidence-
Agricultural Sector 
Variable Total inequal ity77 Between-Group Within-Group 
Coel t-stat Coel t-stat Coel t-stat Coel t-stat 
In8lt 2.40r 3.34 2.4090 3.35 -1.1690 -6.01 0.8100 5.85 
Ink, 0.578 0 4.09 0.57r 4.08 0.3940 3.64 0.3690 3.27 
ao 0. 651b 2.46 0.653 b 2.47 -0.051 -0.32 1.5050 5.47 
Iny, -0.210 -0.64 -0.246 -0.76 1.330b 2.56 -1.286' -1.99 
(InY'_1)2 0.071 0.72 0.082 0.83 -0.5180 -3.32 0.479b 2.47 
lng, 0.105' 1.93 0.107' 1.97 -0.216b -2.57 0.443 0 4.04 
Yo 0.212 0.67 0.244 0.77 -1.7960 -3.54 0.541 0.85 
Ink, -O.l71b -2.78 -0.077 -1.17 0.017 0.40 0.007 0.12 
In8lt -0.325 -1.00 -0.843b -2.49 0.5060 6.72 -0.308 0 -4.54 
00 4.1200 39.14 3.9640 32.15 4.232 0 71.64 3.6280 26.44 
R2 
y 0.72 27.00 0.72 26.93 0.84 53.70 0.85 55.41 
R2 e 0.48 8.11 0.48 8.22 0.82 32.17 0.88 48.28 
R2 p 0.56 9.99 0.36 7.04 0.77 32.71 0.65 17.15 
Breusch-Pagan 3.46 0.326 9.56 0.023 6.82 0.078 5.60 0.133 
Joint test on Iny, and (Iny,)2 0.36 0.697 9.74 0.001 4.49 0.018 
. " " , , , , Notes. , and denote slgmficance at lYo, 5Yo, and lOYo l vels respectIvely. The Breusch-
Pagan Statistics is for the test of independence of residuals of the equations. F-statistics (llllder 
coef. Colunms) and P-VAL (llllder t-stat columns) for joint Wald test on lnYt and (lnYt)2 are 
presented on the last row. 
Agricultural capital per unit labour is as expected, positive and significant. 
Total and within-group inequalities significantly enhance agricultural value 
added, while between-group inequality reduces it. Their coefficients are higher 
than those of whole economy and manufacturing sector. A percentage increase 
in between-group inequality brings about l.169 percent drop in agricultural 
value added. The same increase in within-group inequality causes 0.810 
percent rise in agricultural value added per worker. This suggests that both 
growth lowering effects of between-group tensions, credit (and other factor) 
constraints and the trickle-down effect of the fruits of growth via social capital 
within-group are equally at work in the agricultural sector. 
77 The first two colunms of the table give results that contain per capita income in poverty equation. 











Vnlike the whole economy and the manufacturing sector, agricultural value-
added per worker and its square are neither individually, nor jointly significant 
on total inequality. However, a mild and significant inverted V-shape for 
between-group inequality with per capita income relationship and V-shape one 
for within-group inequality seem to exist. Agricultural per capita output and its 
square have the respective significant negative (-1.286) and positive (0.479) 
signs on within-group inequality. The signs are reversed in between-group 
inequality equation (1.330 and -0.518 respectively). Both are jointly 
significant in between- and within-group inequality equations. Figure 5.5 plots 
the relationships. This result may be supported by the active support to the 
agricultural sector, particularly in terms of diesel subsidies, extension services, 
credit provisions and (less significantly) land redistribution, largely in favour 
of black farmers. 
Figure 5.5: Inequality-Per Capita Income in Agriculture 
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In the poverty equations, agricultural production has negative impacts on all 
poverty measures. The impacts on poverty incidence are in Table 5.13 and 
those on poverty intensity and severity are in Table 5.14. One percent increase 
in value-added per worker in the agricultural sector results in 0.171, 0.234 and 











respectively. These coefficients are higher than those of whole economy and 
manufacturing. The abjectly poor thus benefit more from agricultural 
production enhancement than the just poor. 
Table 5.14: Impact on Poverty Intensity and Severity-Agricultural Sector 
Variable Poverty intensity equation Poverty Severity equation 
Coel t-stat Coel t-stat 
T-Theil -0.309 -0.66 -0.276 -0.46 
B-Theil O.64r 4.98 0.738 0 4.11 
W-Theil -0.3740 -3.52 -0.423 0 -3.01 
Income -0.234b -2.65 -0.309b -2.73 
CapitaljL -0.100 -1.06 -0.138 -1.13 
R~/F-stat 0.65 17.97 0.60 13.44 
. " " c , , , Note. , and denote slgrnficance at 1 Yo, 5Yo, and lOYo levels respectIvely. There are three 
regressions per poverty measure - each for total, between- and within-group inequalities. 
Income coefficients are for total inequality equation, while capital coefficients are for within-
group inequality. 
Regression with agricultural income substituted for by its production function 
shows that agricultural capital per worker has no significant anti-poverty 
effects on any of the poverty measures. The Introduction of the lag value of 
capital in within-group inequality sub-model made no difference. The same 
indifference is observed on the lag value of income. This suggests that the 
trickle-down effect of income from richer members to poorer ones of the 
group may not apply for agricultural sector. Agricultural activities reduce 
poverty directly through the poor's current participation in the sector, either 
via labour supply or farm ownership. Therefore in the agricultural sector, the 
weight of income at the top tail of within-group underlies its positive 
coefficient on agricultural income more than within-group solidarity. 
Estimation with Energy 
The figures in Table 5.15 are the estimates of per capita agricultural value 
added, inequality and poverty with energy included. The goodness of fit for 
production, inequality and poverty remain close to those of the estimation 











Table 5.15: 3sls for, Energy-Inequality-GDP and Poverty - Agricultural 
Sector 
Variable Total inequality Between-Group Within-Group 
pO pI p2 pO pI p2 pO pI p2 
In8lt 1.938 0 1.932 0 1.931 0 -0.8610 -0.85r -0.859 0 0.592 0 0.5910 0.591 0 
Ink, 0.092 0.101 0.101 0.034 0.046 0.044 -0.048 -0.044 -0.041 
Ine, 0.908 0 0.899 0 0.899 0 0.966 0 0.954 0 0.956 0 1.048 0 1.044 0 1.041 0 
ao -2.589 0 -2.564 0 -2.563 0 -3.504 0 -3.466 0 -3.473 0 -2.618 0 -2.607 0 -2.598 0 
In8lt -0.408 -0.357 -0.342 0.8220 0.805 0 0.810 0 -0.7920 -0.783 0 -0.775 0 
Iny, 1.008 0 1.025 0 1.031 0 1.011 0 1.025 0 1.028 0 1.025 0 1.025 0 1.026 0 
Inpe, -0.199' -0.220' -0.226' -0.028 -0.049 -0.049 0.111b 0.104' 0.097b 
Po 3.834 0 3.905 0 3.927 0 3.680 0 3.738 0 3.738 0 1.784 0 1.821 0 1.858 0 
Iny, -0.171 -0.135 -0.087 1.150' 1.037' 0.884 -0.386 -0.153 -0.011 
(InY'_1)2 0.040 0.030 0.016 -0.487b -0.461b -0.414b 0.230 0.166 0.121 
lng, 0. 124b 0. 121b 0.119b -0.239b -0. 221b -0.218b 0.426 0 0.405 0 0.404 0 
Ine, 0.010 0.006 0.003 0.272b 0.287b 0.299b -0.289 0 -0.314 0 -0.323 0 
Yo 0.199 0.184 0.158 -2.8310 -2.768 0 -2.697 0 1.035' 0.920' 0.848 
Ink, -0.007 0.015 0.051 0.143 0.182 0.254 0.158 0.211 0.309 
In8lt -0.784b -0.921' -1.078' 0.514 0 0.6310 0.7320 -0.309 0 -0.373 0 -0.440 0 
Ine, -0.147 -0.244 -0.362 -0.165 -0.246 -0.379 -0.210 -0.311 -0.467 
00 4.503 0 4.161 0 4.123 0 4.756 0 4.412 0 4.460 0 4.304 0 3.884 0 3.869 0 
R~ 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.81 0.81 
R2 
e 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 
R2 e 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.90 0.90 0.90 
R2 p 0.35 0.30 0.30 0.81 0.69 0.64 0.69 0.59 0.55 
." " , , , , Note. , and denote slgmficance at 1 Yo, 5 Yo, and 10 Yo levels respectIvely. 
Like in the case of the whole economy and manufacturing, the inclusion of 
energy causes the coefficient of capital per unit labour to drop and become 
insignificant. Energy elasticity of agricultural value-added per worker is also 
high, at 0.908% for total inequality model, 0.966% between-group and 1.048% 
within-group in poverty incidence sub-model. Per capita agricultural income is 
a significant determinant of energy demand in agriculture. One percent rise in 
agricultural income causes 1.008 percent increase in agricultural energy use. 
Energy price effect is also significant and lies between -0.028 and -0.226 for 
the different sub-models. This implies that per capita energy demand in 
agriculture is inelastic with respect to price. Though total inequality show no 
significant effect on agricultural energy use, both between- and within-group 
components do. A percentage increase in between-group (within-group) 











III poverty incidence sub-model. Aggregate energy use in agriculture has 
significant between-group widening and within-group reducing effects. Energy 
use in agriculture is poverty reducing, but not significant on poverty severity. 
Table 5.16 summarises the results for disaggregated agricultural energy types 
(details are in Tables C3.l to C3.4 of Appendix). In terms ofR-squares and F-
statistics of the models, they are reliable. The capital per worker coefficients 
are high and significant for coal and kerosene, significant and moderate for 
electricity, but low and insignificant for diesel. On the contrary, coal does not 
significantly enhance agricultural production per capita. The effect of kerosene 
is the lowest among significant coefficients. One percent increase in diesel, 
electricity and kerosene leads to 0.746, 0.616 and 0.170 percent increase in per 
capita agricultural value added. 
Table 5.16: Disaggregated Energy-GDP-Inequality-Poverty - Agriculture 
Effect of Energy types 
Electricity Diesel Kerosene Coal 
Per capita income 0.616 0 0.746 0 0.170 b -0.045 
Total inequality 0.018 -0.075 -0.018 -0.015 
Between-group 0.238 0 0.271 b 0.028 0.0810 
Within-Group -0.205 b -0.543 0 -0.092 -0.081 b 
Poverty incidence -0.154' 0.027 0.004 0.060 0 
Intensity -0.224' -0.012 0.009 0.0800 
Severity -0.286' -0.084 -0.003 0.085b 
Effect on Energy Demand 
Per capita income 0.979 0 0.904 0 1.963 0 -2.095 
Total inequality 1.152 -0.876 -0.603 -7.635' 
Between-group 0.372 0.8510 2.278' 6.960 0 
Within-Group -0.115 -0.814 0 -1.374 -5.6020 
." c 
, , , , Note. , and denote slgmficance at 1 Yo, 5 Yo, and 10 Yo levels respectIvely. 
On the feedback effect, per capita agricultural output IS a significant 
determinant of electricity, diesel and kerosene demands. The coefficients 
indicate that one percent increase in per capita income in agriculture results in 
more than proportionate (1.963 percent) rise in kerosene demand, and less than 
proportionate rise in electricity (0.979) and diesel (0.904) demands. Between-
group inequality tends to increase energy demand while within-group 
inequality tends to attenuate it for all energy types, but the coefficients are 











Coal use significantly widens between-group inequality and lowers within-
group inequality and is associated with increase in poverty. Because coal has 
insignificant effect on production per capita, this suggests that coal may be 
used mainly by the low income farmers, and it exacerbates their poverty by 
reducing productivity. Agricultural electricity use has significant poverty 
reducing effects on all poverty measures. Though diesel shows poverty 
reducing tendencies, its coefficients are insignificant. This suggests that the 
poorer farmers do not use diesel, which is the most productive agricultural 
energy type. Because of diesel's positive long-run relationship with capital and 
negative with labour, one suggests that lack of capital is limiting the use of 
diesel by the poor, and the use of diesel reduces labour employment, leaving 
diesel with no impact on poverty. 
5.3.4 Mining Sector 
The pair-wise correlation coefficients of mining energy, GDP per capita, 
inequality, poverty and government expenses and their significance 
probabilities are shown in Table 5.17. Mining output per worker correlates 
positively with total and within-group inequality and all the energy types. It 
has negative correlation with between-group inequality, and all the poverty 
measures. All mining energy types have negative correlation with the three 
poverty measures. Government expenses show significantly positive 











Table 5.17: Correlation Coefficients - Mining Sector 
inequality Poverty Output/ 
worker 
T TB Tw pO pi p' 
output per worker 0.777 0 -0.866 0 0.958 0 -0.819 0 -0.756 0 -0.707 0 -
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
T ota I Energy 0.754 0 -0.869 0 0.950 0 -0.800 0 -0.726 0 -0.662 b 0.983 0 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.000) 
Coal 0.643 b -0.68r 0.7640 -0.7020 -0.621 b -0.509 b 0.8010 
(0.007) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.010) (0.044) (0.000) 
Electricity 0.766 0 -0.848 0 0.93r -0.811 0 -0.74r -0.6920 0.978 0 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) 
Liquid Petroleum 0.779 0 -0.83r 0.9510 -0.734 0 -0.662 b -0.632 b 0.978 0 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.009) (0.000) 
Government 0.7120 -0.859 0 0.9320 -0.748 0 -0.670 b -0.643 b 0.965 0 
expenses/GDP (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.007) (0.000) 
." 0 c , , , Notes. , and denote slgmficance at 1 Yo, 5 Yo, and 10 Yo levels respectIvely. 
Estimation without Energy 
The results of the regression output without energy in Table 5.18 show 
significant model performance and high goodness of fit for all the equations in 
the various sub-models. Mining production function's goodness of fit ranges 
from 83 0 92 percent, that of inequality from 63 to 92 and of poverty from 40 











Table 5.18: 3s1s for GDP-Inequality-Poverty Incidence - Mining Sector 
Variable Total inequalitl 8 Between-Group Within-Group 
Coel t-stat Cae I t-stat Coel t-stat Coel t-stat 
In8lt 1.949b 2.20 1.999b 2.22 -1.1410 -5.13 l.340° 9.61 
Ink, 0.4390 4.55 0.4330 4.35 0.3130 4.34 0.028 0.44 
ao 3.46r 10.15 3.4880 9.91 2.8900 19.14 5.6840 19.49 
Iny, l.323 1.24 0.868 0.79 5.343b 2.42 0.202 0.18 
(InY'_1)2 -0.111 -1.05 -0.064 -0.58 -0.585b -2.65 0.052 0.45 
lng, -0.105 -l.33 -0.100 -1.23 -0.221 -1.44 0.016 0.23 
Yo -3.936 -1.44 -2.844 -1.01 -13.135b -2.33 -2.884 -1.00 
Ink, -0.2340 -4.39 -0.072 -l.39 0.046 1.59 0.1690 3.10 
In8lt 0.336 1.02 -0.423 -0.88 0.6120 6.82 -0.63r -5.45 
00 5.0090 18.76 4.0830 22.15 4.1980 71.93 2.8590 11.14 
R2 
y 0.84 50.95 0.83 50.23 0.89 83.84 0.92 153.89 
R2 e 0.64 12.38 0.63 12.37 0.80 29.89 0.92 100.11 
R2 p 0.69 16.22 0.40 6.47 0.76 37.68 0.75 29.53 
Breusch-Pagan 4.83 0.185 12.97 0.005 14.07 0.003 20.41 0.000 
Joint test on Iny, and (Iny,)2 3.92 0.028 8.85 0.001 41.41 0.000 
. " c C , , , Notes. , and denote slgmficance at 1 Yo, 5 Yo, and 10 Yo levels respectIvely. The Breusch-
Pagan Statistics is for the test of independence of residuals of the equations. F -statistics 
(under coef. Colunms) and P-VAL (under t-stat colunms) for joint Wald test on 
lnYt and (lnYt)2 are presented on the last row. 
Mining capital per worker shows positive effect on per capita mining income 
but it is significant only in total and between-group inequality models. All 
inequality measures have significant effect on mining output. Total and 
within-group inequalities have positive effect, with respective coefficients of 
1.99 and 1.34. Between-group inequality is negative on output, with one 
percent increase leading to 1.141 percent fall in mining output per worker. The 
magnitudes of the inequality coefficients are higher than for the whole 
economy and the manufacturing sector, but lower than those of the agricultural 
sector. There is the same suggestion that growth stifling factors seem to act 
through between-group inequality via the credit, political economy channels 
and criminality and interracial tensions. The positive effect of within-group 
inequality may also be capturing the trickle-down effect of the fruits of growth 
via social capital within-group especially in African households. 
78 The first two colunms of the table give results that contain per capita income in poverty equation. 











Contrary to the other sectors, both mining output per worker and its square are 
insignificant on total and within-group inequality. However, there is evidence 
of an inverted V-shaped relationship with between-group inequality. This 
implies that one percent increase in mining output enhances between-group 
inequality by 5.343 percent, but in times of more enhanced increase in mining 
activity, inequality increase is attenuated at a rate of 0.585 percent. Figure 5.6 
plots the relationship. Equally, the active redistribution policies of the post-
apartheid government of South Africa (which has enabled share and stakes to 
be acquired by black people, through the BEE process in the mining and other 
sectors) may be at the basis of this relationship. 
Figure 5.6: Inequality-Per Capita Income for Mining 
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The estimates with poverty equations show that like in the agricultural sector, 
mining production per worker has negative impacts on all poverty measures. 
The impacts on poverty incidence are in Table 5.18 and those on poverty 
intensity and severity are in Table 5.19. One percent increase in mining GDP 
per worker brings about 0.234, 0.267 and 0.310 percent reduction in poverty 
incidence, intensity and severity, all significant at 5% level and less. Like the 
agricultural sector, the abjectly poor benefit more from agricultural production 























Table 5.19: Impact on Poverty Intensity and Severity - Mining Sector 
Variable Poverty intensity equation Poverty Severity equation 
Coel t-stat Coel t-stat 
T-Theil -0.832 -1.18 -0.969 -1.04 
B-Theil 0.8330 5.36 1.0020 4.60 
W-Theil -0.90r -4.92 -1.1240 -4.41 
Income -0.26r -3.13 -0.310b -2.60 
Capita IlL -0.060 -0.79 -0.076 -0.76 
R~/F-stat 0.64 21.60 0.59 16.23 
. " c 
, , , , Note. , and denote slgmficance at 1 Yo, 5 Yo, and 10 Yo levels respectIvely. The output is for 
three regressions per poverty measure - one for total, between- and within-group inequalities. 
Income coefficients are for total inequality equation, while capital coefficients are for within-
group inequality. 
Regression with mmmg mcome substituted for by its production function 
shows that mining capital per worker has no significant anti-poverty effects on 
any of the poverty measures in total and between-group inequality models. In 
within-group inequality model, mining capita per worker enhances all 
measures of poverty. As with the agricultural sector, the introduction of the lag 
value of capital in within-group inequality sub-model made no difference. The 
same indifference is observed on the lag value of mining income. This 
suggests mining activities reduce poverty directly through the poor's current 
participation in the sector, via lab ur supply. 
Estimation with Energy 
Table 5.20: 3sls for Production, Energy, Inequality, GDP and Poverty-
Mining Sector 
Total inequality Between-Group Within-Group 
pO pI p2 pO pI p2 pO pI p2 
-1.489 0 -1.489 0 -1.50r 0.572 0 0.577 0 0.578 0 -0.373 0 -0.373 0 -0.376 0 
-0.012 -0.012 0.000 -0.086 -0.077 -0.064 -0.009 -0.008 0.002 
1.012 0 1.012 0 1.000 0 1.086 0 1.077 0 1.064 0 1.009 0 1.008 0 0.998 0 
-1.156 0 -1.156 0 -1.126 0 -0.837 0 -0.8120 -0.774 0 -1.355 0 -1.352 0 -1.328 0 
0.005 0.005 0.006 -0.357b -0.357b -0.353b 0.256 0.259 0.276 
1.026 0 1.029 0 1.059 0 0.849 0 0.873 0 0.933 0 0.894 0 0.899 0 0.948 0 
0.187 0.184 0.157 0.236b 0.215b 0.160 0.174 0.167 0.111 
0.057 0.055 0.038 0.399' 0.386' 0.354 0.943 0.953 0.990 
0.812 0.797 0.997 6.600 0 6.007b 5.964b -1.379 -1.269 -1.312 
-0.067 -0.066 -0.087 -0.668 0 -0.608b -0.601b 0.173 0.163 0.166 






















0.036 0.035 0.038 -0.271 -0.271 -0.238 0.257 0.260 0.241 
-2.670 -2.633 -3.128 -15.742b -14.277b -14.464b 0.461 0.139 0.431 
0.091 0.157 0.168 0.069 0.114 0.097 0.157b 0.239b 0.294b 
0.167 0.005 0.035 0.452 0 0.597 0 0.843 0 -0.434b -0. 660b -1.0380 
-0.286 0 -0.388 0 -0.447b -0.088 -0.131 -0.069 -0.102 -0.114 -0.009 
5.253 0 4.9020 4.713 0 4.512 0 4.0010 3.387 0 3.645 0 2.549 0 0.983 0 
0.91 0.91 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.94 
0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
0.63 0.63 0.63 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.92 0.92 
0.68 0.57 0.44 0.81 0.69 0.61 0.78 0.70 
." 0 
, , , , Note. , and denote slgmficance at 1 Yo, 5 Yo, and 10 Yo levels respectIvely. 
The introduction of aggregate energy to the model equally results in a sharp 
fall in the coefficients of capital per unit labour (Table 5.20). They are all 
insignificant in the presence of total mining energy. Mining energy is a strong 
determinant of mining output per worker. A percentage increase in energy use 
resulting in 1.012 percent increase in output per worker. Mining output per 
worker is also a significant determinant of aggregate per capita energy demand 
in the sector, with coefficient of around 1.026. Mining energy does not appear 
to have significant effects on any inequality measure, and shows significant 
poverty reducing effects in total inequality model. One percent increase in 
energy use results in 0.286, 0.388 and 0.447 percent reduction in poverty 
incidence, intensity and severity. 
Table 5.21: Estimates with disaggregated Energy types - Mining 
Effect of Energy types 
Electricity Liquid Petroleum Coal 
Per ca pita income 0.9240 0.757 0 0.041 
Total inequality 0.033 0.142 ' 0.010 
Between-group 0.151 -0.055 0.018 
Within-Group -0.025 -0.011 -0.019 
Poverty incidence -0.42r -0.2130 -0.039' 
Intensity -0.5910 -0.2190 -0.049 
Severity -0.6630 -0.3490 -0.041 
Effect on Energy Dema nd 
Per ca pita income 0.911 0 l.375° 1.588 
Total inequality -0.219 1.286 0.895 
Between-group 0.155 -0.031 0.239 
Within-Group -0.022 0.823 b -l.365 















Disaggregation of energy types (Table 5.21 and Tables D4.1 to D4.3 of 
Appendix) shows that mining electricity and liquid petroleum both have strong 
positive effect on output per worker, with coefficients of 0.924 and 0.757 
respectively. Output equally strongly enhances the demand for these energy 
types, with elasticities slightly less than unity for electricity and above unity for 
liquid petroleum. Coal has no effect on output and inequality. Both output and 
inequality do not also significantly affect mining coal use. 
All energy types in the mining sector show poverty reducing effects but the 
coefficient of coal is significant only on poverty incidence. One percent 
increase in electricity use leads to 0.427, 0.591 and 0.663 percent reduction in 
poverty incidence, intensity and severity. The same increase in liquid 
petroleum use leads to 0.213, 0.219 and 0.349 percent reduction in the 
respective poverty indices, while that of coal brings about only 0.039 percent 
reduction in poverty incidence. A number of factors can explain the 
performance of the mining sector towards poverty reduction. First, mining 
sector is a heavy employer of low- and semi-skilled labour after agriculture 
(see STATSSA Labour Force Survey, 2004). Secondly, with the Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE) policies, many black-owned mining firms are 
emerging, such as African Rainbow Minerals and Mvelaphanda Resources. 
These imply that factor rewards in the mining sector trickle down to the poor 
(however, not through capital), either through the sales of labour, or ownership 
of factors other than crude labour. 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter completes the pro-poor growth analysis with the addition of 
inequality and poverty into the energy and production framework developed in 
chapter four. It uses a Cobb-Douglas per worker production function, and 
develops inequality frameworks based on Ahluwalia (1976) and poverty 
equations based on pro-poor growth framework (Son and Kakwani, 2008). 
The frameworks are jointly estimated first without energy types, then 
including per capita energy demand, with inequality disaggregated into sub-











There is significant negative effect of between-group inequality on production 
(in all the sectors) which may be explained in theory by credit constrains, 
criminality and between race tensions. Within-group inequality impacts 
positively on production, which could be capturing the trickle-down effect of 
the fruits of growth via social capital within-group especially in African 
households where significant remittances may go to poorer individuals from 
the richer and well endowed ones. This may apply particularly for the whole 
economy and manufacturing sector. For agricultural and mining sectors, black 
economic empowerment effects may cause income at the top tail of within-
group inequality to weigh positively in the overall income, causing its positive 
effect. 
There is evidence of an inverted V-shape inequality-per capita mcome 
relationship for between-group inequality, but a V-shaped one for within-
group inequality. it may be difficult for one to claim that this result is picking 
the Kuznets V-shaped development-inequality hypothesis since the time 
period under consideration here is only about 20 years. This may rather agree 
with the active post-apartheid policies of Black Economic Empowerment, 
which, while yielding fruits in the reduction of between-group inequality, 
actually increases within-group inequality. This is supported by the 
coefficients of Government expenses with significant negative and positive 
impacts on between-group and within-group inequality components 
respectively. 
Per capita income has poverty reducing effects in the entire economy and in 
the respective sectors studied. Between-group inequality (in line with pro-poor 
growth theory) has poverty increasing effect, with the abjectly poor suffering 
more from inequality than others. The effect of within-group inequality makes 
sense in terms of within-group solidarity, where growth at first widens 
inequality within-group when the relatively well-endowed individuals access 
some of the fruits of economic growth. They then remit some of the growth 
returns to their poorer family members. This intuition is supported by the fact 
that first lag of capital is poverty reducing in within-group inequality (holds 











poverty severity implies that such remittances are for altruistic motives, with 
the very poor receiving more attention. Statistics South Africa (2002) reports 
that the most important source of income for the unemployed in South Africa 
is financial support from other working members of their household. By 
deduction (from the fact that government expenses reduce total and between-
group inequalities) and in line with the correlation coefficients of government 
expenses (negative and significant) on all poverty measures, one would 
conclude that government efforts are yielding some anti-poverty fruits. 
However, as the coefficients indicate, these efforts are a little biased towards 
the just poor than the very poor. 
The reduction in the coefficients of capital per unit labour following the 
introduction of productive energy types into the production equation imply that 
capital estimates in traditional production functions be biased, picking the 
effect of omitted energy. 
Higher between-group inequality results in higher demand for all energy types 
(except gasoline and gas in whole economy, gas in manufacturing). The 
possible reason why higher inequality may be associated with increased energy 
consumption is that while energy consumption does not decrease with 
relatively poorer people, it may increase faster with the richer group as 
inequality widens. This reason is suggested by the coefficients of price 
(inelastic) and income (luxury good nature). 
All the energy types (except diesel in the whole economy) enhance total and 
between-group inequality. The impact is negative (except for gas) on within-
group inequality. All the manufacturing energy types have positive overall total 
and between-group inequality elasticities, but negative on within-group 
inequality (except for gas). Diesel though shows a negative effect on total and 
within-group inequalities, has a positive elasticity on between-group inequality. 
However, it may be erroneous to interpret that the uses of the above energy 
types reduce within-group inequality since the other inputs (capital) show the 
same effect. The possible explanation for negative effects on within-group 











eventually trickle-down within-group (through remittances for altruistic and 
other motives). 
Total energy, gasoline, kerosene and coal for the whole economy, electricity, 
diesel and kerosene in manufacturing, and coal in agriculture are associated 
with higher poverty (for all three measures of poverty). One would say that the 
fruits of production from these energy types go to the rich. Due to strong 
complementarity with capital, electrification by itself may not contribute 
significantly to poverty reduction unless other factors such as capital (both 
physical, human and social) accompany it. 
The poverty elasticities of all mining energy types and electricity in agriculture 
are negative. This is possibly because both sectors are the main employers of 
unskilled labour. Capital's weak poverty (incidence) reducing effect and 
poverty (intensity and severity) enhancing effects in the whole economy and 
manufacturing sector, and its ineffectiveness on poverty in agriculture and 
mining sectors suggest that lack of adequate access to capital by the poor is the 











6. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
6.1 Introduction 
This thesis investigates the impact of energy types on poverty in South Africa. 
Since poverty reduction comes by growth boosting and inequality attenuating 
factors, the thesis specifically investigates the relationship between various 
energy types and economic output in dis aggregated forms; investigates the 
relationship between energy types and other factors of production; examines 
the production-inequality-poverty nexus and assesses the effect of various 
energy types on inequality and poverty. 
Literature on pro-poor growth in general and the role of energy in particular 
suggest some unresolved issues that fall within the objective of this thesis. The 
first is possible simultaneity problems between production/growth and 
inequality on one hand, and production and energy on the other hand. The 
second is distinguishing the impacts of different energy types on the whole 
economy and disaggregated economic sectors. This is needed because various 
fuels can have different effects, and the effects can vary with economic sectors. 
Third is the need for a country-specific time series case study for the above 
growth-inequality link. Th s thesis directly addresses these concerns. 
The methodology used is designed to look at the impact of energy types on 
other factors of production on the one hand, and production/growth, inequality 
and poverty on the other. While chapter one introduces the thesis and chapter 
two explores related literature, chapter three revisits the Vector Autoregressive 
approach to causality and co-integration with twofold purpose. (I) To 
determine the degree and direction of causality between various energy types 
and real GDP (and other factors of production), in the Lag-Augmented 
Causality (LAC) framework. (2) To assess whether there are any long-run or 
co-integrating relationships between the energy types and GDP (and other 
factors of production), using the Auto-Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) or 
bound test approach. In chapter four, a theory-based Variable Elasticity of 











relatively less theoretical ARDL setup. The framework allows for the 
calculation of three important parameters of production theory - elasticities of 
substitution, output elasticities and Returns to Scale (RTS). The YES functions 
are jointly estimated with classical energy demand equations by 3sls. In 
chapter five, a per capita Cobb-Douglas (C-D) production function is adapted 
to include inequality and energy. Ahluwalia's (1976) inequality functional 
form is extended with government expenses and energy. Inequality is 
decomposed into between- and within-group components. These are jointly 
estimated with a poverty equation adapted from Son and Kakwani (2008) and 
per capita energy demand. 
Energy types are dis aggregated and the whole economy, manufacturing, 
agriculture and mining are the sectors considered because of availability of 
suitable data. Energy data are from the International Energy Agency and South 
African Department of Minerals and Energy (DME). Energy prices from 
Statistics South Africa (STATSSA), Eskom and DME. GDP, capital 
formation, employment and government expenses are from South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB), STATSSA and Department of Agriculture. Population 
data are from World Development Indicators (2008). Inequality and poverty 
data are from South African Development Indicators (2009) based on All 
Media and Products Survey data. The rest of the chapter presents the main 
findings of the thesis (6.2), implications of the findings for research (6.3), for 
policy (6.4). 
6.2 Main Findings 
The main findings of this thesis relate energy to output and output growth, other 
factors of production (capital and labour), inequality and poverty. Other findings 
not directly related to energy are also highlighted. 
6.2.1 Energy and Income/Income Growth 
The findings are arranged in order of methods used. Causal relationships run 
from total energy to GDP in the entire economy, but from GDP to total energy 
in the manufacturiHng sector. In the agricultural and mining sectors, there is 











integrated relationships between GDP and energy in the whole economy and all 
the three sectors considered. However, disaggregating energy types and 
economic sector reveals differences in effects. In the whole economy, electricity 
and gas co-integrate positively with GDP, while gasoline, kerosene and coal 
show long-run GDP slow-down effects. Electricity, diesel, coal and gas have 
long-run GDP enhancement effects, but kerosene slows down GDP in the long-
run for manufacturing. Electricity and diesel in agriculture, and liquid 
petroleum and coal in mining co-integrate positively with GDP of the respective 
sectors. 
The results agree largely with those of the theory-based analysis. Though the 
marginal productivity of total energy is lower than those of capital and labour, it 
enhances the Returns to Scale elasticity (RTS). RTS rises from 0.449 without 
energy to 0.488 with total energy in the whole economy, from 0.559 to 0.821 in 
manufacturing, 0.047 to 0.803 in agriculture and 0.131 to 0.470 in mining. 
Differing impacts are shown when energy types are disaggregated. Electricity 
contributes the highest to RTS (more than capital), followed by gas, coal and 
diesel in the whole economy, while gasoline and kerosene reduce RTS relative 
to estimation with no energy. The same order is observed in manufacturing, 
with the contributions of the respective energy types to R TS enhancement 
higher than in the whole economy. However, kerosene's RTS slow-down effect 
is more attenuated in manufacturing than in the whole economy. The difference 
may be accounted for by the residential sector where kerosene may impair the 
development of human capital (Muller et ai, 2003). In the agricultural sector, 
diesel contributes the most to RTS enhancement, followed by kerosene and 
electricity. In the mining sector, all energy types enhance RTS, with the highest 
contribution by liquid petroleum, then coal and electricity. The highest RTS is 
in agriculture in the presence of diesel, followed by manufacturing in the 
presence of electricity and mining in the presence of liquid petroleum. The 
whole economy, manufacturing and mining sectors exhibit diminishing Returns 
to Scale in the presence of the various energy types, but there are increasing 











The C-D framework of Chapter five shows that all energy types enhance per 
capita income in the whole economy, but kerosene is insignificant in 
manufacturing, while coal is insignificant in agriculture and mining. The share 
of residential kerosene has been falling since the post-apartheid era, but that of 
transport sector has been rising. Kerosene in transport is mainly used in the 
aviation industry, which contributes significantly to transport GDP. Given that 
the transport sector takes all the gasoline, and more than 50 percent of the 
kerosene, their positive effects on per capita income in this chapter79 can be 
explained by the increasing weight of the transport sector in national income. 
Electricity responds more than proportionately to increases in income for all 
sectors of the economy, with the greatest magnitudes being in agriculture and 
mining. Diesel and gas in whole economy and manufacturing, and coal in 
mining also respond more than proportionately. Income contributes significantly 
to increases in demand for gasoline and coal in the whole economy and for 
diesel in agriculture. The results are similar for per capita income, although the 
magnitudes vary somewhat. A case for concern is gasoline, on which income 
has positive effect. This implies that economic growth may lead to higher 
gasoline use (through luxury cars), which in turn slows the growth process. 
6.2.2 Energy and Other Factors of Production 
A causal relationship runs from total energy to capital and labour (with 
feedback for labour) in the entire economy. In the manufacturing sector, 
causality is from capital and labour to total energy (with feedback for capital). 
In the agricultural and mining sectors, there is bidirectional causality between 
total energy and labour. Total mining energy causes capital formation without 
feedback. Disaggregating energy types (and sectors) shows some differences 
in direction of causality between different energy types and GDP (and other 
factors). For example, electricity causes labour (with feedback) and capital in 
the whole economy. Manufacturing labour and capital cause electricity (with 
feedback for capital), while electricity causes labour in agricultural and mining 
79 The dataset used for this chapter starts from 1993, while that of chapter four starts from 1971 and 











sectors, but causes capital only in the mining sector. Diesel (liquid petroleum) 
behaves like electricity in manufacturing and agriculture (mining). 
Gasoline and coal have negative co-integration relation with total labour and 
capital. Electricity, diesel and gas are associated with increased employment in 
the whole economy. Manufacturing coal, diesel and electricity co-integrate 
positively with capital and labour. In the agricultural sector, positive level 
relationships exist for electricity, diesel and kerosene respectively with capital. 
Labour negatively co-integrates with diesel, electricity and kerosene. 
Electricity and liquid petroleum uses in the mining sector have positive level 
relation with capital and labour (but negative for coal). 
The YES production function estimates show that total energy is a 
complement to both capital and labour in whole economy and agriculture, but 
more of a substitute for capital (labour) and complement to labour (capital) in 
manufacturing (mining) sector. However, dis aggregated energy types show 
that electricity is more a substitute for labour and complement to capital in 
whole economy and agriculture, but a strong substitute for (complement to) 
labour (capital) in manufacturing and mining sectors. Diesel complements 
both labour and capital in the whole economy, manufacturing and agriculture 
(moderately). Gas is a strong substitute for capital but complement for labour 
in the whole economy and manufacturing (moderately). Kerosene moderately 
complements capital and labour in the whole economy, but substitutes for 
them in the manufacturing sector. In agriculture, kerosene substitutes for 
labour but complements capital. Coal complements labour, but weakly 
substitutes for capital in the whole economy and manufacturing sector, while 
in agriculture, it is a substitute for both capital and labour. In mining sector, 
coal is a substitute for labour but a complement to capital, while liquid 
petroleum is a complement to labour but a substitute for capital. 
In the C-D framework, the introduction of more productive energy types 
electricity and diesel - generally reduces the coefficients of capital per labour 
compared to estimates without energy, or with less productive energy types. 











where the main productive energy types are omitted may be biased, picking the 
effect of omitted energy. 
6.2.3 Energy, Inequality and Poverty 
All the energy types (except diesel in the whole economy) enhance total and 
between-group inequality. The impact is negative (except for gas) on within-
group inequality. All the manufacturing energy types (except for gas) have 
positive overall total and between-group inequality elasticities, but negative 
within-group inequality elasticity. Diesel's positive effect on between-group 
inequality is weak, and significant only in manufacturing and agriculture, but 
has negative effect on within-group inequality. The possible explanation for 
negative effects of these energy types on within-group inequality is that 
energy's productivity eventually trickle-down to poorer members within-group 
through remittances for altruistic and other avenues. 
Because of its insignificant effect on (between-group) inequality, diesel has 
poverty reducing effect in the whole economy. Total energy, gasoline, 
kerosene and coal in the whole economy, electricity, diesel and kerosene in 
manufacturing, and coal in agriculture are associated with higher poverty (for 
all three measures of poverty). One would say that the fruits of production 
from these energy types go to the rich. The strong complementarity of 
electricity with capital in production imply that electrification by itself may 
yield significant poverty reduction effects unless other factors such as capital 
(both physical, human and social) accompany it. The report of IEG (2008) 
supports this view. 
The poverty elasticities of all mining energy types and electricity in agriculture 
are negative. This is possibly because both sectors are the main employers of 
unskilled labour. Capital's weak poverty (incidence) reducing effect and 
poverty (intensity and severity) enhancing effects in the whole economy and 
manufacturing sector, and its ineffectiveness on poverty in agriculture and 
mining sectors suggest that lack of adequate access to capital by the poor is the 
main hindrance to poverty reduction, and not just energy. These are consistent 











Higher between-group inequality results in higher demand for all energy types 
(except gasoline and gas in whole economy, gas in manufacturing). The 
possible reason why higher inequality may be associated with increased energy 
consumption is that while energy consumption does not decrease with 
relatively poorer people, it may increase faster with the richer group as 
inequality widens. This reason is suggested by the coefficients of price and 
income elasticities of demand. The price elasticities suggest that all energy 
types are necessities, implying that energy demand falls far slower than the rate 
of their respective prices increase (inelastic). On the other hand, income 
elasticity shows that one percent increase in income results in more than 
proportionate increase in the demand for the respective energy types. This 
implies that energy consumption would increase faster at the top end of income 
distribution, where a greater share of the fruits of economic growth goes to. 
Within-group inequality has negative effect on total energy and positive on 
liquid petroleum demands in mining. Since total mining energy is substitute to 
labour and complement with capital, while liquid petroleum is more a 
substitute to capital than labour, it would appear that increase in within-group 
inequality forces more individuals within (especially the poor) groups to seek 
employment in the mining sector, leading to higher use of labour 
complementing resources like liquid petroleum and less use of substitutes to 
labour such as coal. This corroborates the fact that coal does not significantly 
reduce poverty in the mining sector. 
6.2.4 Other Findings 
The other findings relate particularly to the production-inequality nexus and 
the relation to poverty in South Africa. There is a negative effect of between-
group inequality on production (in all the sectors) which may be explained in 
theory by credit constraints, criminality and between race tensions. Within-
group inequality impacts positively on production. This could be capturing the 
trickle-down effect of the fruits of growth. Such trickle-down mechanism can 
occur via social capital within-group, especially in African households where 
significant remittances may go to poorer individuals from the richer and well 
endowed ones. This may apply particularly for the whole economy and 











empowerment effects may cause income at the top tail of within-group 
inequality to weigh positively in the overall income, causing its positive effect. 
There is evidence of an inverted V-shape inequality-per capita income 
relationship for between-group inequality, but a V-shaped one for within-
group inequality. Due to short data span, it may be difficult to relate this to the 
Kuznets V-shaped development-inequality hypothesis. These may rather agree 
with the active post-apartheid policies of Black Economic Empowerment, 
which, while yielding fruits in the reduction of between-group inequality, 
actually increases within-group inequality. This is supported by the 
coefficients of Government expenses on between-group and within-group 
inequality components (with significant negative and positive impacts 
respectively). 
Per capita income has poverty reducing effects in the entire economy and in 
the respective sectors studied. Between-group inequality (in line with pro-poor 
growth theory) has poverty increasing effect, with the abjectly poor suffering 
more from inequality than others. The effect of within-group inequality makes 
sense in terms of within-group solidarity, where growth at first widens 
inequality within-group when the relatively well-endowed individuals access 
some of the fruits of economic growth. They then remit some of the growth 
returns to their poorer family members. This intuition is supported by the fact 
that first lag of capital has poverty reducing effects only in within-group 
inequality sub-model (this is the case only for total economy and the 
manufacturing sector). The strong effect on poverty severity implies that such 
remittances are for altruistic motives, with the very poor receiving more 
attention. Statistics South Africa (2002) reports that the most important source 
of income for the unemployed in South Africa is financial support from other 
working members of their household. By deduction (from the fact that 
government expenses reduce total and between-group inequalities) and in line 
with the correlation coefficients of government expenses (negative and 
significant) on all poverty measures, one would conclude that government 











indicate, these efforts are a little biased towards the just poor than the very 
poor. 
6.2 Implication for Research 
These findings have implications for research. Firstly, without controlling for 
endogeneity in the growth-inequality framework, single equations time series 
analyses are likely to give biased results. The same would happen when 
estimating energy demand functions separately from that of growth andlor 
production in a time series, because indeed, according to the D WH test, there 
is endogeneity between production and inequality on one hand and production 
and energy demand on the other. 
Secondly, the elasticities of production and substitution noticeably vary over 
time and with factor ratios, for all factors of production, including 
disaggregated energy types. Therefore it may not be plausible to restrict the 
elasticities of substitution to unity or constant. 
Thirdly, all the productive sectors including the whole economy exhibit 
diminishing Returns to Scale without energy. With energy types like 
electricity, diesel, gas and coal, the scale elasticities increase somewhat, but 
only in the agricultural sector are there increasing Returns to Scale with the 
use of diesel. Unitary and constant elasticity of substitution production 
functions constrain the substitution elasticities to unity and constant 
respectively. Such restrictions will not capture these details. Though these 
energy types contribute less to scale elasticity (RTS) (which is the determinant 
of an economy's growth path) than capital and labour in most cases, the graph 
of the time evolution shows that they set the pace for RTS. This implies that if 
the South African economy is less endowed with these resources, economic 
growth will be seriously jeopardised. 
Fourth, various energy types have different effects on output (and also on 
growth by their contribution to the scale elasticity), inequality and poverty. 
The effects vary with economic sectors. This implies that aggregate energy 












Fifth, within and between-group inequalities have positive and negative effects 
on production respectively, suggesting that in multiracial and fragmented 
societies, it is important to decompose inequality into sub-group components. 
6.3 Policy Implication 
The outcome of this study suggests some implications for growth, energy 
demand, redistribution, and poverty policies. 
The first implication is that different energy types have different impacts on 
production and economic growth. Electricity shows the strongest positive 
effect on the growth of the entire economy and the manufacturing sector, 
while diesel has the strongest effect on agricultural production and liquid 
petroleum on the mining sector. Gasoline and kerosene have negative 
production and growth effects in all the sectors where they are used. Coal has 
a negative effect only in the agricultural sector. This implies that any energy 
policy targeting growth must be disaggregated, laying particular emphasis on 
electricity and diesel with strong positive effects and taking note of the 
production attenuating effects of gasoline and kerosene. The negative effect of 
gasoline is indicative of luxury consumption at the expense of investment. 
However, that of kerosene may involve deeper household deprivation 
dynamics such that while any measure to reduce the consumption of gasoline 
may also have poverty reducing effects, the reduction of kerosene 
consumption is likely to affect the (severely poor) households if it is not 
simultaneously accompanied by improved access to and enhanced 
affordability of cleaner and more productive forms of energy like electricity. 
The impact of diesel on agriculture is remarkable. Agriculture exhibits 
increasing Returns to Scale with diesel use. This implies that the uncertainty 
surrounding fossil fuels and their increasing prices pose a great threat to future 
food security. Equally, the combination of diesel's high positive impact on per 
capita income and low and insignificant effect on the poverty increasing type 
of inequality makes its use in South Africa a poverty reducing energy type. 
This anti-poverty role is very strong in agriculture. Therefore, more has to be 











diesel) in the agricultural sector. Though electricity has the highest impact on 
labour productivity, its contribution to production goes almost exclusively to 
the rich owners of capital (and skilled labour), such that its effect on poverty is 
positive. This suggests that its weak association with labour in the whole 
economy is biased towards skilled labour; hence its poverty effect is not 
significant except in agriculture and mining sectors. Since both energy types 
are strong complements to capital, any effort for equitable access to these 
growth enhancing energy types must be accompanied by broadened access to 
both human and physical capital by the poor. The only manufacturing energy 
type with strong association with labour and hence high poverty reducing 
effect is gas. This is most likely due to its use by the poor in motorcar repairs 
and art and craft industries. 
Total energy, electricity, diesel and coal in the whole economy, manufacturing 
and agriculture have between-group inequality enhancing effects. However, 
their effects on within-group inequality are negative. This suggests that the 
fruits of energy's contribution to economic growth are still being appropriated 
relatively more by the richer groups of society. 
Given that between-group inequality shows a negative effect on growth while 
within-group inequality shows positive effect, redistribution policies in South 
Africa have to focus on the interracial divide. This redistribution can be done 
through increases in (both level and quality of) employment, but equally and 
more importantly, increased access to energy (electricity and diesel) and 
capital goods. However, it is worth mentioning that active redistribution 
policies as captured by Government expenses show significant negative 
impact on total and between-group inequalities. 
Because the demand for most energy types is price inelastic, pricing measures 
may not be an effective instrument to check energy consumption, it can lead to 
poverty traps, where the poor lack access to the proper kind of energy (and 
capital) for production. However, targeted taxes (taxing energy for those at the 
top of income distribution for redistribution) may be applicable. However, this 
needs to be undertaken with caution so as not to lower incentives for 











associated with increased energy consumption. This is possibly due to the fact 
that while energy consumption does not decrease with relatively poorer 
people, it increases faster with the richer group as inequality widens on the one 
hand. On the other hand, the income elasticity shows that a one percent 
increase in income results in a more than proportionate increase in the demand 
for the respective energy types. This implies that energy consumption would 
increase faster at the top end of income distribution curve, where a greater 
share of the fruits of economic growth goes to. 
Redistribution efforts should focus on the' bad' type of inequality - between-
group. The effect of Government expenses shows that public effort is doing a 
great deal to ameliorate between-group inequality and should be encouraged. 
Efforts to reduce between-group inequality can also be associated with energy 
conservation, since it tends to increase the demand for all energy types except 
gas. A possible reason is that while energy consumption does not decrease 
with relatively poorer people, it may increase faster with the richer group as 
inequality widens. This reason is suggested by the coefficients of price and 
income elasticities of demand in chapter four and here. 
Access to energy types like electricity, diesel and gas are crucial for economic 
growth, but for them to yield significant anti-poverty fruits, efforts must go 
beyond energy to (both physical and human) capital. 
6.4 Caveats and Further Research 
In conclusion, some limitations to this analysis and areas of further research 
are worth mentioning. First, chapters four and five have not taken the problem 
of unit roots into account. This is due to the fact that in a limited observations 
dataset, simultaneous equations modelling limits degrees of freedom. If 
variables are to be differenced, then little leeway will be available for the 
estimates. Besides, interaction terms in YES framework make differencing 
complicated and can even result in non-linearity. However time trends have 
been used in all the models to minimise the biases due to variables trending 
over time. Chapter three takes care of unit root issues and from comparison of 











and inequality data in chapter five only span (1993 to 2007) though it has been 
adjusted to 20 observations. Because the span is this short, the findings of the 
chapter may not be usable for projections. In addition, the partial equilibrium 
approach used in this work can only capture some of the many avenues 
through which energy affects growth, inequality and poverty. A more 
embracive approach would be a general equilibrium methodology. 
Notwithstanding, each method has its trade-offs and the choice of anyone type 
depends on the point of focus. However, these do not water down the validity 
of the policy conclusions here. In terms of further research, there is need for 
further verification either in panel data or longer time series as more data 
becomes available, with possibility of extension to other sub-Saharan African 
Countries. Due to space, time and data limitations, other sectors like 
residential, commercial and transport were not included in the analysis, which 
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Appendix B: Unit Root Tests 
Table B 1: Unit Root Test - Whole Economy 
Variable level 1
st 
diff V Variable level 1
st 
diff 
in log cit Lag PP-stat Lag PP-stat in log cit Lag PP-stat Lag PP-stat 
(p-val) Ale (p-val) Ale (p-val) (p-val) Ale (p-val) Ale (p-val) 
GOP - 2 0.292 1 -3.90a Gasoline cit 1 -1.933 0 -6.5a 
(0.35) (0.98) (0.002) (0.081) (0.64) (0.000) 
Capital - 3 -0.358 2 -3.143b Gas - 1 -3.106b 1 -6.57a 
(0.27) (0.918) (0.023) (0.721) (0.026) (0.000) 
Labour - 4 -0.312 1 -2.966b Kerosene - 1 -0.082 0 -4.82a 
(0.28) (0.92) (0.038) (0.115) (0.951) 0.000) 
Total cit 3 -3.110 0 -S.26a Coal - 1 -2.187 0 -S.02a 
Energy (0.008) (0.103) (0.000) (0.95) (0.21) (0.000) 
Electricity cit 1 -3.248c 0 -4.36a Pop cit 5 3.121 4 0.50 
(0.012) (0.075) (0.000) (0.000) (1.00) (0.99) 
Diesel - 1 -0.825 0 -4.02a 
(0.131) (0.812) (0.002) 
Table B 2: Unit Root Test - Manufacturing 
Variable level 1
st 
diff Variable level 1
st 
diff 
in log cit Lag PP-stat Lag PP-stat inlog cit Lag PP-stat Lag PP-stat 
(p-val) Ale (p-val) Ale (p-val) (p-val) Ale (p-val) Ale (p-val) 
GOP cit 1 -2.445 0 -4.33a Diesel cit 1 -2.559 0 -S.98a 
(0.066) (0.356) (0.000) (0.075) (0.299) (0.000) 
Capital - 3 -1.424 2 -3.36b Gas - 1 -2.581c 0 -6.57a 
(0.190) (0.571) (0.013) (0.603) (0.097) (0.000) 
Labour cit 2 -1.907 1 -3.155b Kerosene - 1 -1.777 0 -6.44a 
(0.017) (0.651) (0.023) (0.289) (0.392) (0.000) 
Total - 3 -2.404 0 -4.13a Coal - 2 -1.699 0 -3.61a 
Energy (0.582) (0.141) (0.001) (0.631) (0.432) (0.006) 
Electricity - 1 -2.093 0 -S.17a 
(0.146) (0.247) (0.000) 
Table B 3: Unit Root Test - Agriculture 
Variable level 1
st 
diff Variable in level 1
st 
diff 
in log cit Lag PP-stat Lag PP-stat log cit Lag PP-stat Lag PP-stat 
(p-val) Ale (p-val) Ale (p-val) (p-val) Ale (p-val) Ale (p-val) 
GOP cit 3 -4.67a 2 -S.93a Electricity - 1 -1.709 0 -6.82a 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.323) (0.426) (0.000) 
Capital - 2 -1.80 3 -4.27a Diesel - 1 -2.019 1 -7.42a 
(0.251) (0.383) (0.001) (0.388) (0.279) (0.000) 
Labour - 5 -2.325 5 -3.97a Kerosene - 1 -1.052 0 -S.21a 
(0.344) (0.164) (0.002) (0.145) (0.734) (0.000) 
Total - 1 -1.396 0 -4.82a Coal - 1 -2.57 1 -7.59a 
Energy (0.264) (0.584) (0.000) (0.856) (0.10) (0.000) 
80 MakiIlilon's critical values without trend is -3.689, -2.975 and -2.619; with trend is -4.288, -3.560 











Table B 4: Unit Root Test - Mining 
Variable level 1
st 
diff Variable in level 1
st 
diff 
in log cit Lag PP-stat Lag PP-stat log cit Lag PP-stat Lag PP-stat 
(p-val) Ale (p-val) Ale (p-val) (p-val) Ale (p-val) Ale (p-val) 
GDP - 1 -3.46a 0 -4.91a Electricity - 1 -3.21b 0 -S.20a 
(0.970) (0.009) (0.000) (0.632) (0.019) (0.000) 
Capital - 3 -2.699c 2 -3.83b Liquid cit 3 -0.863 0 -S.97a 
(0.440) (0.074) (0.003) Petroleum (0.050) (0.96) (0.000) 
Labour cit 2 -1.610 1 -3.48a Coal - 1 -3.353b 3 -9.40a 
(0.035) (0.788) (0.009) (0.594) (0.013) (0.000) 
Total - 1 -1.38 0 -S.59a 
Energy (0.151) (0.592) (0.000) 
Appendix C: DWH Test and 0' Variation 
with Factor Ratios and Time 
Table C 1: DWH Test for Endogeneity 
Total Inequality Between-group Within-group 
t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat 
Whole 0.829 2.48 1.186 0.061 1.578 1.46 
Economy 
Manufacturing 1.117 2.43 -1.224 -0.49 2.867 1.65 
Agriculture -0.469 -1.45 -0.861 -1.42 0.789 1.28 
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Figure C 2: Elasticity of Substitution and Factor Ratios - Manufacturing 
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Appendix D: Detailed 3s1s Results for 
Disaggregated Energy types 
Table Dl. 1: 3sls for Electricity - Whole Economy 
Variable Total inequality Between-G roup Within-Group 
pO pI p2 pO pI p2 pO pI 
lnalt -0.446 a -0.445 a -0.447 a 0.022 0.022 0.022 -o.onb -0.075b 
lnk t -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.055 -0.055 -0.056 0.033 0.028 
lne t 1.002 a 1.003 a 1.003 a 1.055 a 1.055 a 1.056a 0.967 a O.972 a 





b 0.424 a 0.418 a 
lnalt 0.394 a 0.392 a 0.391 a 0.109b 0.112b 0.109 b -0.103 b -0.110 b 
lnYt 1.007 a 1.010 a 1.013 a 1.232 a 1.237 a 1.226 a 1.319 a 1.337 a 
lnpet -0.009 -0.004 -0.001 -0.213 -0.223 -0.201 -0.275 c -0.295 b 
Po -O.421b -0.448b -O.472b -1.924 b -1.972b -1.867 b -2.629 a -2.764 a 
lnYt -6.434b -6.415b -5.925b 19.147 a 18.687 a 17.474 a -19.824 a -20.333 a 
lnYt_l 0.661b 0.659b 0.602b -2.413 a -2.369 a -2.237 a 2.389 a 2.453 a 
lng t 0.009 0.004 0.001 -0.378 a -0.370 a -0.376 a 0.233 a 0.204 a 






b -44.948 a -43.991 a -41.562 a 40.705 a 41.602 a 
lnk t -0.488b -O.626c -0.544 -O.227c -0.272 -0.050 -0.245 c -0.314 
lnalt -0.361 -0.732 -1.017 0.621 a 0.869 a 1.128 a -0.703 a -1.031 a 
lnet 0.479 0.687 0.570 0.439b 0.602b 0.414 0.789 a 1.162 a 
00 3.210 a 1.995c 1.736 3.199 a 2.130 a 2.011b 0.855 c -1.416 c 
R2 
y 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
R2 e 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
R2 • 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.96 0.96 
R2 p 0.49 0.39 0.32 0.80 0.67 0.57 0.78 0.70 
Table Dl. 2: 3sls for Diesel - Whole Economy 
Variable Total inequality Between-Group Within-Group 
pO pI p2 pO pI p2 pO pI 
lnalt -0.553 a -0.553 a -0.550 a 0.151 a 0.151 a 0.151 a -0.134 a -0.134 a 
lnkt 0.078 b 0.078 b 0.080 b 0.164 a 0.164 a 0.164 a 0.047 b 0.047 b 
lnet 0.922b 0.922b 0.920b 0.836 a 0.836 a 0.836 a 0.953 a 0.953 a 
a o 1.259 a 1.259 a 1.259 a 1.364 a 1.365 a 1.365 a 1.201 a 1.201 a 
lnalt 0.413 b 0.411 b 0.412 b -0.138 c -0.137 c -0.141 c 0.174 b 0.174 b 
lnYt 1.042 a 1.038 a 1.042 a 1.073 a 1.070 a 1.073 a 1.028 a 1.029 a 
lnpet -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.009 -0.010 
Po -1.588 a -1.578 a -1.589 a -1.803 a -1.793 a -1.802 a -1.316 a -1.317 a 
lnYt -1.922 -2.118 -2.068 23.687a 23.004a 21.276a -21.554a -21.729a 
lnYt-l 0.123 0.146 0.139 -2.760 a -2.677 a -2.473 a 2.463 a 2.483 a 
lngt -0.146 b -0.142 b -0.149 b -0.486 a -0.469 a -0.498 a 0.192 c 0.176 c 


















































Yo 2.308 2.749 2.598 -52.951 a -51.373 a -47.849a 43.720a 43.994a 43.034a 
lnkt -0.055 -0.100 0.162 -0.412 b -O.600 e -0.379 -0.323 -O.54S c -0.439 
lnalt -0.377 -0.656 -0.844 0.728 a 1.029 a 1.258 a -0.795 a -1.178 a -1.436 a 
lnet -0.068 -0.004 -0.343 -0.483 a -0.534b -0.434 -0.508 a -0.590 a -0.541 
00 4.204 a 3.382 a 3.229 a 3.427 a 2.353 a 2.071 a 1.366b -0.841 -1.957 
R2 
y 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
R2 e 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
R2 • 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.97 0.97 0.97 
R2 p 0.42 0.33 0.31 0.81 0.69 0.59 0.77 0.72 0.67 
Table Dl. 3: 3sls for Gasoline - Whole Economy 
Variable Total inequality Between-G roup Within-Group 
po pI p2 po pI p2 po pI p2 
lnalt 0.260 0.256 0.257 -0.411 a -00405 a -0.414 a O.533 a 0.534 a 0.536 a 
lnkt 0.459 a 0.461 a 0.460 a 0.240b 0.246b 0.239b -0.054 -0.055 -0.056 
lnet 0.541 a O.539 a 0.540 a 0.760 a 0.754 a 0.761 a 1.054 a 1.055 a 1.056 a 
ao 1.402 a 1.403 a 1.403 a 0.895 a 0.904 a 0.891 a 1.373 a 1.374 a 1.374 a 




a 1.221 a 1.128 a 1.167 a 1.147
a 1.164 a 1.173 a 1.184 a 
lnpet -0.187 a -0.189 a -0.189b -0.115 a -0.131 a -0.120 a -O.068e -0.084b -0.093b 
Po -1.036b -1.045 b -1.049b -O.743 c -0.855b -0.802b -1.696 a -1.630 a -1.615 a 
lnYt -8.145 -7.991 -7.814 5.467 3.133 1.885 -13.493 b -13.882 b -12.844 b 
lnYt_l 0.979 0.961 0.942 -0.673 -0.404 -0.268 1.680 b 1.724 b 1.614 b 
lngt -0.067 -0.069 -0.070 -0.389 a -0.398 a -0.371 a O.237 a 0.237 a 0.201b 
lnet 0.180 0.173 0.166 0.971b 1.044 a 1.102 a -0.684b -0.667b -0.714b 
Yo 16.143 15.821 15.451 -15.468 -10.683 -7.982 28.645b 29.441b 27.112b 
lnkt -0.563 a -0.736 a -0.776 a -0.235 a -0.389 a -0.301 -0.312b -0.540b -0.366 
lnalt 0.361 0.355 0.131 0.322 a 0.366 a 0.599b -0.176 -0.147 -0.412 
lnet 0.954 a 1.356 a 1.435 a 0.548 a 0.944 a 0.849b 0.762 a 1.246 a 1.174b 
00 2.11S a 0.476 -0.198 2.875 a 1.237b 1.017 1.970 a 0.214 -0.681 
R2 
y 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
R2 e 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.90 
R2 • 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.96 0.96 0.96 
R2 p 0.85 0.86 0.73 0.89 0.87 0.75 0.83 0.85 0.74 
Table Dl. 4: 3sls for Gas - Whole Economy 
Variable Total inequality Between-Group Within-Group 
po pI p2 po pI p2 po pI p2 
lnalt -O.68ge -O.686e -O.686 e 0.315 a 0.316 a 0.316 a -0.210b -0.211b -0.209b 
lnkt 0.685 a 0.684 a 0.684 a 0.674 a 0.673 a 0.673 a 0.741 a 0.743 a O.740 a 
lnet 0.315 a 0.316 a 0.316 a 0.326 a 0.327 a 0.327 a 0.259b 0.257b 0.260b 
ao 1.942 a 1.943 a 1.943 a 2.221 a 2.222 a 2.223 a 1.792 a 1. 791 a 1.793 a 











lnYt -0.973 -0.894 -0.898 -0.031 0.097 0.086 -0.778 -0.681 -0.731 
lnpet -0.848 -0.803 -0.807 -0.014 -0.086 -0.075 -0.093 -0.027 -0.072 
Po 2.417 2.278 2.279 1.507 1.270 1.276 5.879 a 5.773 a 5.771 a 
lnYt -5.440 -5.304 -5.334 13.753 a 13.201b 12.702b -17.697 a -17.606a -16.90 a 
lnYt_l 0.657 0.642 0.644 -1.565 b -1.503b -1.443b 2.140 a 2.132 a 2.053 a 
lngt 0.015 0.013 0.017 -0.338b -0.327b -0.331b 0.138 0.127 0.107 
lnet -0.052 -0.049 -0.052 -0.405 b -0.419 a -0.421 a 0.236b 0.244b 0.261b 
Yo 11.275 10.967 11.058 -30.457 a -29.202 b -28.155b 35.306a 35.042a 33A07a 
lnkt 0.029 0.101 0.155 0.050 0.100 0.142 0.193 b 0.332b 0.478b 
lnalt -0.371 -0.731 -1.063 00442 a 0.606 a 0.847 a -0.392 a -0.601 a -0.867 a 
lnet -00405 a -0.553 a -0.687 a -0.126 -0.176 -0.128 -0.216b -0.270 c -0.249 
00 4.627 a 4.003 a 3.634 a 4.348 a 3.721 a 3.206 a 3.537 a 2.408 a 1.295 
R2 
y 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 
R2 e 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.68 0.67 0.68 
R2 • 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.96 0.96 0.96 
R2 p 0.71 0.62 0.54 0.80 0.69 0.61 0.78 0.69 0.64 
Table Dl. 5: 3sls for Kerosene - Whole Economy 
Variable Total inequality Between-G roup Within-Group 
po pI p2 po pI p2 po pI p2 
lna lt -1.050 b -1.048 b -1.048 b 0.350 b 0.352b 0.354b -0.284b -0.282 b -0.281 b 
lnkt 0.682 a 0.681 a 0.681 a 0.775 a 0.778 a 0.781 a 0.833 a 0.827 a 0.826 a 
lnet 0.318b 0.319b 0.319b 0.225 0.222 0.219 0.167 0.173 0.174 
ao 1.932 a 1.933 a 1.933 a 2.214 a 2.214 a 2.214 a 1.700 a 1.705 a 1.706 a 
lna lt -0.537 -0.538 -0.540 0.595b 0.582b 0.568b -1.162 a -1.176 a -1.212 a 
lnYt 2.149 a 2.144 a 2.140 a 1.950 a 1.957 a 1.964 a 2.461 a 2A56 a 2A37 a 
lnpet -0.289 a -0.287 a -0.286 a -0.157c -0.162b -0.167b -0.048 -0.043 -0.027 
Po -5.924 a -5.909 a -5.898 a -5.228 a -5.246 a -5.265 a -9.354 a -9.368 a -9.391 a 
lnYt -15.589c -15.169c -14.106c -11.403 -11.543 -11.627 -6.419 -6.757 -3.887 
lnYt-l 1.811 c 1.764c 1.643 c 1.264 1.279 1.290 0.873 0.918 0.595 
lngt -0.007 -0.012 -0.015 -0.405 a -00405 a -00407 a 0.222 a 0.197 a 0.182 b 
lnet 0.259 0.251 0.228 0.685 a 0.688 a 0.691 a -0.424b -0.418b -0.481 b 
Yo 32.908c 31.976c 29.676 23.052 23.355 23.522 11.706 12.289 6.038 
lnkt -0.513 a -0.652 a -0.700 a -0.211b -0.314b -0.260 -0.254c -0.349 -0.166 
lna lt 0.255 0.133 -0.065 0.346 a O.421b 0.613b -0.209c -0.281 -0.560c 
lnet 0.403 a 0.568 a 0.603 a 0.254 a 0.392 a 0.365b 0.317 a 00472 a 0.444b 
00 4.362 a 3.641 a 3.186 a 4.154 a 30460 a 3.028 a 3.709 a 2.849 a 1.732 b 
R2 
y 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.89 0.89 0.89 
R2 
e 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.91 0.91 0.90 
R2 • 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.97 0.97 0.96 











Table Dl. 6: 3sls for Coal - Whole Economy 
Variable Total inequality Between-G roup Within-Group 
pO pI p2 pO pI p2 pO pI p2 
lnalt -0.232 -0.232 -0.233 -0.506 a -0.504 a -0.493 a O.207c O.209C O.20Sc 












lnet O.523 a O.523 a 0.523 a 0.854 a 0.852 a 0.843 a 0.750 a 0.752 a 0.748 a 
a o 1.082 a 1.082 a 1.082 a 0.249 0.254 0.275 0.937 a 0.936 a 0.939 a 
lnalt 0.142 0.143 0.144 0.774 a 0.772 a 0.761 a -0.586 a -0.584 a -0.577 a 
lnYt 0.700 a 0.698 a 0.697 a 1.026 a 1.029 a 1.035 a 1.129 a 1.128 a 1.138 a 
lnpet -0.078 -0.076 -0.075 0.030 0.024 0.009 0.100 0.098 0.077 
Po 1.301 c 1.299c 1.297c -0.107 -0.092 -0.048 -1.954b -1.942b -1.871b 
lnYt -9.713b -9.390b -8.859b 11.610 a 10.871 a 9.931 a -21.788 a -21.840 a -20.560 a 
lnYt_l 1.125b 1.089b 1.027b -1.384 a -1.304 a -1.194 a 2.605 a 2.615 a 2.470 a 
lng t 0.040 0.035 0.036 -0.286 a -0.272 a -0.282 a 0.270 a 0.257b 0.250b 










lnkt -0.379 a -0.461 a -0.486b -0.180b -0.220 -0.077 -0.166 -0.165 0.020 
lnalt -0.373 -0.762 -1.137 0.353 a 0.486 b 0.788 b -0.304 b -0.465 b -0.751 b 
lnet 0.577 a 0.808 a 0.889 a 0.362 a 0.504 b 0.368 0.497 a 0.690 a 0.651 b 
00 2.541 a 1.085c 0.315 3.174 a 2.085 a 1.998 b 2.104 a 0.488 -0.543 
R2 
y 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.90 0.90 
R2 e 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.78 0.78 0.78 
R2 • 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.96 0.96 0.96 
R2 p 0.75 0.66 0.55 0.82 0.72 0.62 0.80 0.71 0.65 
Table D2. 1: 3sls for Electricity - Manufacturing 
Variable Total inequality Between-Group Within-Group 
pO pI p2 pO pI p2 pO pI p2 
lna lt -0.662b -0.660b -0.659b -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.060 -0.060 -0.060 
lnkt 0.144 0.141 0.139 0.040 0.038 0.043 0.065 0.067 0.066 
lnet 0.856 a 0.859 a 0.861 a 0.960 a 0.962 a 0.957 a 0.935 a 0.933 a 0.934 a 
a o -0.488 -0.494 -0.499 -0.697c -0.704c -0.688c -0.682b -0.678
b -0.679b 
lna lt 1.131 a 1.112 a 1.103 a 0.193 0.213 c 0.224c 0.092 0.071 0.083 
lnYt 0.388a 0.413 a 0.431 a 0.921a 0.979a 1.011 a 0.649a 0.690a 0.673a 
lnpet -0.394 a -0.404 a -0.368 a -0.556b -0.450b -0.390c -0.761 -0.714 -0.722 
Po 6.543 a 6.309 a 6.127 a 2.749b 2.227b 1.935c 4.445 4.118 4.225 
lnYt -11.185a -11.071a -10.742a 13.584a 14.418a 13.638a -23.677a -23.872 a -23.360a 
lnYt_l 1.222 a 1.209 a 1.172 a -1.576 a -1.671 a -1.584 a 2.713 a 2.735 a 2.683 a 
lngt -0.045 -0.047 -0.048 -0.355 a -0.343 a -0.360 a 0.167b 0.158 b 0.147 b 








lnkt -O.423 b -0.493b -0.488c -0.065 0.016 0.179 -0.118 -0.038 0.135 











lnet 0.425 b 0.563 b 0.568 0.182c 0.190 0.082 0.451 a 0.584 a 0.570 b 
00 2.818 a 1.535 0.977 3.538 a 2.736 a 2.543 a 1.389b -0.512 -1.653 
R2 
y 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.90 
R2 e 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
R2 • 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.98 0.98 0.98 
R2 p 0.43 0.29 0.23 0.77 0.64 0.58 0.72 0.62 0.59 
Table D2. 2: 3sls for Diesel - Manufacturing 
Variable Total inequality Between-G roup Within-Group 
pO pI p2 pO pI p2 pO pI p2 
lnalt -0.191 -0.194 -0.193 -0.071 -0.067 -0.066 0.023 0.023 0.023 
lnkt 0.059 0.061 0.059 0.002 0.008 0.010 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
lnet 0.941 a 0.939 a 0.941 a 0.998 a 0.992 a 0.990 a 1.000 a 1.001 a 1.001 a 
a o 1.624 a 1.624 a 1.624 a 1.586 a 1.588 a 1.589 a 1.656 a 1.656 a 1.656 a 
lnalt 0.358 0.364 0.361 0.110 0.090 0.092 -0.033 -0.037 -0.039 
lnYt 1.112 a 1.122 a 1.114 a 1.080 a 1.104 a 1.101 a 1.093 a 1.100 a 1.096 a 
lnpet -0.050b -0.053b -0.050b -0.014 -0.025 -0.023 -0.022 -0.023 -0.021 
Po -1.880 a -1.908 a -1.885 a -1.850 a -1.922 a -1.912 a -1.976 a -2.007 a -1.998 a 
lnYt -22.233 -21.648 
-6.661b -6.289b -5.902c 20.677 a 20.229 a 19.351 a 0 -22.079 a 0 
lnYt-l 0.738 b 0.698b 0.655c -2.335 a -2.282 a -2.181 a 2.551 a 2.536 a 2.492 a 
lngt -0.021 -0.025 -0.028 -0.351 a -0.377 a -0.402 a 0.182 b 0.178 b 0.167 b 













lnkt -0.304c -0.322 -0.247 -0.074 0.032 0.229 -0.123 -0.059 0.100 
lnalt -0.550 -0.990 -1.299 0.629 a 0.919 a 1.193 a -0.620 a -0.936 a -1.212 a 
lnet 0.290 0.355 0.253 0.236c 0.219 0.052 0.555 a 0.743 a 0.744 b 
00 3.899 a 3.010 a 2.577 a 3.891 a 3.121 a 2.740 a 2.156 a 0.454 -0.721 
R2 
y 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.93 
R2 e 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.94 
R2 • 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.98 0.98 0.98 
R2 p 0.43 0.31 0.26 0.78 0.64 0.57 0.74 0.64 0.60 
Table D2. 3: 3sls for Gas - Manufacturing 
Variable Total inequality Between-Group Within-Group 
pO pI p2 pO pI p2 pO pI p2 
lnalt -0.725 -0.724 -0.723 0.323 b 0.322 b 0.324 b -0.208c -0.205c -0.201 c 
lnkt 0.636 a 0.635 a 0.635 a 0.658 a 0.658 a 0.659 a 0.730 a 0.724 a 0.716 a 
lnet 0.364 a 0.365 a 0.365 a 0.342 a 0.342 a 0.341 a 0.270b 0.276b 0.284b 
a o 1.203 a 1.202 a 1.202 a 1.509 a 1.507 a 1.509 a 1.176 a 1.172 a 1.167 a 
lnalt 1.543 1.535 1.520 -1.256 a -1.248 a -1.246 a 1.765 a 1.739 a 1.698 a 











lnpet 0.226 0.240 0.266 -0.046 -0.046 -0.002 -0.054 0.013 0.110 
Po 3.001 c 3.031 c 3.090 c 3.158b 3.135 b 3.262 b 10.347 a 100401 a 100458 a 
lnYt -2.035 -1.690 -1.463 14.856 a 14.854 a 14.101 a -12.530 a -12.144 a -11.315 a 
lnYt-l 0.253 0.215 0.189 -1.652 a -1.650 a -1.566 a 1.495 a 1.455 a 1.370 a 
lngt -0.045 -0.050 -0.053 -0.294b -0.301b -0.299b 0.039 0.020 -0.023 
lnet 0.090 0.095 0.099 -0.259b -0.254b -0.259b 0.242 a 0.252 a 0.277 a 
Yo 3.571 2.765 2.234 -33.431 a -33.468 a -31.770 a 24.357 a 23.370 a 21.228 a 
lnkt 0.004 0.083 0.127 0.074 b 0.152 b 0.214 b 0.136 b 0.262 b 0.367 b 
lnalt 0.018 -0.164 -0.317 0.362 a 00482 a 0.680 a -0.263 b -0.405 b -0.581 b 
lnet -0.386 a -0.568 a -0.699 a -0.213 a -0.338 a -0.373 b -0.267 a -0.386 a -0.425 a 
00 5.379 a 5.120 a 4.999 a 4.767 a 4.391 a 4.001 a 4.319 a 3.580 a 2.794 a 
R2 
y 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.84 
R2 e 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.76 0.77 0.78 
R2 • 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.99 0.99 0.99 
R2 p 0.80 0.74 0.63 0.87 0.79 0.70 0.85 0.81 0.74 
Table D2. 4: 3sls for Kerosene - Manufacturing 
Variable Total inequality Between-G roup Within-Group 
po pI p2 po pI p2 po pI p2 
lna lt -1.124c -1.126c -1.124 c 0.597 b 0.588 b 0.581 b -0.524 a -0.525 a -0.524 a 
lnkt 0.980 a 0.980 a 0.980 a 1.012 a 1.011 a 1.010 a 1.037 a 1.037 a 1.037 a 
lnet 0.020 0.020 0.020 -0.012 -0.011 -0.010 -0.037 -0.037 -0.037 
ao 1.599 a 1.598 a 1.599 a 2.022 a 2.017 a 2.014 a 1.091 a 1.091 a 1.092 a 
lna lt 1.288 1.271 1.318 2.825 2.615 2.713 -7.564c -7.525 c -7.519c 
lnYt 3.946 4.077 3.910 4.562 4.888 4.613 7.095b 7.098b 6.781b 
lnpet -2.397 -2.433 -2.389 -1.996 -2.124 -2.027 -0.883 -0.896 -0.811 
Po -5.865 -6.279 -5.738 -8.590 -9.587 -8.749 -33.569b -33.489b -32.468b 
lnYt -9.448c -9.606c -9.858 c 3.243 4.822 5.709 -30.716a -30.810a -30.593 a 
lnYt-l 1.105c 1.122c 1.150c -0.308 -0.487 -0.589 3.565 a 3.574 a 3.551 a 
lngt -0.061 -0.058 -0.053 -0.483 a -00482 a -00477 a 0.043 0.048 0.043 
lnet 0.Q25 0.026 0.026 0.055 b 0.051 b 0.049 b 0.030c 0.030c 0.030c 
Yo 19.969 20.333 20.914 -9.665 -13.131 -15.053 65.166 a 65.403 a 64.896 a 
lnkt -0.075 -0.035 -0.022 0.082 c 0.152 c 0.203 c 0.215 a 0.409 a 0.620 a 
lna lt -0.032 -0.304 -0.586 0.597 a 0.833 a 1.092 a -0.520 a -0.854 a -1.261 a 
lnet 0.040 a 0.055 a 0.063 b 0.004 0.006 -0.001 0.007 0.003 -0.014 
00 4.098 a 3.238 a 2.689 a 4.090 a 3.336 a 2.889 a 2.849 a 1.294b -0.132 
R2 
y 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.85 0.85 0.85 
R2 e 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.59 0.59 0.59 
R2 • 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.98 0.98 0.98 











Table D2. 5: 3sls for Coal - Manufacturing 
Variable Total inequality Between-G roup Within-Group 
pO pI p2 pO pI p2 pO pI p2 
lna lt -1.128b -1.129b -1.131 b 0.107 0.109 0.116 -0.147 -0.147 -0.147 
lnkt 0.466 a 0.466 a 0.466 a 0.426 a 0.429 a 0.442 a 0.493 a 0.492 a 0.491 a 
lnet O.534 a 0.534 a 0.534 a 0.574 a 0.571 a 0.558 a 0.507 a 0.508 a 0.509 a 
a o 0.297 0.296 0.296 0.354 0.362 0.397 0.311 0.310 0.307 
lna lt 2.473 a 2.479 a 2.489 a 0.410 0.399 0.386 0.285 0.282 0.275 
lnYt 0.655 b 0.651 b 0.647b 1.141 a 1.152 a 1.i77 a 0.787 0.785 0.788 
lnpet -0.134 -0.130 -0.127 0.008 -0.016 -0.061 -0.180 -0.174 -0.167 
Po 3.114 a 3.112 a 3.115 a 0.343 0.413 0.522 2.834 2.804 2.749 
lnYt -4.871b -4.688b -4.380b 17.739 a 17.7SS a 16.740 a -21.752 a -21.672 a -21.205 a 
lnYt_l 0.551 b 0.531 b 0.497b -1.978 a -1.978 a -1.866 a 2.513 a 2.504 a 2.456 a 
lngt -0.019 -0.019 -0.021 -0.433 a -0.441 a -0.444 a 0.161 b 0.160 b 0.143 b 












lnkt -0.131 -0.099 -0.111 0.129b 0.273 b 0.377b O.169c 0.340 b 0.458b 
lna lt -0.405 -0.735 -1.083 0.643 a 0.937 a 1.205 a -0.569 a -0.848 a -1.104 a 
lnet 0.009 -0.021 0.008 -0.055 -0.136 -0.183 0.083 0.074 0.112 
00 4.193 a 3.512 a 2.881b 4.276 a 3.772 a 3.426 a 2.511 a 1.111 c -0.121 
R2 
y 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.80 0.80 0.80 
R2 e 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.68 0.68 0.68 
R2 • 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.98 0.98 0.98 
R2 p 0.42 0.32 0.28 0.79 0.70 0.64 0.66 0.60 0.60 
Table D3. 1: 3sls for Electricity - Agriculture 
Variable Total inequality Between-Group Within-Group 
pO pI p2 pO pI p2 pO pI p2 
lnalt 0.039 0.036 0.034 -0.417e -0.416 e -0.416e 0.189 0.188 0.188 
lnkt 0.384 b 0.379
b 0.377 b 0.500 a 0.493 a 0.491 a 0.470 a 0.465 a 0.463 a 
lnet 0.616 a 0.621 a 0.623 a 0.500 a 0.507 a 0.509 a 0.530 a 0.535 a 0.537 a 
a o -1.044a -1.051 a -1.054a -1.195 a -1.203 a -1.206a -0.776 a -0.784a -0.787
a 
lnalt 1.152 1.157 1.155 0.372 0.360 0.359 -0.115 -0.105 -0.100 
lnYt 0.979 a 0.974 a 0.972 a 1.031 a 1.041 a 1.045 a 0.986 a 0.980 a 0.980 a 
lnpet 0.127 0.112 0.105 -0.242 -0.175 -0.154 -0.247 -0.236 -0.223 
Po 1.340 1.386 1.408 2.430 2.230 2.170 2.145 2.132 2.103 
lnYt -0.369 -0.264 -0.215 1.667 a 1.614 a 1.557 a -1.646b -1.461 b -1.375 b 
lnYt_l 0.098 0.068 0.052 -0.641 a -0.626 a -0.602 a 0.583b 0.520 b 0.484b 
lngt 0.128b 0.118b 0.116b -0.328 a -0.326 a -0.336 a 0.595 a 0.597 a 0.608 a 
lnet 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.238 a 0.240 a 0.241 a -0.205b -0.205 b -0.202 b 






lnkt 0.004 0.020 0.016 0.069 0.093 0.109 0.024 0.039 0.041 











lnet -0.154c -0.224c -0.286c -0.063 -0.107 -0.161 -0.053 -0.102 -0.150 
00 4.324 a 3.784 a 3.484 a 4.302 a 3.738 a 3.426 a 3.795 a 3.165 a 2.798 a 
R2 
y 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.66 
R2 e 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.67 
R2 • 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.89 0.90 0.90 
R2 p 0.39 0.33 0.32 0.81 0.69 0.63 0.67 0.57 0.53 
Table D3. 2: 3sls for Diesel - Agriculture 
Variable Total inequality Between-Group Within-Group 
pO pI p2 pO pI p2 pO pI p2 
lnalt 2.719 a 2.746 a 2.753 a -1.169 a -1.171 a -1.173 a 0.834 a 0.834 a 0.833 a 
lnkt 0.254 0.240 0.236 0.084 0.087 0.085 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
lnet 0.746 a 0.760 a 0.764 a 0.916 a 0.913 a 0.915 a 1.002 a 1.003 a 1.001 a 
a o -1.708 a -1.740 a -1.748 a -3.120 a -3.116 a -3.122 a -1.782 a -1.783 a -1.780 a 
lnalt -0.876 -0.930 -0.946 0.851 a 0.837 a 0.828 a -0.814 a -0.813 a -0.798 a 
lnYt 0.904 a 0.903 a 0.905 a 0.940 a 0.941 a 0.945 a 1.000 a 1.001 a 1.002 a 
lnpet -O.l27b -0.121b -0.120b -0.051 -0.055 -0.059 -0.005 -0.006 -0.011 
Po 3.148 a 3.120 a 3.112 a 3.411 a 3.419 a 3.423 a 1.818 a 1.822 a 1.854 a 
lnYt 0.094 0.116 0.088 1.052 c 0.796 0.619 -0.276 -0.067 0.007 
lnYt-l -0.010 -0.019 -0.011 -0.452 b -0.390b -0.337b 0.258 0.195 0.166 
lngt 0.074 0.076 0.079 -0.204b -0.166c -0.161 c 0.321 b 0.312 b 0.319b 
lnet -0.075 -0.073 -0.071 0.271 b 0.310 b 0.325b -0.543 a -0.558 a -0.557 a 
Yo 0.200 0.183 0.201 -2.582 a -2.447






lnkt -0.119 -0.137 -0.146 0.051 0.071 0.080 0.078 0.086 0.109 
lnalt -0.742 c -0.923 c -1.122 0.512 a 0.644 a 0.743 a -0.319 a -0.386 a -0.459b 
lnet 0.027 -0.012 -0.084 -0.083 -0.149 -0.231 -0.142 -0.200 -0.287 
00 3.934 a 3.379 a 3.175 a 4.504 a 4.098 a 3.986 a 4.056 a 3.489 a 3.240 a 
R2 
y 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.87 0.87 0.87 
R2 e 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.68 0.68 0.69 
R2 • 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.89 0.89 0.89 
R2 p 0.38 0.33 0.32 0.78 0.66 0.60 0.67 0.57 0.53 
Table D3. 3: 3sls for Kerosene - Agriculture 
Variable Total inequality Between-Group Within-Group 
pO pI p2 pO pI p2 pO pI p2 
lnalt 0.678 0.684 0.685 -0.361 -0.363 -0.363 0.204 0.205 0.205 
lnkt 0.830 a 0.830 a 0.830 a 0.876 a 0.877 a 0.877 a 0.868 a 0.868 a 0.868 a 
lnet 0.170 b 0.170 b 0.170b 0.124 0.123 0.123 0.132 0.132 0.132 
a o -0.060 -0.060 -0.060 -0.397 c -0.399c -0.399c 0.039 0.039 0.039 
lnalt -0.603 -0.567 -0.477 2.278 c 2.243 c 2.248 c -1.374 -1.303 -1.201 
lnYt 1.963 a 2.000 a 2.037 a 2.5 76 a 2.628 a 2.655 a 2.407 a 2.450 a 2.463 a 











Po -1.214 -1.192 -1.144 _1.0gg e -1.070c -1.066c -3.845 -3.675 -3.437 
lnYt -0.167 -0.003 0.099 1.829b 1.490 1.293 -0.835 -0.518 -0.357 
lnYt-l 0.044 -0.001 -0.031 -0.648b -0.554b -O.492 c 0.315 0.221 0.169 
lngt 0.133 b 0.119 b O.l13 c -0.293 a -0.271b -0.273b 0.543 a 0.532 a 0.534 a 
lnet -0.018 -0.Q25 -0.029 0.028 0.044 0.054 -0.092 -0.107 -O.114c 
Yo 0.262 0.110 0.022 -2.360 a -2.061b -1.923b 0.460 0.203 0.092 
lnkt -0.189b -0.263 b -0.313 b -0.047 -0.093 -0.132 -0.078 -0.139 -0.186 
lnalt -O.S87 e -0.702 -0.817 0.485 a 0.586 a 0.651 a -0.271 a -0.315 a -0.351b 
lnet 0.004 0.009 -0.003 0.023 0.032 0.027 0.022 0.033 0.030 
00 4.165 a 3.551 a 3.148 a 4.299 a 3.714 a 3.342 a 3.776 a 3.108 a 2.669 a 
R2 
y 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.69 
R2 e 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.59 
R2 • 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.90 0.90 0.90 
R2 p 0.34 0.29 0.27 0.80 0.69 0.62 0.68 0.58 0.53 
Table D3. 4: 3sls for Coal - Agriculture 
Variable Total inequality Between-G roup Within-Group 
po pI p2 po pI p2 po pI p2 
lnalt 0.037 0.035 0.033 -0.437 -0.436 -0.434 0.183 0.181 0.178 
lnkt 1.045 a 1.045 a 1.045 a 0.998 a 0.998 a 0.999 a 1.021 a 1.021 a 1.022 a 
lnet -0.045 -0.045 -0.045 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.021 -0.021 -0.022 
ao -0.232 a -0.232 a -0.232 a -0.530 -0.530 -0.528 -0.073 -0.075 -0.077 
lnalt -7.63S c -7.641 c -7.661 c 6.960 a 6.981 a 6.972 a -5.602 a -S.579 a -5.574 a 
lnYt -2.095 b -2.113b -2.143b 0.180 0.176 0.156 -0.018 -0.054 -0.100 
lnpe t 0.983 1.011 1.056 1.022 1.046 1.065 2.745 b 2.765 b 2.824b 
Po -1.280 -1.399 -1.588 0.768 0.669 0.596 -17.402b -17.438b -17.665b 
lnYt -0.061 -0.011 -0.050 0.752 0.697 0.662 -0.744 -0.612 -0.643 
lnYt-l -0.001 -0.Q18 -0.005 -0.264 -0.250 -0.240 0.230 0.184 0.192 
lngt 0.103 0.101 0.103 -O.166c -O. lSS c -O.lS0c 0.409 a 0.404 a 0.409 a 
lnet -0.015 -0.017 -0.016 0.081 a 0.083 a 0.083 a -0.081 b -0.085b -0.084 b 
Yo 0.168 0.130 0.161 -1.545 b -1.484b -1.449b 0.354 0.258 0.290 
lnkt -0.091 b -O.126c -O.188e -0.017 -0.046 -0.082 -0.060 -0.112 -0.160 
lnalt 0.041 0.150 0.105 0.327 b 0.358 O.556c -0.055 0.010 -0.040 
lnet 0.060 a 0.080 a 0.085 b 0.024 0.035 0.014 0.054 b 0.081 b O.078e 
00 3.974 a 3.291 a 2.896 a 4.129 a 3.462 a 3.200 a 3.882 a 3.265 a 2.817 a 
R2 
y 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 
R2 e 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.76 0.76 0.76 
R2 • 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.89 0.89 0.89 











Table D4. 1: 3sls for Electricity - Mining 
Variable Total inequality Between-Group Within-Group 
pO pI p2 pO pI p2 pO pI p2 
lnalt 1.019 a 1.027 a 1.056 a -O.379 a -0.392 a -00401 a 0.290 a 0.297 a 0.309 a 











lne t 0.924 a 0.926 a 0.934 a 0.921 a 0.931 a 0.940 a 0.953 a 0.960 a 0.971 a 
a o -0.283b -0.286b -0.301 b -0.618 a -0.650 a -0.676 a -O.173 a -0.182 a -0.198 a 
lnalt -0.219 -0.221 -0.236 0.155 0.159 0.164 -0.022 -0.017 -0.013 
lnYt 0.911 a 0.906 a 0.898 a 0.917 a 0.909 a 0.904 a 0.827 a 0.818 a 0.809 a 
lnpet O.326c O.303 c 0.260 0.263 b O.222c 0.189 0.161b O.13gC 0.116 
Po 0.056 0.140 0.289 0.321 0.468 0.581 0.880b 0.985 b 1.089b 
lnYt 1.238 1.120 1.151 5.027b 4.440b 4.197b -0.975 -0.536 0.041 
lnYt_l -0.112 -0.099 -0.101 -0.555 b -0.496b -0.467b 0.161 0.121 0.059 
lng t -0.060 -0.059 -0.063 -O.272 c -O.2S0c -O.26S c O.130c O.08ge 0.085 
lne t 0.033 0.028 0.026 0.151 0.157 0.137 -0.Q25 -0.040 -0.021 
Yo -3.649 -3.351 -3.437 -13.172b -l1.721b -l1.145b 0.504 -0.645 -2.080 
lnk t 0.078 0.150 0.169 0.095 b 0.162 b O. 177c 0.166 a 0.262 a 0.332 b 
lnalt 0.188 -0.007 -0.116 0.439 a 0.565 a 0.765 a -0.400b -O.577b -0.881b 
lne t -0.427 a -0.591 a -0.663 a -0.204b -0.328b -0.307 -0.220b -O.309C -0.231 
00 5.881 a S.772 a 5.592 a 4.980 a 4.783 a 4.290 a 4.199 a 3.503 a 2.146 
R2 
y 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
R2 e 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 
R2 • 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.92 0.92 0.92 
R2 p 0.69 0.60 0.50 0.83 0.72 0.63 0.79 0.73 0.67 
Table D4. 2: 3sls for Liquid Petroleum - Mining 
Variable Total inequality Between-Group Within-Group 
pO pI p2 pO pI p2 pO pI p2 
lnalt -4.280 a -4.283 a -4.278 a 1.491 a 1.500 a 1.503 a -1.117 a -1.117 a -1.122 a 
lnkt 0.243 0.241 0.242 0.049 0.049 0.051 0.048 0.048 0.042 
lnet 0.757 a 0.759 a 0.758 a 0.951 a 0.951 a 0.949 a 0.952 a 0.952 a 0.958 a 






lnalt 1.286 1.308 1.370 -0.031 -0.001 0.001 0.823 b 0.832b 0.866b 
lnYt 1.375 a 1.372 a 1.370 a 1.525 a 1.500 a 1.483 a 1.188 a 1.183 a 1.150 a 
lnpet 0.094 0.094 0.089 0.097 0.114 0.122 0.017 0.016 0.020 
Po -3.250 a -3.231 a -3.193 a -4.068 a -4.013 a -3.969 a -1.415 -1.380 -1.216 
lnYt 0.442 0.408 0.607 6.092 b 5.260b 4.556c -3.387 -2.865 -2.037 
lnYt_l -0.041 -0.037 -0.057 -0.638b -0.555b -0.483 b 0.366 0.314 0.228 
lngt -0.140 -0.139 -0.148 -0.333 c -0.312 c -0.330c 0.125 0.067 0.031 
lnet 0.142c 0. 142 c 0. 142c -0.055 -0.044 -0.014 0.262 c 0.282 c 0.296c 
Yo -1.917 -1.831 -2.333 -15.409b -13.365b -11.768c 6.213 4.762 2.687 











lnalt 0.485 0.463 0.492 0.466 a 0.604 a 0.775 a -0.492 a -0.727 a -1.022 a 
lnet -0.213 a -0.291 a -0.349 a -0.034 -0.066 -0.065 -0.011 -0.004 0.019 
00 4.452 a 3.822 a 3.435 a 4.256 a 3.620 a 3.204 a 3.196 a 2.049 a 0.996 
R2 
y 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.85 0.85 0.85 
R2 e 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 
R2 • 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.92 0.92 0.92 
R2 p 0.49 0.39 0.36 0.78 0.66 0.61 0.74 0.67 0.65 
Table D4. 3: 3sls for Coal - Mining 
Variable Total inequality Between-Group Within-Group 
pO pI p2 pO pI p2 pO pI p2 
lnalt -3.324 a -3.322 a -3.323 a 0.747 b 0.747b 0.747b -0.715 a -0.715 a -0.716 a 
lnkt 0.959 a 0.959 a 0.960 a 0.987 a 0.987 a 0.987 a 0.930 a 0.930 a 0.929 a 
lnet 0.041 0.041 0.040 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.070 0.070 0.071 
a o 1.391 a 1.391 a 1.391 a 2.172 a 2.172 a 2.172 a 1.005 a 1.005 a 1.004 a 
lnalt 0.895 0.903 0.822 0.239 0.246 0.240 -1.365 -1.353 -1.345 
lnYt 1.588 1.551 1.499 1.546 1.563 1.524 2.485 2.491 2.487 
lnpet 1.962 2.029 2.163 2.436 2.410 2.480 2.194 2.163 2.160 
Po - - -





lnYt 0.907 1.023 1.269 6.765 b 6.484b 6.667b -3.229 -2.852 -2.749 
lnYt_l -0.071 -0.082 -0.109 -0.721b -0.690b -0.702 b 0.398 0.361 0.346 
lngt -0.111 -0.117 -0.115 -0.353 c -0.362 c -0.415 b 0.165 0.145 0.174 
lnet 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.018 0.018 0.019 -0.019 -0.018 -0.019 
Yo -
-2.932 -3.225 -3.792 -17.039b -16.414b 17.063
b 
5.811 4.843 4.720 
lnkt -0.087c -0.093 -0.140 0.030 0.046 0.033 0.141 b O.22Ob 0.285b 
lnalt 0.236 0.092 0.111 0.491 a 0.662 a 0.879 a -0.518 a -0.753 a -1.037 a 
lnet -0.039c -0.049 -0.041 -0.017 -0.019 0.002 -0.019 -0.021 -0.001 
00 4.318 a 3.635 a 3.259 a 4.221 a 3.579 a 3.209 a 3.111 a 1.959 a 0.968c 
R2 
y 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.72 0.72 0.72 
R2 e 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 
R2 • 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.91 0.91 0.91 
R2 p 0.50 0.39 0.30 0.81 0.68 0.60 0.78 0.70 0.65 
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